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The Count the Costs initiative: 
aims and activities
 
Documenting the costs
The Count the Costs initiative aims to highlight the negative 
impacts of the war on drugs in key policy areas: security, 
development, human rights, public health, stigma and 
discrimination, crime, economics, children and young 
people, and the environment.
Although governments and the UN have failed to 
systematically evaluate the costs of the war on drugs, 
there is nonetheless a substantial body of research 
available to demonstrate their scale and scope. In addition 
to this report, other resources documenting the costs of 
current drug policy can be found on the Count the Costs 
website, www.countthecosts.org, where many materials 
are available in both Spanish and Russian. You can also 
follow @CounttheCosts on Twitter and “like” the initiative 
on Facebook at www.facebook.com/countthecosts. 
Reaching out to a wider audience of civil 
society groups and policy makers
A key aim of the initiative is to encourage wider 
engagement in the debate on drug policy reform, 
particularly for organisations and individuals whose 
work is impacted by the war on drugs but have historically 
steered clear of the issue. The briefings that comprise 
the Alternative World Drug Report, 2nd edition are the 
primary tool for achieving this. An additional element of 
this outreach is to build up individual and organisational 
endorsements for the Count the Costs statement, which 
calls upon world leaders and UN agencies to quantify 
the negative consequences of the current approach to 
drugs, and to assess the potential costs and benefits of 
alternative policies. Over 100 NGOs and civil society 
groups have already offered their support (check the 
website for details). 
Promoting debate on alternatives based on 
the best possible evidence and analysis
The call on governments to count the costs of their war 
on drugs and consider alternative approaches is not 
an endorsement of any one policy position. Rather, it 
highlights the need for scrutiny of current policy and 
exploration of evidence-based alternatives, with a view 
to putting in place less costly policies. Acknowledging 
and systematically assessing these costs is the first step 
to informing the vital debate over future developments of 
drug policy and law.
Supporters of Count the Costs have a range of often 
divergent views regarding these alternatives. However, 
there is consensus on the following:
• That the harms of current approaches can no longer 
remain un-scrutinised by those responsible for them
• That reform is needed
• That alternatives need to be assessed and debated 
using the best possible evidence and analysis
  
Count the Costs initiative sign-on statement
www.countthecosts.org/take-action/sign-our-statement  
The war on drugs is a policy choice. 
There are other options that, at the 
very least, should be debated and 
explored using the best possible 
evidence and analysis. We all share 
the same goals – a safer, healthier and 
more just world. Therefore, we the 
undersigned, call upon world leaders 
and UN agencies to quantify the 
unintended negative consequences 
of the current approach to drugs, 
and assess the potential costs and 
benefits of alternative approaches.

9Wasting billions, undermining economiesThreatening public health, spreading disease and death
9
Executive 
summary
10
The Alternative World Drug Report, 2nd edition
Executive summary
Fifty years ago, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs cemented an enforcement based approach into 
an international legal framework that remains largely 
unchanged to this day. The Count the Costs initiative was 
launched in 2011 to mark this anniversary, and calls on 
policy makers to review the costs of maintaining the 
current regime, and compare it with alternatives that 
could achieve better outcomes.
The costs of drug misuse itself have been well documented 
and ever present on the agenda of high level political 
discourse. In contrast, the serious negative impacts of 
drug policy enforcement are left largely unevaluated 
and ignored, despite the fact that the current approach, 
with its aspirational goal of creating a “drug-free world”, 
has demonstrably failed on its own terms. This report 
estimates that enforcing global prohibition costs at 
least $100 billion a year, and far from eliminating use, 
supply and production, up to 246 million people now use 
drugs worldwide, contributing to a global market with a 
turnover of $320 billion a year.
The current global drug control system, administered and 
overseen by the UN, is predicated upon police and military 
enforcement against producers, suppliers and users – a 
“war on drugs” in popular discourse. But, as this report 
demonstrates, this approach is fatally undermining all of 
the “three pillars” that underpin the UN’s work – peace 
and security, development and human rights.
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has 
acknowledged that current international drug policy is 
having a range of negative “unintended consequences”, 
including: the creation of a huge criminal market; the 
displacement of production and transit to new areas (the 
“balloon effect”); the diversion of resources from health 
to enforcement; the displacement of use to new drugs; 
and the stigmatisation and marginalisation of people who 
use drugs.
However, despite acknowledging these problems, neither 
the UN nor its member states have sought to discover 
if the intended consequences of the current system 
outweigh the unintended consequences. These costs are 
not systematically assessed or detailed in the UNODC’s 
annual “World Drug Report”, which is based primarily on 
self-reporting from member states via the Annual Report 
Questionnaires. Despite recent improvements these do 
not include questions on many key policy impacts, and 
government self reporting responses are incomplete and 
biased. These shortcomings reflect the problems implicit 
in self reporting on a system by those who oversee, 
enforce and champion it.
This Alternative World Drug Report has been produced 
by the Count the Costs initiative to describe these 
enforcement related costs, and to start to fill the gap left 
by official government and UN evaluations.
Recent political developments suggest there is a growing 
demand for a more balanced and comprehensive 
evaluation of the wider impacts of current drug law 
enforcement strategies, and also for evidence-based 
exploration of possible alternative approaches. In 
particular, the debate on the future of international drug 
control has moved decisively into the political and media 
mainstream for the first time. This phenomenon is now 
reaching critical mass as member states move into a new 
era following the 2016 UN General Assembly Special 
Session on the World Drug Problem and into negotiations 
for the new 2019 global drug strategy.
In keeping with this new era, this report also outlines 
all the major policy options available to governments, 
and suggests that countries individually and collectively 
engage in reviews that scrutinise the effectiveness of the 
current system, and compare it with alternatives that 
could achieve better outcomes.
Ultimately, this report represents a call to apply science 
to an area of policy that has eschewed adequate scrutiny 
for far too long. The world is increasingly willing and 
able to count the costs of the war on drugs, explore the 
alternatives and gradually move towards the shared goal 
of a healthier, safer world.
1. Barack Obama, quoted in Calmes, J. (2012) ‘Obama Says 
Legalization Is Not the Answer on Drugs’, The New York Times, 
14.04.14. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/15/world/americas/
obama-says-legalization-is-not-the-answer-on-drugs.html
“I think it is entirely legitimate to have a 
conversation about whether the [drug] 
laws in place are ones that are doing 
more harm than good in certain places.”
1
 
Barack Obama
President of the United States
2012
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There is an absence of evidence that either supply-side or 
user-level enforcement interventions have dramatically 
reduced or eliminated use. Instead, drug-related risks 
are increased and new harms created – with the greatest 
burden carried by the most vulnerable populations.
2. Undermining peace 
and security
The UN attempts to promote the security of its member 
states through implementing a drug control system that 
treats the use of certain drugs as an “existential threat” 
to society. But this approach is having the opposite effect: 
it is undermining peace and security by creating a huge 
criminal market that enriches criminal organisations to 
such an extent that in many regions their power threatens 
the state.
• As the UNODC has identified, the collision of rising 
demand with a prohibitionist global drugs control 
system has created a “criminal market of staggering 
proportions” that is undermining governance, 
stability and the rule of law across the world – but 
particularly in developing and middle-income 
countries that are centres of drug production or 
along key trafficking routes
• To secure and expand their business interests, 
criminal organisations invest in the intimidation 
and corruption of police and public officials, 
undermining civic institutions and fostering a 
culture of impunity
• In the absence of formal regulation, violence is the 
default regulatory tool within the illicit drug trade, 
and is endemic in key producer and transit regions. 
Supply-side drug law enforcement often increases 
rather than decreases violence – by internally 
destabilising criminal organisations or established 
markets 
• Illicit drug profits fund the increasing weaponisation 
of criminal organisations that are in many cases now 
able to outgun law enforcers. Drug money can also 
fuel conflict by providing funding for paramilitary 
and terrorist organisations. State enforcement itself 
has become increasingly violent and militarised 
as the arms race with criminal organisations has 
evolved
• Expanding domestic enforcement budgets, and 
aid for militarised drug responses, have serious 
1. Threatening public health, 
spreading disease and death
While the war on drugs has primarily been promoted as 
a way of protecting health, it has in reality achieved the 
opposite. It has not only failed in its key aim of significantly 
reducing or eliminating drug use, but has increased 
risks and created new health harms – while establishing 
political and practical obstacles to effective public health 
interventions that might reduce these harms. 
• Prevention and harm reduction messages are 
undermined by the criminalisation of target 
populations, leading to distrust and stigmatisation 
• Criminalisation encourages high-risk drug-using 
behaviours, such as injecting in unhygienic, 
unsupervised environments
• Enforcement tilts the market towards more potent 
but profitable drug products. It can also fuel 
the emergence of new, high-risk drugs (or novel 
psychoactive substances – NPS) , and domestically 
manufactured drugs
• Illegally produced and supplied drugs are of 
unknown strength and purity, increasing the risk of 
overdose, poisoning and infection
• The emotive politics of the drug war, and 
stigmatisation of drug users, has created obstacles to 
the provision of effective harm reduction services, 
which, despite proven cost-effectiveness, remain 
unavailable in many parts of the world. This fuels 
overdose deaths, the spread of HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, 
and tuberculosis among people who inject drugs
• The growing population of people who use drugs in 
prisons has created a particularly acute health crisis, 
as prisons are high-risk environments, inadequately 
equipped to deal with the health challenges they face 
• The development impacts of the war on drugs have 
had much wider negative impacts on health service 
provision, with billions diverted from proven health 
programmes into counterproductive enforcement
• Drug-war politics have had a chilling effect on the 
provision of opiates for pain relief and palliative 
care, with over five billion people having little or no 
access to the medicines they need
 
12
The Alternative World Drug Report, 2nd edition
While there are some marginal economic benefits from 
the illicit drug trade in producer and transit regions, 
these are hugely outweighed by the wider negative 
development costs. The development impacts of the global 
war on drugs have long been overlooked, a situation only 
now changing beginning to change, as governments, UN 
agencies and NGOs working on development issues are 
belatedly waking up to the growing crisis. 
4. Undermining human rights
Human rights are only mentioned once in the three 
UN drug conventions, reflecting their historical 
marginalisation in drug law politics and enforcement. 
The war on drugs is severely undermining human rights 
in every region of the world, through the erosion of civil 
liberties and fair trial standards, the demonisation of 
individuals and groups, and the imposition of abusive and 
inhuman punishments. 
• While there is no specific right to use drugs, the 
criminalisation of consenting adult behaviours 
engaged in by hundreds of millions of people 
impacts on a range of human rights, including the 
right to health, privacy, and freedom of belief and 
practice
• Punishments for drug possession/use are ineffective, 
and frequently grossly disproportionate, resulting in 
incarceration in many countries
• The erosion of due process when dealing with drug 
offenders is widespread, involving parallel justice 
systems, the presumption of guilt (reversing the 
burden of proof), and detention without trial 
• Various forms of torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment are widely applied for 
arrested or suspected drug offenders. These include: 
beatings, death threats to extract information, 
extortion of money or confessions, judicial corporal 
punishment, and various abuses in the name 
of “treatment” – including denial of access to 
healthcare, denial of food, sexual abuse, isolation 
and forced labour
• The death penalty for drug offences is illegal 
under international law but is still retained by 
33 jurisdictions, executing around 1,000 people a 
year. Illegal extrajudicial targeted killings of drug 
traffickers also remain common 
opportunity costs, starving health and social 
development programmes of resources
• The displacement (rather than eradication) of drug 
production and trafficking following enforcement 
efforts has only served to exacerbate and disperse 
negative security impacts more widely
Ironically, the UN, an organisation set up to protect 
member states from the security threats created by wars, 
is now overseeing a war on drugs that is itself undermining 
peace and security across the world.
3. Undermining development
Criminal drug producers and traffickers naturally seek 
to operate in marginal and underdeveloped regions, 
where vulnerable populations can be exploited and 
weak authorities kept at bay. The corruption, violence, 
conflict and instability that follow undermine social and 
economic growth and can lock regions into a spiral of 
underdevelopment. 
• Illegal drug markets are characterised by violence 
between criminal organisations and police or 
military, or between rival criminal organisations 
– problems only made worse by the intensification 
of enforcement efforts. Drug profits also provide 
a ready supply of income for various insurgent, 
paramilitary and terrorist organisations
• Criminal organisations seeking to protect and 
expand their business invest heavily in corrupting 
– and further weakening – all levels of government, 
police and judiciary 
• Investment is deterred from affected regions, 
while limited aid budgets are directed into drug 
law enforcement and away from health and 
development
• Resulting underdevelopment contributes to the 
spread of HIV and wider health costs 
• Fragile ecosystems are destroyed by producers in 
order to grow drug crops, and by crop eradications 
carried out by law enforcement
• Human rights violations carried out in the name of 
drug control become commonplace
13
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• Punitive drug law enforcement has led to a dramatic 
expansion in the prison population, with growing 
numbers also held in mandatory “drug detention” 
centres under the banner of “treatment” 
• The right to health – in terms of access to healthcare 
and harm reduction – is frequently denied to people 
who use drugs, particularly in prison environments 
• Attempts to protect children’s rights using drug law 
enforcement, however well intentioned, have had 
the opposite effect, putting them in jeopardy on 
multiple fronts
• Cultural and indigenous rights have been 
undermined through the criminalisation of 
traditional practices such as coca chewing by laws 
formulated without the participation of affected 
populations
The main claim for any human rights benefit of 50 years 
of prohibition-based international drug control, is that 
while it has not prevented overall drug use from rising, 
it has kept levels of use lower than they would otherwise 
have been, so contributing to the right to health. However, 
this argument is unsustainable given the overwhelming 
evidence of the significant health harms created and 
exacerbated by the war on drugs, even before related 
human rights abuses are considered.
5. Creating crime, enriching 
criminals
Squeezing the supply of prohibited drugs in the context 
of high and growing demand inflates prices, providing 
a lucrative opportunity for criminal entrepreneurs. The 
war on drugs has created an illegal trade with an annual 
turnover of more than $320 billion. The level of criminality 
associated with the illegal trade is in stark contrast to the 
parallel legal trade for medical uses of many of the same 
drugs. 
• A significant proportion of street crime is related to 
the illegal drug trade: rival gangs fighting for control 
of the market, and robbery committed by people 
with drug dependencies fundraising to support their 
habit
• Millions of otherwise law-abiding, consenting people 
who use drugs are criminalised for their lifestyle 
choices
• The criminal justice-led approach has caused an 
explosion in the prison population of drug and drug-
related offenders
• Drugs are now the world’s largest illegal commodity 
market, enriching organised crime groups and 
fuelling money laundering and corruption
• Violence is inherent to the illegal drug trade. Aside 
from conflicts with drug law enforcers, violence is 
used to enforce the payment of debts and to protect 
or expand criminal enterprises
• Evidence suggests that more vigorous enforcement 
exacerbates violence. Drug profits also fuel regional 
conflict by helping to arm insurgent, paramilitary 
and terrorist groups
• The war on drugs has provided a smokescreen for 
various forms of illegal government action, including 
torture, and the use of the death penalty and judicial 
corporal punishment for drug offenders 
• The costs of proactive drug law enforcement are 
dwarfed by the reactive costs of dealing with the 
crime it fuels 
There is little evidence of a deterrent effect from drug 
law enforcement targeted at people who use drugs, 
or of significant impacts in reducing long-term drug 
availability from supply-side enforcement – displacement 
is the best that can be achieved. Using drug-related crime 
as a justification for the war on drugs is unsustainable 
given the key role of enforcement in fuelling the illegal 
trade and related criminality in the first place. Separating 
the health and social costs created by drug misuse from 
the crime costs created by drug policy is a vital first step 
towards improving community safety.
6. Wasting billions, undermining 
economies
Ever-expanding drug law enforcement budgets often 
temporarily squeeze drug supply while demand continues 
to grow. The result is inflated drug prices and the creation 
of a profit opportunity that has fuelled the emergence of 
a vast illegal trade controlled by criminal entrepreneurs. 
This has a range of negative impacts on local and global 
economies.
• Estimating global spending on drug law enforcement 
is difficult (due to poor data, inclusion criteria, 
14
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• Criminalisation limits employment prospects and 
reduces access to welfare and healthcare, further 
reducing life chances and compromising the health 
and wellbeing of vulnerable populations
• At its most extreme, the stigma associated with drug 
crimes can dehumanise and provide justification for 
serious abuses, including torture
• Drug law enforcement has frequently become a 
conduit for discrimination or institutionalised racial 
prejudice, with certain minorities overrepresented 
in arrests and prison populations
• Vulnerable women drawn into trafficking are 
subject to disproportionately harsh sentencing, while 
women who use drugs are also frequently subject to 
abuse, denied access to healthcare, and arbitrarily 
denied parenting rights
• Children and young people carry a disproportionate 
burden of the costs of the war on drugs. As 
drug users, they are exposed to additional risks 
and denied access to healthcare, and through 
involvement in, or contact with, criminal markets, 
they are subject to violence and abuse from both 
criminals and law enforcers 
• International law has effectively criminalised entire 
cultures with longstanding histories of growing and 
using certain drug crops
Poverty and social deprivation increase the potential 
negative impact of drug use and the likelihood of both 
coming into contact with law enforcement and being 
involved in the illicit trade. Some argue that criminalising 
and stigmatising drug users sends a useful message of 
social disapproval, yet there is no evidence for this having 
any significant deterrent effect, and it is not the role of 
criminal law to serve as a form of public education. 
8. Harming, not protecting, 
children and young people
Punitive responses to drugs have long been justified 
on the basis of child protection. But not only have they 
failed in their central goal of significantly reducing or 
eradicating drug availability and use, they have also 
increased the risks faced by children and young people 
who do use drugs, and created a range of new harms that 
impact disproportionately on the most vulnerable. 
etc.), but is likely to be well in excess of $100 billion 
annually
• In terms of achieving the stated aims of 
enforcement, this spending has been extremely poor 
value for money, causing displacement, rather than 
eradication, of illegal activities, falling drug prices, 
and rising availability
• Enforcement spending incurs opportunity costs in 
other areas of public expenditure, including other 
police priorities, drug-related health interventions 
and social programmes
• The illegal trade is estimated to turn over more than 
$320 billion annually
• Profits from this trade undermine the legitimate 
economy through corruption, money laundering, 
and the fuelling of regional conflicts – problems 
most evident in already vulnerable regions where 
the illicit drug activity is concentrated
• The illicit drug trade creates a hostile environment 
for legitimate business interests, deterring 
investment and tourism, creating sector volatility 
and unfair competition (associated with money 
laundering), as well as wider, destabilising 
macroeconomic distortions 
• There are some localised economic benefits from the 
illicit trade, although profits are mostly accrued in 
consumer countries, and by those at the top of the 
criminal hierarchies. Key beneficiaries of the war on 
drugs are military, police and prisons budgets, and 
related technological and infrastructural interests
 
7. Promoting stigma and 
discrimination
Criminalisation remains a primary weapon in the war 
on drugs. But using the criminal justice system as the 
primary tool to address a public health problem has 
not only proven ineffective, it is also socially corrosive, 
promoting stigmatisation and discrimination, the burden 
of which is carried primarily by already marginalised or 
vulnerable populations.
• The criminalisation of people who use drugs fuels 
various forms of discrimination, which is made 
worse by populist drug-war rhetoric and media 
stereotyping and misinformation 
15
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• There is no evidence that increasingly punitive 
approaches are an effective deterrent – but there 
is substantial evidence that they can increase risky 
behaviours, tilt markets towards more risky drug 
products of unknown strength and purity, and create 
obstacles to accessing harm reduction and treatment 
services
• There is evidence that accurate, targeted education 
and prevention programmes can be effective at 
reducing some health harms, but even the best 
interventions will be undermined by the stigma and 
alienation fostered by punitive enforcement and 
criminalisation
• Children and young people who use drugs, or who 
are arrested or suspected of drug offences, are more 
likely to come into contact with law enforcers than 
other groups. Once arrested, they are frequently 
subjected to imprisonment and serious forms of 
cruel and unusual punishment – including torture, 
sexual abuse, and denial of access to healthcare
• Punitive “zero tolerance” drug policies in schools 
and colleges – particularly including random drug 
testing, sniffer dogs, and harsh punishments such as 
exclusions, are not only ineffective, but can further 
undermine the prospects of already vulnerable and 
marginalised young people
• The unnecessary and disproportionate punishment, 
criminalisation and incarceration of adults for drug 
offences (particularly women), or death and illness 
from avoidable drug harms, can have disastrous 
implications for children and young people in their 
care – often drawing them into ineffective, often 
abusive institutionalised care systems  
• Children and young people are invariably on the 
front line of drug war violence and exploitation 
– either drawn into organised criminal activities 
(sometimes trafficked or enslaved), or caught in the 
crossfire as rival groups fight each other, or state 
enforcers
If the high-profile narrative of child protection in the drug 
debate is to be more than empty rhetoric, it is imperative 
that the impacts of drug law enforcement on children and 
young people are meaningfully evaluated and factored 
into future policy developments. 
9. Causing deforestation and 
pollution
The war on drugs has put a heavy emphasis on “upstream” 
supply-side actions, including drug crop eradication. 
This has not only proved futile in reducing total drug 
production – which has more than kept pace with growing 
demand – but has also had disastrous consequences for 
the environment. 
• Aerial fumigations of drug crops take place in South 
Africa, and have only recently been suspended 
in Colombia, the world’s second most biodiverse 
country, after the chemicals used in the fumigations 
were identified as a carcinogen by the WHO. The 
chemicals used kill plant life indiscriminately, 
destroy habitats of rare and endangered animals, 
and contaminate waterways
• The unregulated processing of drug crops leads 
to unsafe disposal of toxic waste, polluting soil, 
groundwater and waterways
• Drug crop eradication does not eliminate drug 
production. As long as the profit opportunity 
remains, production simply moves (the so-called 
“balloon effect”), which exacerbates deforestation 
and environmental damage, often in protected 
national parks 
There is an urgent need to meaningfully count these costs 
and build environmental impact assessments into all drug 
law enforcement programmes.
10. Options and alternatives
The growing consensus on the need to reform the current 
global drug control system is fuelling a debate on a range 
of alternative approaches. Determining which approaches 
will be most effective at achieving the widely shared goals 
of drug policy, and reducing the costs outlined in this 
report, requires a political commitment to research and 
experimentation – much of which is currently inhibited by 
the international drug laws. Key alternative approaches 
include: 
• Fighting the war on drugs with increased ferocity 
– through increasing the level of resources 
for enforcement and handing down harsher 
punishments – with the aim of significantly reducing 
or eliminating drug use
16
• Cannabis social clubs in Spain: legalisation without 
commercialisation
• Cannabis regulation in Colorado: early evidence 
defies the critics
• Cannabis legalisation in Uruguay: public health and 
safety over private profit
• Heroin-assisted therapy in Switzerland: successfully 
regulating the supply and use of a high-risk 
injectable drug
• Turkey’s opium trade: successfully transitioning 
from illicit production to a legally regulated market
Conclusions
It is now clear that the global prohibitionist consensus 
has broken, and cannot be fixed. Alternative drug 
policy approaches, including decriminalisation and 
legal regulation, are a growing reality as the global drug 
control system adapts to a world dramatically different 
from when the current approach to drugs was established 
more than half a century ago.
It is now time for UN agencies, supported by other regional 
and multilateral bodies, to provide real leadership to 
shape this change. Civil society groups in fields beyond 
the drug policy sector should also play their part – a 
process that is already gathering momentum. 
While bringing science and evidence-based scrutiny 
to bear on this issue will ensure a more objective and 
balanced debate, evaluating the global drug control 
system is not easy, or free. But the real problem is one of 
political will. That is where member states have a crucial 
role to play: raising the issue in multilateral and domestic 
policy forums, providing resources, and working together 
with civil society to drive review and reform. It is also 
important for member states to lead by example through 
assessing and reforming drug policy domestically too.
In short, as more and more jurisdictions and UN bodies 
take an approach to drugs based on the UN’s three pillars 
of peace and security, development and human rights – 
rather than the punishment, discrimination and violence 
that has characterised drug policy for far too long – the 
time has come to count the costs of the war on drugs, and 
explore the alternatives.
• Incremental reforms to enforcement and public 
health and treatment interventions (within 
the existing prohibitionist legal framework) to 
improve policy outcomes. Adequate investment in 
evidence-based prevention, treatment and harm 
reduction should form a key pillar of drug policy 
under any legal framework. However, current 
enforcement approaches can undermine, rather 
than support, effective health interventions. Reforms 
to enforcement practices can also target some of the 
most harmful elements of the criminal market to 
reduce key crime costs, such as violence, from their 
current levels
• A reorientation to a health-based approach and 
decriminalisation of personal possession and use 
(civil or administrative sanctions only). Evidence 
suggests that if implemented intelligently, as part 
of a wider health reorientation, decriminalisation 
can deliver criminal justice savings, and positive 
outcomes on a range of health indicators, without 
increasing drug use
• The legal regulation of drug markets offers the 
potential to dramatically reduce the costs associated 
with the illegal trade outlined in this report, but 
requires negotiating the obstacle of the inflexible UN 
drug conventions, and managing the risks of over-
commercialisation. Drawing on experiences from 
alcohol, tobacco and pharmaceutical regulation, 
increasingly sophisticated models have now been 
proposed for regulating different aspects of the 
market – such as production, vendors, outlets, 
marketing and promotion, and availability – for a 
range of products in different environments
This updated Alternative World Drug Report also 
includes a series of new case studies that explore the 
impacts of different drug policy models. The focus is 
on models of reform – in Portugal, Uruguay, Colorado, 
Switzerland, Spain, the Netherlands and Turkey, but it 
also includes a review of Sweden’s more traditional, 
enforcement-oriented drug policy.    
 
• Drug policy in Sweden: a repressive approach that 
increases harm 
• Drug decriminalisation in Portugal: setting the 
record straight
• Cannabis policy in the Netherlands: moving 
forwards not backwards
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Foreword
The global drug control system emerged in 1961, with the 
ratification of the United Nations Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs. The convention provides the legal bedrock 
of what later became known as the “war on drugs”, a 
legal and policy model that, to this day, prioritises the 
criminalisation of people who produce, supply and use 
drugs. As this report shows, in reality the war on drugs 
is not directed against substances – it is primarily a war 
on people. 
In 2011, an alliance of more than 100 non-governmental 
organisations came together to mark the 50th anniversary 
of the Single Convention. The Count the Costs initiative 
sought to shine a light on the devastating harm being 
caused by the world’s approach to drugs, and to encourage 
the international community to review the costs of the 
current regime, comparing it with alternatives that might 
achieve better outcomes.
In 2012, Count the Costs released the Alternative World 
Drug Report, to coincide with the publication of the UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) annual World Drug 
Report. Unlike this “official” account, the alternative 
version was a compendium of the costs generated by 
the drug war itself – the social and economic costs of 
the vast criminal market it has fuelled, the health harms 
made worse by punitive enforcement, and the human 
rights, development and security costs of increasingly 
militarised drug law enforcement. This second edition 
has been revised and updated with the latest research. 
It also includes new sections covering security costs, 
impacts on children and young people, and an expanded 
“options and alternatives” section featuring case studies 
from around the world.
It arrives at a critical moment in the global drug policy 
debate, as the world reflects on the outcomes of the 2016 
UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on the 
World Drug Problem, and looks towards 2019, when the 
next 10-year global strategy will be negotiated. The 2016 
UNGASS was convened at the request of the presidents 
of Colombia, Mexico and Guatemala, who, like those 
who support the Count the Costs initiative, want an 
evidence-based review of the global drug control system’s 
outcomes, alongside a meaningful exploration of all 
alternative approaches. But while the UNGASS arguably 
marks the moment when the critical reform discourse 
moved decisively from the margins to the high-level 
mainstream, the significant drug policy reforms that have 
taken place since 2011 have been about far more than one 
UN meeting, and far more that purely theoretical debate. 
Indeed, real-world reform has been unfolding globally: 
harm reduction approaches continue to evolve, the trend 
towards ending the criminalisation of people who use 
drugs is gathering momentum, and multiple jurisdictions 
are exploring or implementing models of cannabis 
regulation. The consensus that the global drug war should 
continue to be fought has decisively broken. 
A growing list of high-level commissions, and a broad 
array of UN agencies, have come to similar conclusions as 
the Count the Costs initiative, critically reviewing current 
failings, and advocating for alternative policies. As we 
move into this new era of policy innovation and change, 
counting the costs of the punitive enforcement approaches 
that still prevail throughout much of the world, and 
meaningfully exploring alternative approaches, becomes 
more important than ever.
“I urge Member States to use [the 
UNGASS on drugs] to conduct a wide-
ranging and open debate that considers 
all options.” 
Ban Ki-moon
UN Secretary-General
2013
“I don’t object to discussing any 
alternatives. But if we are going to 
discuss alternatives, let’s discuss 
every alternative ... let’s discuss what 
alternatives do we have – what is the 
cost, what is the benefit of each?” 
Juan Manuel Santos
President of Colombia
2010
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drug-market violence, the stigma and limited life chances 
that stem from a criminal conviction for drug possession, 
or deaths from contaminated street drugs – are confused 
or deliberately conflated with the harms of drug use per 
se. Such harms are then used to justify the continuation, 
or intensification, of the very policies that created them in 
the first place.
This report estimates that the global war on drugs costs at 
least $100 billion a year, and that  despite this expenditure, 
the production, supply and use of drugs have all risen 
significantly during the last half-century. According to 
the UNODC’s 2015 World Drug Report, approximately 246 
million people now use drugs worldwide, funding the 
largest illegal commodities market the world has ever 
seen, with a turnover of $320 billion a year. The current 
approach – which ultimately aspires to create “a drug-free 
world” – is demonstrably failing on its own terms. 
Introduction
Exploiting opportunities for peace: counting 
the costs of the drug war and exploring the 
alternatives 
The 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
frames its approach in terms of a concern for the “health 
and welfare of mankind” and a desire to “combat” the 
“serious evil” of “addiction to narcotic drugs”.
1
 Even 
if implemented with good intentions, framing the 
challenge in such crusading language has helped lead 
to the use of certain drugs (but not alcohol or tobacco) 
being viewed as a threat to humankind, and treated as 
a domestic and international security issue, rather than 
one of health, human rights or development. 
As a result, the current global drug control system is 
predicated upon police and military enforcement against 
producers, suppliers and users – a “war on drugs” in 
popular discourse. But, as this report demonstrates, 
this approach is fatally undermining all of the so-called 
“three pillars” of the UN’s work – peace and security, 
development and human rights – and will continue to do 
so, as long as the UN-led response to drugs continues to 
conceive of drug use as an existential threat to society. 
This situation has been allowed to continue in part 
because although the enormous costs of drug misuse 
have been well documented, the serious negative impacts 
of drug policy are often marginalised and ignored by the 
agencies tasked with overseeing it. In many cases, harms 
that are a direct or indirect result of drug enforcement 
– such as children and young people injured or killed in 
The UNODC’s five negative consequences of international drug control
2
1. “The creation of a criminal black market.”  
2. “Policy displacement: The expanding criminal black market demands a commensurate law enforcement 
response, requiring more resources. But resources are finite. Public health, which is the driving concern 
behind drug control, also needs resources, and may have been forced to take the back seat in the past.”  
3. “Geographical displacement: It is often called the balloon effect because squeezing (by tighter controls) in 
one place produces a swelling (namely, an increase) in another place.”  
4. “Substance displacement: If the use of one drug was controlled, by reducing either supply or demand, 
suppliers and users moved on to another drug with similar psychoactive effects, but less stringent controls.”  
5. “Exclusion and marginalisation: The way the authorities perceive and deal with the users of illicit drugs. 
A system appears to have been created in which those who fall into the web of addiction find themselves 
excluded and marginalized from the social mainstream, tainted with a moral stigma, and often unable to find 
treatment even when motivated to seek it.”
“The international community should...
tolerate different national drug policies, 
to accept the fact that some countries 
will have very strict drug approaches; 
other countries will legalize entire 
categories of drugs.” 
William Brownfield
US Assistant Secretary of State 
2014
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“Drug cartels are spreading violence in Central 
America, Mexico and the Caribbean. West Africa is 
under attack from narco-trafficking. Collusion between 
insurgents and criminal groups threatens the stability 
of West Asia, the Andes and parts of Africa, fuelling 
the trade in smuggled weapons, the plunder of natural 
resources and piracy.”  
This is a situation that could not have been imagined by 
those who designed today’s system of drug control over 
half a century ago. However, while these consequences 
may still be unintended, they are now entirely predictable. 
Yet, despite acknowledging the problems created by 
enforcement measures, the UNODC has never asked the 
obvious question: do the intended consequences of the 
current system outweigh the unintended consequences?
These unintended consequences, despite their obvious 
magnitude, are not systematically assessed by any 
UN mechanisms, or detailed in the UNODC’s annual 
World Drug Report, which is still based primarily on 
self-reporting from member states via Annual Report 
Questionnaires (see p. 23). Despite some improvements, 
these ARQs do not include questions on many key policy 
impacts (not least peace and security, development 
and human rights), and are inevitably biased towards 
presenting a favourable assessment. Indeed, there is an 
inherent problem in accepting reports on the effectiveness 
of a system by those whose role it is to oversee, enforce 
and champion it. The result is that less than half the story 
is being told, and the process of policy development and 
evolution in a rapidly changing global environment is 
critically undermined before it even begins.
Hence the conclusion of the US National Academy of 
Sciences’ 2001 report “Informing America’s Policy on 
Illegal Drugs: What We Don’t Know Keeps Hurting Us” are 
as true for the entire global drug control system today as 
they were for the US then:
“It is unconscionable for this country to continue to 
carry out a public policy of this magnitude and cost 
without any way of knowing whether, and to what 
extent, it is having the desired result. Our committee 
strongly recommends that a substantial, new, and 
robust research effort be undertaken to examine 
the various aspects of drug control, so that decision-
making on these issues can be better supported by 
more factual and realistic evidence.” 
That is why this second edition of the Alternative World 
Drug Report seeks, from a civil society perspective, to help 
fill the gap left by official government and UN evaluations 
of current drug law enforcement strategies. The Count 
In 2008, the UNODC made an important acknowledgement 
– that beyond this failure, the current enforcement-led 
system of global drug control is having a range of major 
negative “unintended consequences”.
The UNODC has since gone further, specifically identifying 
the role of the drug control efforts – which they are 
overseeing – in fuelling negative impacts on international 
development and security:
3
“Global drug control efforts have had a dramatic 
unintended consequence: a criminal black market of 
staggering proportions. Organized crime is a threat 
to security. Criminal organizations have the power to 
destabilize society and Governments. The illicit drug 
business is worth billions of dollars a year, part of 
which is used to corrupt government officials and to 
poison economies.
“Public policies devised over the past 
several decades to address the drug 
issue in the Hemisphere have not proved 
sufficiently flexible to draw in the new 
evidence needed to make them more 
effective, to detect unintended costs 
and damages, and to embrace recent 
economic and cultural changes. We 
need to develop and generate additional 
methods, evidence, analysis, and 
evaluation, to learn from both successes 
and failures, to adapt standards to 
the needs and characteristics of each 
specific environment, and to take into 
account the net impact in terms of costs 
and benefits of applying particular 
policies in a given country and society 
as well as for all our countries and 
societies.” 
Organization of American States
2013
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the Costs initiative also argues that although the list of 
negative consequences outlined by the UNODC is useful, 
it is incomplete, and that a more comprehensive analysis 
shows that the current approach to drugs:
• Threatens public health, spreading disease and 
causing death
• Undermines peace and security
• Undermines development
• Undermines human rights
• Creates crime and enriches criminals
• Wastes billions and undermines economies 
• Promotes stigma and discrimination
• Harms, rather than protects, children and 
young people
• Causes deforestation and pollution
Making drug control fit for purpose
It is now clear that the global prohibitionist consensus 
has broken, and cannot be fixed. Alternative drug policy 
approaches, including decriminalisation and legal 
regulation, are a growing reality as the global drug control 
system adapts to a world dramatically different from 
when the Single Convention was drafted (see box below).
It is now time for UN agencies, supported by other regional 
and multilateral bodies, to provide real leadership to 
shape this change. Civil society groups in fields beyond 
the traditional drug policy sector should also play their 
part – a process that is gathering momentum with recent 
engagement from organisations such as Christian Aid, 
Chatham House, Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch. 
While bringing science and evidence-based scrutiny to 
bear on the drugs issue will underpin a more objective 
The prohibitionist consensus has fractured
It is welcome to note that there have been a number of important advances in relation to some of the key 
themes of the Count the Costs initiative. Since 2011, when the first edition of this report was drafted:   
• The global prohibitionist consensus has been shattered by systems of legal cannabis regulation being 
implemented or pending in multiple US states, Uruguay (the first nation state to legalise), and Canada (the 
first G7 country). Other jurisdictions are also contemplating similar moves
• The trend towards ending the criminalisation of people who use drugs has continued. Over 25 UN 
member states have decriminalised the possession and use of either cannabis or all drugs
• For too long, drug policy issues were ghettoised within the UNODC, isolated from the norms and 
principles of the wider UN family. That is changing. The decriminalisation of drug users is now supported 
across UN agencies, while several made powerful reform-minded submissions to the debate – most 
notably the UN Development Programme and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (both of which cite work by the Count the Costs initiative, including the original Alternative 
World Drug Report)
• Innovative harm reduction programmes continue to evolve – and displace failed zero-tolerance 
approaches to drug use
• Bolivia’s demands for indigenous rights led to it withdrawing from, and then re-acceding to, the 1961 
Single Convention with a reservation that permits traditional uses of the coca plant
• New Zealand established the world’s first system of regulated sales for novel psychoactive substances
• For the first time ever, a major multilateral body, the Organization of American States, conducted a 
review of drug policy harms, and a meaningful exploration of alternatives, including decriminalisation, 
legal regulation, and reform of the UN drug treaties
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and balanced debate, evaluating the global drug control 
system is not easy, or free. But the real problem is one of 
political will.
That is where member states have a crucial role to play: 
raising the issue in multilateral and domestic policy 
forums, providing resources, and working together with 
civil society to drive change. It is also important for 
member states to lead by example through assessing and 
reforming drug policy domestically too.
In short, as more and more jurisdictions and UN bodies 
take an approach to drugs based on the UN’s three pillars 
of peace and security, development and human rights, 
rather than punishment, discrimination and violence, the 
time has come to count the costs of the war on drugs, and 
explore the alternatives.
“There is growing evidence ... that 
current drug control policy has not only 
failed to achieve its own objectives 
but has generated considerable 
harms to health, social and economic 
development, and to peace, security, 
and stability.
“Measuring success by arrests and 
seizures creates perverse incentives for 
law enforcement, and may encourage 
law enforcement to engage in violence 
or other abuse to achieve these goals. 
The development of a comprehensive 
set of metrics to measure the full 
spectrum of drug-related health issues, 
as well as the broader impact of drug 
control policies on human rights, 
security, and development would be an 
important contribution.” 
United Nations Development Programme
2015
25
Introduction
 
The World Drug Report – less than half the story
Current high-level evaluations of drug policy impacts are undermined by the political and institutional 
frameworks they serve and operate within. The UNODC’s annual World Drug Report (WDR) is largely built 
around data from country Annual Report Questionnaires (ARQs) – a system that is highly problematic. 
The UNODC is open about the “data gaps and the varying quality of the available [ARQ] data” and 
acknowledges that “submitted questionnaires are not always complete or comprehensive”. As the UNODC 
also acknowledges: “much of the data collected are subject to limitations and biases”. States naturally have an 
inbuilt bias against reporting failures or poor performance, a problem assumed to be most acute in states or 
regions of greatest concern. 
Aside from these methodological challenges with the data that is collected, is the more pressing issue of what 
is not collected. The ARQs themselves are not drawn up by the UNODC independently, but rather agreed by 
consensus of the member states at the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, with the questionnaires remaining 
inadequate in their thematic coverage of drug policy impacts. While there have certainly been improvements 
(new questions on drug-related deaths, injecting and HIV for example), substantive areas of drug policy are 
not included – impacts on human rights compliance, development and conflict, stigma and discrimination, the 
environment, and economic impacts for example. 
For many of these data shortcomings there are alternative sources of information available (from academic 
research or NGO “grey literature”, for example), there is often a reluctance to use them, at least in part for 
political reasons – avoiding upsetting member states, many of which provide the agency with discretionary 
funding. 
As a result, the focus of the ARQs, and the report, remains unhelpfully skewed towards process measures 
(such as drug seizures) rather than outcome measures that actually tell us what policy is achieving in terms of 
the health and welfare of communities. Process measures can give the impression of success when the reality 
on the ground is the precise opposite.  Overarching these data issues is the institutional nature of the UNODC. 
Established under the three drug conventions, its default position is to defend the drug war status quo, rather 
than challenging the system it operates within. 
The annual report from the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) also forms a prominent part of the 
UN drug control system’s evaluation and reporting mechanisms alongside the WDR. The INCB describes itself 
as the “independent and quasi-judicial monitoring body for the implementation of the UN international drug 
control conventions”.
The INCB annual report has been even more narrowly focused on process measures than the WDR, reflecting 
the INCB’s historically inflexible interpretation of the drug treaties and views on member states’ compliance. 
As such, it is both less objective and more politically constrained. These problems, combined with a relative 
lack of methodological rigour and expertise compared to the UNODC, render it of negligible value in terms of 
evaluating the wider costs, or indeed benefits, of international drug control.
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Enforcement against the illicit trade can, in turn, 
compound these health risks, as users are marginalised 
and stigmatised, driven to increasingly dangerous forms 
of consumption, in unsafe and unhygienic environments. 
The threat of criminalisation even means drug users are 
reluctant to seek medical attention when they need it. 
Drug use is widely acknowledged to be a health issue, yet 
there are no other health issues for which the primary 
prescription is arrest, incarceration and a criminal 
record.
Such measures are overwhelmingly targeted at some 
of the most vulnerable and marginalised populations – 
those from socially deprived communities, young people, 
people with mental health problems, people who are 
dependent on drugs, and people who inject drugs. The 
war on drugs therefore punishes those most in need – 
those who should be considered patients and clients. In 
short, as the box on page 28 further illustrates, there is a 
The war on drugs has primarily been promoted as a way of protecting 
health. The evidence shows, however, that it has failed in its key 
aim of reducing or eliminating drug use. The drug war has instead 
increased health risks, produced new health harms, and at the same 
time created political and practical obstacles to effective public 
health interventions that might reduce them. 
Introduction 
While understanding and responding to the health risks 
of problematic or dependent drug use is vitally important, 
there is an urgent additional need to examine and find 
solutions to the public health costs specifically created or 
exacerbated by current drug policy. 
These policy related harms are explored in this chapter 
and include:  
• The maximisation of risks associated with use, 
such as unsafe products, behaviours and using 
environments
• The health harms created or fuelled directly by drug 
law enforcement, or indirectly through the wider 
social impacts of the violent illegal trade it creates, 
including disastrous impacts on international 
development and security
• The political and practical obstacles for health 
professionals in doing their job addressing drug-
related health problems and reducing harms, and 
how they are obliged to work within a legal and 
policy framework that is often in direct conflict 
with fundamental medical ethics – not least the 
commitment to “first, do no harm”
The war on drugs has meant that control of the drug 
trade defaults to organised crime groups. And while it 
is clearly true that all drug use carries risks, these risks 
are dramatically increased when drugs are produced and 
supplied by criminal profiteers. Indeed, drug production 
and supply is completely unregulated, conducted without 
any formal oversight. Hence those in charge of the drug 
trade are also those least likely or qualified to manage it 
responsibly. The result is that drugs of unknown potency 
and purity, often cut with dangerous adulterants,
1
 are sold 
to anyone who can afford them – regardless of their age.
“The expanding criminal black market 
obviously demanded a commensurate 
law enforcement response, and more 
resources. The consequence was 
that public health was displaced into 
the background, more honoured in 
lip service and rhetoric, but less in 
actual practice.”
 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
 2008
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stark contrast in outcomes for those who use drugs, and 
society as a whole, that result directly from choosing to 
take an enforcement-, rather than health-led, approach to 
drugs.
The health costs of the 
war on drugs 
1. Maximising harms to users
Risky behaviours and using environments
Evidence shows that the severity of drug law enforcement 
has, at best, only a marginal impact on levels of drug use.
2
 
Yet criminalising people who use drugs, particularly young 
people, does have a significant impact on the amount of 
harm caused by drugs, encouraging high-risk drug using 
behaviours and pushing drug use into unhygienic and 
unsupervised “underground” environments.
3
Enforcement against possession of drug injecting 
paraphernalia can encourage needle sharing, which 
increases the risk of users transmitting blood-borne 
viruses.
4
 Higher levels of enforcement are also associated 
with hurried and higher-risk injecting.
5
 The very choice to 
inject, rather than use safer forms of administration, such 
as snorting or smoking, is also sometimes attributable 
to drug law enforcement, which can temporarily lead to 
increases in the price of drugs. This price inflation causes 
users to seek more “bang for their buck” – consuming 
drugs in whichever way will give them the biggest hit 
to make their purchase go further, regardless of the 
dangers involved.
6
Displacement from one drug to another can also follow 
enforcement efforts.
7
 The impacts are unpredictable, 
but as experience with amphetamine-type stimulants 
demonstrates, can lead to the use of new “designer” drugs, 
or novel psychoactive substances (NPS), about which 
little is known (a risk factor in itself), creating challenges 
for police, forensics, harm reduction, treatment and 
emergency services.
8 9
For example, in the Eurasian region, economic pressures, 
combined with enforcement against more established 
drugs, have fuelled the emergence of high-risk, 
domestically manufactured and injectable amphetamine-
type stimulants, such as “boltushka”
10
 in Ukraine,and 
“vint”
11
 and opiates such as “krokadil”
12
 in Russia. 
Injection of NPS stimulants is also a growing problem in 
the region. 
An enforcement-led approach to drugs also hinders risk 
education and prevention efforts. Not only are proven 
interventions inadequately funded as the lion’s share 
of drug budgets goes to enforcement (see chapter 6) 
but authorities attempting to educate young people 
about drug risks are simultaneously seeking to arrest 
and punish them. The resulting alienation and stigma 
inevitably undermines outreach to those most in need. 
Combined with prevention messages more often driven 
by politics than science, this leads to wider distrust in 
even the best drug education programmes. With limited 
access to honest, credible information, there is a greater 
likelihood of high-risk behaviours such as poly-drug use 
and bingeing, and fewer people well-equipped to deal 
with crisis situations such as overdoses.
Punitive drug policies maximise the potential harms associated with drug use
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Promoting more dangerous products 
The likelihood of users suffering avoidable health harms, 
and even a fatal overdose, is further increased by the 
economics of the unregulated illicit trade. When drugs 
are prohibited, they will tend to be produced in criminal 
markets in more potent and risky forms. In order to 
avoid detection by law enforcement and at the same time 
maximise their profits, producers and traffickers prefer to 
deal with more portable, concentrated drug preparations; 
smaller volumes of high-strength substances are more 
profitable and easier to transport than larger volumes of 
less potent ones. This is comparable to how, under 1920s 
US alcohol prohibition, consumption of beer and wine 
gave way to sales of more concentrated, profitable and 
dangerous spirits – a process that went into reverse when 
prohibition was repealed. Under current prohibition, 
smoked opium has been replaced by injectable heroin, 
cocaine markets have evolved towards smoked or injected 
crack cocaine, and the cannabis market has become 
increasingly dominated by more potent varieties.
Illegally produced and supplied drug products lack any 
health and safety information, and are of unknown (and 
highly variable) strength and purity, creating a range of 
risks not associated with their counterparts on the licit 
market.
13
 
• Risks of overdose are increased, particularly for 
injectors, when drugs are of unknown and variable 
potency 
• There are poisoning risks associated with the 
adulterants and bulking agents used by criminal 
suppliers to maximise their profits.
14
 Examples 
include Levamisole, a potentially toxic
15
 de-worming 
and cancer treatment pharmaceutical drug, widely 
used as a cocaine adulterant (the DEA reported 
its presence in 69% of seized cocaine in the US in 
2009) and fentanyl, a highly potent synthetic opiate 
analgesic, being added to heroin (in the US, between 
2005 and 2007, more than 1,000 deaths were 
attributed to the drug
16
) . Even illicit cannabis has 
been bulked up by other substances, such as lead 
particles, which in Germany resulted in 29 hospital 
admissions for lead poisoning in 2007
17
 
• Among people who inject drugs, there is a particular 
infection risk from biological contaminants. The UK, 
for example, has witnessed clusters of infections 
associated with contaminated batches of heroin, 
including 35 deaths in 2000 from Clostridium novyi 
bacterium, and over 30 infections with Bacillus 
Anthracis (anthrax), leading to 10 deaths in 2009-10
Parallel example of two heroin users
A clear illustration of the impact of the war on 
drugs can be seen from comparing two injecting 
heroin users – one forced to use illegal heroin 
under prohibition, the other using legally sup-
plied heroin in a supervised medical environ-
ment. This is not theoretical – the two scenarios 
take place in parallel already (see Switzerland 
case study, p. 180).
The user of illegal heroin: 
• Commits high volumes of property crime 
and/or street sex work to fund their habit, 
and has a long – and growing – criminal 
record 
• Uses “street” heroin of unknown strength 
and purity, with dirty and often shared 
needles, in unsafe marginal environments 
• Is supplied by a criminal drug dealing 
network that can be traced back to illicit 
opium production in Afghanistan
• Has a high risk of overdose, and HIV and 
hepatitis C infection 
The user of prescribed heroin: 
• Uses legally manufactured and prescribed 
pharmaceutical heroin of known strength 
and purity 
• Uses clean injecting paraphernalia in a 
supervised medical setting where they 
come into contact with health professionals 
on a daily basis 
• Is not implicated in any criminality, 
profiteering or violence at any stage of the 
drug’s production or supply, and does not 
offend to fund their use 
• Has no risk of contracting a blood-borne 
infection associated with their use, and a 
nearly zero risk of overdose death
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reduction approaches are evolving and gaining ground 
across the globe, but are forced to operate within the 
punitive, ideologically driven, harm-maximising drug-
war framework. 
This conflict has led to a widening of harm reduction 
thinking to include a parallel focus on reforming  drug 
policies and laws that are creating or exacerbating the 
harms that front line service providers are attempting 
to mitigate. The increasing convergence of the harm 
reduction field and drug law reform movement - 
particularly around decriminalisation of people who use 
drugs - has been demonstrated by initiatives such as the 
Vienna Declaration
19
, the Global Commission on Drug 
Policy
20
, and the Stop the Harm coalition.
21
  
Key harm reduction interventions such as needle and 
syringe programmes (NSP) and opioid substitution 
therapy (OST) expanded primarily in response to HIV 
transmission risk from injecting, although the approach 
now encompasses a much wider range of drugs, using 
behaviours and related harms. Harm reduction services 
are now recognised by UN human rights monitors as a 
requirement of the right to health for people who use 
or inject drugs (including for youth and those in prison 
settings),
22
 as is access to methadone and buprenorphine 
for OST, both of which are on the World Health 
Organization’s essential medicines list.
In 2014, Harm Reduction International (HRI) stated 
that, despite becoming increasingly established, harm 
reduction “is facing a crisis. International and national 
funding for essential services is disastrously short of need 
in low- and middle-income countries. Unless fundamental 
changes are made in donor priorities, matters are set to 
worsen”:
23
 
• In Russia, although 37% of the 1.8 million people 
who inject drugs are infected with HIV, NSP is 
severely limited and OST is illegal. By comparison, 
HIV rates among people who inject drugs in 
countries with long-established harm reduction 
programmes, such as the UK, Australia and 
Germany, are below 5% 
• Of the 158 countries reporting injecting drug use, 68 
have no NSPs and 78 have no OST
• In Central Asia, Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, OST coverage equates to less than one person 
for every 100 people who inject drugs. The obstacles 
to improved provision are more a failure of politics 
than of resources, as harm reduction is highly cost-
effective.
24 
Merely using the term “harm reduction” 
2. Creating obstacles to effective 
harm reduction 
A new policy approach known as “harm reduction” 
emerged in the 1980s. Rather than adopting the war on 
drugs’ narrow focus on attempting to significantly reduce 
drug use, this approach is more pragmatic, and can be 
summarised as: “policies, programmes and practices that 
aim primarily to reduce the adverse health, social and 
economic consequences of the use of legal and illegal 
psychoactive drugs without necessarily reducing drug 
consumption.”
18
 
The emergence of harm reduction can be seen, to a 
significant degree, as a response to harms either created 
or exacerbated by the war on drugs. There now exists 
an unsustainable internal policy conflict – with health 
professionals caught in the middle. Evidence-based harm 
“Criminalisation of drug use has 
considerable impact on drugs users’ 
right to health... In many States, 
access to proven harm-reduction 
measures - including syringe 
exchange programmes and opiate 
substitution therapy - is extremely 
limited, non-existent or banned. 
“Failure to provide health-care and 
harm-reduction programmes... 
facilitates transmission of diseases 
such as HIV and hepatitis C. In 
some States, laws prohibit carrying 
injecting paraphernalia, and this 
creates additional health risks for 
people who inject drugs”
Navanethem Pillay 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
2014
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• Of the 15.9 million people who inject drugs around 
the world, an estimated 10 million are living with 
HCV
31
• China, the Russian Federation and Vietnam have 
rates of HIV/HCV co-infection in populations of 
injectors of over 90%
• People who have HIV or HCV are at particularly 
great risk of contracting tuberculosis. 30% of 
injecting drug users in Western Europe, 25% in 
Central Europe and well over 50% in Eastern Europe 
have the disease
32
Crucially, both HBV and HCV can be effectively prevented, 
treated and potentially cured. However, it is clear that 
treatment uptake remains extremely low among people 
who inject drugs, even where it is available.
33
While treatment for HCV and HBV remains (or is perceived 
to be) prohibitively expensive
34
 in the short term, in many 
middle- or low-income countries prevention measures are 
relatively inexpensive and of proven cost-effectiveness. 
Yet they remain underdeveloped, despite being strongly 
supported by the WHO, UNAIDS and UNODC.
35
remains a contentious political issue in high-level 
international forums
25
Spreading infectious diseases: HIV/AIDS, 
hepatitis and tuberculosis 
From the outset of the HIV epidemic, transmission among 
people who inject drugs via sharing of needles has been a 
serious and growing problem, one that is exacerbated by 
an undue emphasis on criminalisation and incarceration, 
at the expense of proven harm reduction measures: 
• Injecting drug use occurs in at least 158 countries/
territories. An estimated 15.9 million people inject 
drugs globally, of whom three million are HIV-
positive in 120 countries
26
• In eight countries – Argentina, Brazil, Estonia, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Myanmar, Nepal and Thailand – 
HIV prevalence among people who inject drugs is 
estimated to be over 40%
27
• Injecting drug use causes one in ten new HIV 
infections globally, and up to 90% of infections in 
regions such as Eastern Europe and Central Asia
28
• Provision of antiretroviral therapy, already limited 
in many low- and middle-income countries, is 
effectively unavailable for the vast majority of HIV-
positive people who inject drugs
Hepatitis B (HBV) and hepatitis C (HCV) are the most 
common blood-borne virus infections affecting people 
who share injecting equipment.
29 
HCV is much more 
robust than HIV, and so can be transmitted even more 
easily. Both HBV and HCV can cause cirrhosis and cancer 
of the liver, and are significant causes of death. 
While the urgency of preventing and treating HIV infection 
has overshadowed what some call the “silent epidemic” 
of viral hepatitis, it is increasingly recognised as a major 
public health problem, particularly where people living 
with HIV are co-infected with HBV and/or HCV. 
• Brazil, China, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, the Russian 
Federation, Thailand, the US, Ukraine and Vietnam 
account for half of the global population of injecting 
drug users (8.1 million) and two-thirds of people 
who inject drugs and are living with HIV (2.1 
million).
30 
The average HIV prevalence among people 
who inject drugs in these countries is approximately 
25%, and HCV prevalence is up to 60%
“Drug use may have harmful health 
consequences, but the Special 
Rapporteur is concerned that the 
current drug control approach 
creates more harm than the harms 
it seeks to prevent. Criminalization 
of drug use, designed to deter drug 
use, possession and trafficking, has 
failed. Instead, it has perpetuated 
risky forms of drug use, while 
disproportionately punishing people 
who use drugs.”
Anand Grover
UN Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone 
to the  enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of health
2010
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• Overdose is commonly the leading cause of death 
among people who use drugs
43
• Around two-thirds of people who inject drugs will 
experience an overdose at some point, with around 
4% of overdose events resulting in death
44
 
• Overdose is a leading cause of death among all 
youth in some countries, and the leading cause of 
accidental death among all adults in some regions
45
 
The last 15 to 20 years have established a range of 
interventions shown to be effective in reducing incidence 
of overdoses, overdose mortality rates, or both. These 
include investment in education and awareness building, 
and increased provision of naloxone (an opiate antagonist) 
both in a take-home formulation and for use by medical 
Bringing drug use into prisons 
The war on drugs has directly fuelled the unprecedented 
expansion of the prison population in recent decades. 
Consequently, current or past drug users constitute a high 
proportion of those incarcerated. Lifetime prevalence 
of injecting drug use in EU member state prisoners, for 
example, ranges from 15% to 50%.
36
Prison is sometimes portrayed as a useful environment 
for recovery from drug problems, but the reality is more 
often the exact opposite. High levels of drug use continue 
in prisons (unsurprisingly, given that people with drug 
dependencies are imprisoned alongside drug dealers and 
traffickers), in an environment that creates a range of 
additional risks, including initiation into high-risk drug 
using behaviours, and substantial incentives to use drugs.
The USA has one of the world’s largest prison populations 
for drug offences, and the level of HCV infection amongst 
its prisoners is between 12 and 35%, substantially higher 
than in the general population, where it is between 1 and 
2%. Despite the evidence of effectiveness, the US Center 
for Disease Control and Prevention does not recommend 
NSP in prisons, and the coverage of HCV testing and 
treatment in US prisons is poor.
As a general principle of international law,
37 38 
prisoners 
retain all rights except those that are necessarily limited 
by virtue of their incarceration. The loss of liberty alone 
is the punishment, not the deprivation of fundamental 
human rights, which includes the right to health. As Harm 
Reduction International note: 
“Failure to provide access to evidence-based HIV and 
HCV prevention measures (in particular NSP and OST) 
to people in prison is a violation of prisoners’ rights to 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health under international law, and is inconsistent 
with numerous international instruments dealing with 
the health of prisoners and with HIV/AIDS.”
39
 
Yet despite clear technical guidance on such provision 
from WHO, the UNODC and UNAIDS,
40
 as well as legal 
guidance from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights
41
 prison-based NSP are currently available 
in only 10 countries, and OST is available (in at least one 
prison) in fewer than 40 countries.
42
Increasing overdose risks 
Overdose deaths, primarily related to opioids, have 
become a growing problem in recent decades: 
“Prisons are extremely high-risk 
environments for HIV transmission 
because of overcrowding, poor 
nutrition, limited access to health 
care, continued illicit drug use 
and unsafe injecting practices, 
unprotected sex and tattooing. 
Many of the people in prisons come 
from marginalized populations, 
such as injecting drug users, which 
are already at elevated risk of HIV 
infection. In most cases, high rates 
of HIV infection in prisons are 
linked to the sharing of injecting 
equipment and to unprotected sexual 
encounters in prison. Syringe sharing 
rates are invariably higher in prisons 
than among injecting drug users 
outside prison.” 
World Health Organization 
2005
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personnel. OST provision has also been shown to reduce 
overdose. For example, there was a 79% reduction in 
opioid overdose over the four years following introduction 
of buprenorphine maintenance in France in 1995.
46
Similarly, supervised injection facilities (SIFs) in nine 
countries have overseen millions of injections and 
experienced no overdose deaths.
47
 Such services are only 
available in a very limited number of locations; while 
there are 25 SIFs in Germany, there are none in the UK, 
and only two in the whole of North America (although 
several new facilities are now planned in Canada, and 
possibly in the US). 
As with harm reduction more broadly, the issue of 
overdose shows how the war on drugs first fuels the 
emergence of a health harm, and then creates obstacles 
for health professionals seeking to reduce it.
3. Wider health impacts of the war on drugs 
Undermining development and security
 
The war on drugs is actively undermining development, 
human rights and security in many of the world’s most 
fragile regions and states – from Afghanistan and the 
Andes, to the Caribbean and West Africa, with catastrophic 
public health impacts in the affected regions. 
As well as the wider impacts on health that flow from 
the underdevelopment and destabilisation associated 
with drug-related corruption and conflict, there are 
direct health and human rights impacts (including 
issues around the right to health) associated with some 
specific enforcement practices. These include chemical 
eradication, arbitrary detention, torture, corporal 
punishment, and, in extreme cases, use of the death 
penalty.
There are also substantial opportunity costs from 
directing limited government and aid resources into 
counterproductive enforcement instead of proven health 
and social programs (see chapter 6).
Reducing access to pain control 
Global drug control efforts aimed at non-medical use of 
opiates have had a chilling effect on medical uses for pain 
control and palliative care. Unduly restrictive regulations 
and policies – such as those limiting doses and prescribing, 
or banning particular preparations – have been imposed 
in the name of controlling the illicit diversion of drugs.
48
 
However, according to the World Health Organization, 
these measures result in 5.5 billion people – including 
5.5 million with terminal cancer – having low to 
nonexistent access to opiate medicines.
49
 More powerful 
opiate preparations, such as morphine and diamorphine 
(medical-grade heroin), are unattainable in over 150 
countries.
Are there benefits? 
The theory behind the war on drugs is not complex: on 
the demand side, punitive enforcement against users 
aims to act both as a deterrent to use, and as support for 
health and prevention initiatives (by “sending a message” 
about the risks or unacceptability of drug use). At the 
same time, supply-side enforcement aims to reduce or 
eliminate drug availability, as well as increasing prices so 
that drugs become less attractive. The dominant measure 
of benefits of the war on drugs is therefore reduced use, 
and, for many states, specifically the creation of a “drug-
free world”.
50
 
This theory can now be tested against 50 years of drug-
war experience, and it is clear that it is not supported by 
the evidence. Despite fluctuations between types of drug, 
regions and populations, drug availability and use globally 
have risen over the past half-century, albeit stabilising in 
much of the developed world during the past decade.
51
 
Given the centrality of the deterrent effect in drug-war 
thinking, there is a striking absence of evidence in its 
favour. As detailed elsewhere in this report (see chapter 10) 
comparative analysis between jurisdictions with different 
levels or intensity of punitive user-level enforcement 
points to any deterrent effect being marginal, with other 
social, cultural and economic variables playing a far more 
significant role in determining demand.
52
While enforcement clearly increases prices and restricts 
availability to some degree, it is also clear that, even if 
some hurdles need to be negotiated and expense incurred, 
drugs are available to most people who want them, most 
of the time. Supply has generally kept pace with rising 
demand, and the interaction between the two has kept 
prices low enough to not be a significant deterrent to 
use. When supply has fallen below demand (whether 
due to enforcement or other factors), as the UNODC has 
noted, the result will tend to be falling drug purity or 
displacement to other drugs (both with unpredictable 
health consequences), or new entrants to the market until 
a new equilibrium is established. 
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Regardless of the actual impacts of the war on drugs, the 
consensus and shared purpose that the international drug 
conventions represent – the need to address the problems 
associated with drug misuse – at least holds the potential 
to develop more effective international responses guided 
by the principles of the United Nations – improving 
human rights, human development and human security. 
This could deliver huge health benefits nationally and 
internationally. 
 
How to count the costs? 
While an enormous amount of money is spent on 
drugs and health research, especially in the US, this has 
historically been skewed towards studying drug toxicity 
and dependence. This work can help establish risks, 
develop treatments, and support rhetorical justifications 
for a war against the drugs “threat”, but tends to avoid 
meaningful scrutiny and evaluation of the negative health 
impacts of the drug war itself. 
So while it remains important to fully explore and 
understand drug-related health harms, this needs to be 
complemented by careful evaluation of all the policies 
intended to mitigate such harms. Indeed, policy outcomes 
and policy alternatives should be carefully evaluated and 
explored. 
The responsibility for this has historically fallen 
mostly to NGOs, using a range of established evaluative 
tools to build up the clear, but admittedly patchwork, 
understanding that we now have. Government and UN 
agencies’ more systematic participation and support 
of this area of research – developing a comprehensive 
system of health indicators for evaluating and reporting 
on drug policy impacts for example, or by using health 
impact assessments
53
 – would support development of 
new approaches and modification of existing ones. This 
would ensure the most efficient mitigation of policy-
related harms at a local, national and international level, 
both in the short and long term.
Conclusions 
A great irony of the war on drugs is that although it was 
launched with the intention of protecting public health, 
it has achieved the exact opposite. Not only are impacts 
of supply- and user-level enforcement measures, at best, 
marginal in terms of reducing availability and deterring 
use, they have created new harms and hindered proven 
public health responses. Failed and counterproductive 
enforcement is hugely expensive and continues to absorb 
the majority of drug budgets, at the direct expense of 
established public health interventions that often remain 
underfunded despite demonstrating cost-effectiveness. 
It is now clear that responding to a serious and growing 
public health challenge within a punitive criminal justice 
framework has been a public health catastrophe, the 
costs of which have barely begun to be acknowledged by 
policy makers.
For medical and public health professionals, the war 
on drugs approach presents an acute dilemma as 
they are required to operate within a legal and policy 
environment that creates and exacerbates health harms, 
and is associated with widespread human rights abuses 
– directly at odds with public health principles and basic 
medical ethics. 
Public health and human rights always suffer in war 
zones, and the drug war contributes to a culture in which 
both are marginalised. The drugs issue has become highly 
politicised, often hijacked by a series of unrelated political 
agendas including race and immigration, law-and-order 
populism, and the war on terror. Science and pragmatic 
public health thinking has given way to political posturing 
and moral grandstanding. The resulting public debate 
has, in the past, pushed meaningful evaluation and 
rational discussion to the margins. 
A reorientation towards a public health approach needs 
to be more than mere rhetoric: other options, including 
decriminalisation and models of legal regulation, should, 
at the very least, be debated and explored using the 
best possible evidence and analysis. Not only are health 
professionals and NGOs perfectly positioned to lead this 
process, but with ever more senior figures all over the 
globe calling for change, and change itself happening, the 
moment for a genuine debate has come.
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Introduction
Contemporary drug prohibition has gifted such a massive 
money-making opportunity to organised crime groups 
that they have accrued a level of wealth and firepower 
which enables them to challenge the state, or even usurp its 
monopoly on legitimate violence (sometimes considered 
the definition of the state itself
1
). The subsequent 
militarisation of the fight against these organised crime 
groups has served only to further undermine security.
As a result, member states that implement the UN’s 
prohibition-based drug control system are effectively 
obliged to violate the organisation’s founding principle: 
the maintenance of international peace and security. This 
is not to claim that all of the security costs identified in 
this chapter arise solely because of the global drug war; 
however, the evidence shows that the “threat-based” 
response to certain drugs has created some of the world’s 
greatest security threats.
What is security?
Although “security” is used differently in a variety of 
fields and contexts, in general, it is the concept that the 
state and its citizens require protection from threats. 
The maintenance of security occurs at different scales 
– human, citizen or public security focus on protection 
against threats to individuals, while national security 
refers to protection against threats to nation states and 
their institutions, and regional and international security 
to protection of international structures and organisations, 
such as the UN or European Union. This chapter primarily 
focuses on threats to international and national security.
The two distinct drug wars that 
undermine security
Governments justify global prohibition by claiming that 
the non-medical use of certain drugs (excluding alcohol 
and tobacco) represents a grave threat to humankind; 
that users and suppliers constitute “existential threats” to 
security; and that a punitive approach is the only way to 
provide protection for citizens. An international relations 
theory describes this as “securitisation”.
2 3
  
This threat-based approach is underpinned by the three 
UN drug conventions. The Preamble to the 1961 UN Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs starts by placing drugs in 
a health and welfare framework: “Concerned with the 
health and welfare of mankind…” But quickly asserts 
that member states have a duty to treat them as a threat: 
“Recognizing that addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes 
a serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social 
and economic danger to mankind … Conscious of their 
duty to prevent and combat this evil…”
4
 
The UN seeks to promote the security of its member states through 
implementing a drug control system that treats the use of certain 
drugs as an “existential threat” to society. But this approach is having 
the opposite effect: it is undermining peace and security by creating 
a huge criminal market that enriches criminal organisations to such 
an extent that in many regions their power threatens the state.
“Impunity and ungovernability pose 
a challenge to the collective security 
and well-being of any State...When 
state structures become involved 
with and affected by violence and 
systemic corruption, drug trafficking 
can further weaken the efficacy of 
Governments to the point of creating 
“failed State” conditions at the national 
or subregional level.” 
International Narcotics Control Board
2016
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the trade in smuggled weapons, the plunder of natural 
resources and piracy.”
7
A similar conclusion was reached by the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in their 2012 report 
“Drugs, Insecurity and Failed States: The Problems of 
Prohibition”.
8
 As Nigel Inkster, Director of Transnational 
Threats and Political Risk at IISS, and former Deputy Head 
of the UK’s MI6 Special Intelligence Service, commented:
“The so-called war on drugs has created a significant 
threat to international security... producer and 
transit countries [governments]...face the unenviable 
choice between allowing their institutions to become 
corrupted...or embarking upon what is effectively a 
civil war in order to defeat them.”
Reports from the UNODC and UN Security Council – which 
is charged with identifying and responding to security 
threats – show that illicit drug production and trafficking 
cover vast regions of the world. The Security Council 
has also concluded that this illicit trade poses a threat to 
international security:
“The Security Council notes with concern the serious 
threats posed in some cases by drug trafficking and 
related transnational organized crime to international 
security in different regions of the world, including 
in Africa. The increasing link, in some cases, between 
drug trafficking and the financing of terrorism, is also 
a source of growing concern.”
9
What it has failed to do, however, is to then apply 
the UNODC’s analysis showing that this illicit drug 
production and trafficking is the inevitable consequence 
of prohibiting a global trade with hundreds of millions 
of consumers. Combining these two analyses would have 
identified the UN drug control system itself as a threat to 
international security.
It would also demonstrate that the UN itself is now 
overseeing a war that is seriously undermining one of the 
key pillars of its work –  peace and security – and Article 
One of its own founding constitution, the UN Charter, 
and indeed its raison d’être, which is: “To maintain 
international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to the peace.”
10
 Instead, the UN Security 
Council has chosen to interpret the UNODC analysis, and 
its own evidence, as a prescription not for change, but for 
redoubled efforts.
11
The 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic In Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances then identifies the 
threat posed by the criminal organisations involved in 
the illicit drug trade: “Recognizing the links between illicit 
traffic and other related organized criminal activities 
which undermine the legitimate economies and threaten 
the stability, security and sovereignty of States.”
5
So, as the two conventions clearly articulate, there are in 
reality two distinct drug wars being fought, in parallel. 
The first is the fight against addiction, which criminalises 
those who use, supply or produce certain drugs for non-
medical purposes. 
  
However, it was an entirely predictable outcome that 
this prohibition would result in control of the drug 
trade defaulting to criminal entrepreneurs, given the 
persistently high demand for drugs. The second drug war 
is fought against these criminals who are enriched by the 
proceeds of the initial prohibition to the point where they 
threaten the security of the state and its citizens. Using 
increasingly militarised enforcement to try to eliminate 
these entrepreneurs, and the illicit market in which 
they operate, then further undermines security via a 
combination of interlinked direct and indirect impacts.
As discussed in the introduction to this report, the 
UNODC’s World Drug Report 2008 describes five major 
“unintended consequences” of the global drug control 
system.
6
 Three of these have a negative impact on security: 
firstly the creation of a huge criminal market that supports 
the organised crime and insurgent groups that control 
it; secondly, the displacement of resources from health 
to enforcement; and thirdly, the “balloon effect”, which 
describes how enforcement, rather than eliminating the 
drug problem, often merely displace it to new locations – 
like air moving around in a squeezed balloon. 
On its website, the UNODC described how the process of 
enforcing prohibition creates regional insecurity:
“Global drug control efforts have had a dramatic 
unintended consequence: a criminal black market of 
staggering proportions. Organized crime is a threat 
to security. Criminal organizations have the power to 
destabilize society and Governments. The illicit drug 
business is worth billions of dollars a year, part of 
which is used to corrupt government officials and to 
poison economies. 
“Drug cartels are spreading violence in Central 
America, Mexico and the Caribbean. West Africa is 
under attack from narco-trafficking. Collusion between 
insurgents and criminal groups threatens the stability 
of West Asia, the Andes and parts of Africa, fuelling 
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The UN drug control system undermines the security of UN member states
The UNODC openly acknowledges that the enforcement-led UN drug control system creates the 
criminal drug market, meaning the system itself is effectively the cause of illicit drug production 
and trafficking globally. In turn, among many others, the UNODC,
12
 UN Security Council,
13 14
 and the 
US Presidential Determination for 2015
15
 have identified this illicit trade as a cause of insecurity 
in over 60 countries across the globe. As a result, maps (such as those below) that illustrate global 
flows of illicit drugs in the UNODC’s World Drug Report 2015 also inadvertently reveal where 
national, regional and international security is compromised or threatened by drug production and 
trafficking.
16
 While many of the places negatively affected – such as Central and South America, West 
Africa, and South East Asia – are perhaps no surprise, even countries with large financial sectors like 
the UK may be threatened indirectly by the corrupting effects of laundering drug money.
17
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The security costs of the 
war on drugs
How the “unintended consequences” of the 
UN drug control system undermine security
1. Creating a criminal market of 
staggering proportions
The sheer size and financial power of the illegal drugs 
industry can undermine legitimate governments 
everywhere, generating lucrative funding streams for 
drug trafficking organisations (DTOs), transnational 
organised crime groups (TOCs) and, some evidence 
suggests, insurgent and terrorist groups.
 A strong state is recognised as one that holds the monopoly 
on legitimate force, alongside other key responsibilities, 
such as being able to provide procedural justice; a 
recognised system – usually democratic – of government; 
a fair allocation of resources; and a sense of identity and 
citizenship. The drug war undermines these elements of 
good governance by creating corruption, violence and 
conflict, which can allow non-state actors such as DTOs, 
TOCs and insurgent groups to create parallel structures 
of power and capability that can threaten the integrity of 
the state itself. Citizens’ faith in the state is undermined, 
which can also increase insecurity.
18
 
As they grow in influence, DTOs and TOCs are particularly 
drawn to fragile states that are already struggling to 
provide security for their citizens. Here, the corruption, 
instability and conflict associated with the illicit drug 
trade is amplified by existing poor governance. Apart 
from a few cases where the state and its elites successfully 
collude with DTOs and TOCs to maintain a functioning 
state – such as in Burma
19
 and Tajikistan
20
 (see box, p. 61) 
– effective governance is rare in very corrupt states, and 
can further exacerbate conditions for conflict.
Throughout Latin America, but also in Central Asia and 
West Africa, long-running civil wars and decades of poor 
governance have been exacerbated by the war on drugs. 
An estimated 95% of illicit drug production occurs in 
such areas, and trafficking from and across them is made 
easier by their chaotic environment.
21
“So long as there is an insistent 
market in a country like the United 
States for illegal narcotics and a 
sufficient profit to be made, they will 
probably be produced. And so long 
as they are illegal, their production 
and distribution will be through 
organized crime.”
Ambassador David Passage
former Director of Andean Affairs, 
US State Department 
2000
“From UN DPA’s perspective and in 
light of the increasingly destabilizing 
effect of transnational organized 
crime and drug trafficking on state 
and regional security, Member 
States may wish to hold a discussion 
on the possibility of including the 
peace and security implications of 
this threat … to exchange ideas and 
lessons learned on what has and has 
not worked in addressing the world 
drug problem, with implications 
for the work of the United Nations 
across its three pillars – namely 
development, human rights, and 
peace and security.”
United Nations Department 
of Political Affairs 
2015
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The vast amounts of money generated by the criminal 
market also has a destabilising and corrupting effect on 
financial systems. A 2015 UK Treasury report estimated 
that 2.7% of global GDP, or $1.6 trillion, was laundered in 
2009, much of which will have come from the drugs trade. 
The report concluded that both money laundering itself, 
and the criminality which drives the need to launder 
money, presents a significant risk to the UK’s national 
security and fuels political instability in key partner 
countries. The drug trade, which largely generates 
proceeds in the form of cash, poses a high risk of money 
laundering, which is in turn a key enabler of serious 
and organised crime, which has estimated social and 
economic costs of £24 billion a year.
31
 
Corruption and impunity
Public servants around the world who are supposed to 
be enforcing the drug control regime are often the most 
susceptible to corruption, simply because they control the 
mechanisms to which criminal gangs need access in order 
to carry out their trade. From low-level police officers to 
high-ranking politicians and the military, individuals are 
routinely corrupted, through bribery or threats, to either 
turn a blind eye to, or actively participate in, illicit activity. 
They are rarely brought to trial, prosecuted or punished. 
In Mexico, the death toll from drug-market-related 
violence has risen to over 100,000 since 2006, with more 
than 40% of the bodies remaining unidentified and little 
justice for the affected families or redress from the state.
29
 
This corruption and impunity corrodes the state’s ability 
to govern effectively, and undermines the rule of law.
30
 
Afghanistan: a study in insecurity
“You cannot carry a war on drugs because, again, if you look at the literature on Latin America, Central 
America, and particularly Mexico... the lesson that is fundamental, [is that] those are failures.”
22
 
Mohammad Ashraf Ghani
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
2015
Afghanistan faces many security challenges, and has a long history of involvement in the global opium trade. 
Despite poppy eradication being one of the stated aims of the coalition invasion in 2001,
23
 opium production 
increased dramatically during the war. Today it supplies more than 90% of global illicit opium/heroin,
24
 which 
is fuelling unprecedented corruption, as well as funding insurgency, and terror groups, both nationally and 
internationally. It is important to exercise caution here, however, as governments have been quick to point to 
terrorist groups – for example, Al Qaeda –  being funded by drugs when this was later shown not to be the case.
25
• The UNODC estimates that in 2014:
26
• Opiates accounted for 13% of Afghanistan’s GDP and considerably exceeded the export value of licit 
goods and services. This is down from 42% in 2008, and is due to the expansion of the licit economy, 
rather than a contraction in opium production
• The total area of opium poppy cultivation was 224,000 hectares in 2014, a 7% increase from the 
previous year. In Helmand province, opium accounted for almost 30% of the total area of agricultural 
land. Potential opium production was 6,400 tons, an increase of 17% from its 2013 level, and the 
second highest since 1994 
• The UN Security Council estimates the Taliban earn $90-160 million annually from opium/heroin 
production, 10-15% of their overall funding. This is substantial, but represents only 3% of the annual 
harvest sale.
27
 Far more money goes to corrupt officials, traffickers and farmers
• Afghan government officials are believed to be involved in at least 70% of opium trafficking, and at least 13 
former or present provincial governors are directly involved in the drug trade
28
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Large parts of South and Central America now experience 
endemic illicit-drug-related corruption. The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, for example, 
has recognised the corrosive influence of criminal funds 
as a problem for the whole Latin American region, stating 
that in various countries “corruption and impunity have 
enabled criminal organisations to develop and establish 
parallel power structures.”
32
 
Unsurprisingly, the countries most closely involved in 
the production or transit of illicit drugs fare badly in 
Transparency International’s corruption perception 
index: Afghanistan and Guinea-Bissau, for example, sit 
close to the bottom, while Mexico and Colombia are also 
heavily criticised.
• As the escape of Sinaloa drug cartel leader Joaquin 
“El Chapo” Guzman Loera from a Mexican jail in 
July 2015 showed, corruption reaches all levels of 
the justice system. So far, seven prison officers have 
been charged with complicity in the escape
33
• Afghanistan, already a fragile state, has been 
severely undermined by corruption and the 
profits from the illicit drugs trade. The police and 
intelligence services regularly kill and torture with 
impunity. Corruption is so rampant that a bribe is 
paid for every service – whether to secure access to 
electricity or purchase a highly valued public sector 
job, even within the judicial system
34
 
“Because drug cartels control such 
immense amounts of money, they 
now have the power to influence 
politics and business at the 
highest levels and gain control of 
entire regions.”
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
2010
Violence and conflict
In the absence of formal regulation – such as legal contract 
enforcement, financial reporting, and the establishment 
of trades unions, for example – violence and intimidation 
have become the default regulatory tools for TOCs and 
DTOs wishing to protect and expand their illicit-market 
interests. To do so, cartels equip private armies and 
militias that are in many cases able to outgun local and 
state enforcement. Organised criminal networks can also 
finance or merge with separatist and insurgent groups, 
and illicit drug profits can become a key source of funding 
for domestic and international terror groups. 
It might seem logical, in the light of the violence 
perpetuated by DTOs and TOCs, that enforcement 
responses directed at these groups would increase 
security and reduce conflict, but this is rarely the case. 
An overview of research into enforcement crackdowns 
found overwhelmingly that such market disruption 
increases levels of violence. This occurs not just because of 
increased violence between criminal groups and security 
forces, but also between and within criminal groups, 
when enforcement action creates a power vacuum, and 
corresponding opportunities to seize illicit market share 
or territory.
35
 Inevitably, ordinary people are often caught 
in the crossfire (see below). 
“Mexico’s police and armed services 
are known to be contaminated 
by multimillion dollar bribes from 
the transnational narco-trafficking 
business ... it is widely considered to 
have attained the status of a national 
security threat.”
Transparency International
2001
46
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State violence
Security is being undermined in many countries by the 
violence perpetrated by police and security forces, either 
at the direct instruction of governments, or indirectly as 
a result of drug-war-related policies (see also chapter 4).
• A report by the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the 
Colombia-Europe-US Human Rights Observatory 
has discovered a positive correlation between 
US military assistance (which has been a feature 
of Colombia’s response to its drug problem) and 
extrajudicial killings, particularly when “moderate” 
amounts of funding are received. Multiple killings 
were committed by soldiers in a higher percentage 
of units commanded by US-trained officers than by a 
random sample of military officers
45
 
• A Global Drug Policy Observatory report on the 
militarisation of counter-narcotic police in Central 
America showed that, in Honduras alone, between 
January 2011 and November 2012, 149 civilians were 
murdered by their police force
46
• In 2003, the Thai government launched a drug 
war crackdown, the first three months of which 
saw 2,800 extrajudicial killings. These were 
not investigated and the perpetrators were not 
prosecuted or punished. The Thai Office of the 
Narcotics Control Board admitted in 2007 that 1,400 
of the people killed had no link to drugs
47
• In 2015, the Indonesian government mooted a 
revival of their “shoot to kill” policy for dealing with 
drug smugglers and dealers, which it described 
as “ruthless”. Opponents point out this would 
contravene the Indonesian constitution
48
• As many as 1,000 executions occur worldwide for 
drug offences each year, but precise numbers are 
unknown. Statistics for China are most uncertain, 
with estimates of executions for all offences in 2007 
varying from 2,000 to 15,000.
49
 Iran has seen a rapid 
increase – 800 in 2015 alone.
50
 The UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office says: “Iran continues to have 
the highest execution rate per capita in the world 
… The death penalty was imposed largely for drug 
offences.”
51
Mexico
While Mexico has a long history of internal 
violence, this was in decline until 2006, when 
President Calderon announced an intensification 
of enforcement efforts against the illicit drug 
trade, with a focus on eliminating the leaders 
of the country’s drug cartels. This so-called 
“decapitation strategy” has been – and still 
is – having severe negative consequences, 
with Mexico suffering an extreme upswing in 
violence. As cartel leaders were removed
36
 and 
a power vacuum created, their organisations 
fractured into smaller factions battling each 
other for territory, while other cartels moved in 
to seize control, along with state security forces.
37
 
Estimates of deaths from violence related to the 
illegal drug trade in Mexico since the war on 
drugs was scaled up in 2006 range from 60,000 to 
more than 120,000,
38 39
 of which at least 1,300 were 
children and 4,000 women. From 2007 to 2014, 
total civilian homicide deaths in Mexico were 
164,000 – a substantially higher number than in 
Iraq or Afghanistan over the same period.
40
These increasingly brutal murders are also 
designed to intimidate competitors and generate 
fear, with murders and torture being filmed and 
posted online, or the bodies left in public places.
41
 
This strategy is not restricted to Mexican drug 
gangs; a study on drug dealing and retaliation 
in St Louis, Missouri, in the US, found that 
direct and violent retaliation was used to serve 
three functions: “reputation maintenance, loss 
recovery and vengeance.”
42
 Such actions further 
increase insecurity and normalise violence 
at levels that destroy communities and deter 
legitimate economic activity.
Mexico’s drug war is also fuelling the illegal arms 
trade, flooding the country with unregistered 
weapons, which inevitably leads to greater 
violent conflict. It has been estimated that up to 
90% of these weapons come across the border 
from the US.
43
 In 2009, the US Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives discovered 
large quantities of AK-47-style rifles were being 
shipped to Mexico, one of which was linked to 
the killing of a US border guard.
44
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Funding and arming insurgents, terrorists and 
separatists
The extent of the links between the global drug war and 
funding for non-state actors – the so-called “drugs-terror” 
nexus – is hotly disputed.
52
 However, it would be hard 
to argue against the claim that in some circumstances 
the effect of the criminal market goes beyond merely 
undermining the state, to directly competing with it by 
giving non-state actors access to a rich source of funding. 
It is highly likely, given the vast sums of money generated 
by the criminal drug trade, and the fact that much of it 
is laundered through the legal global banking system,
53
 
that illicit drug profits are funding efforts to undermine 
multiple states.
The drug war, and in particular its crop eradication 
tactics, has also been accused of pushing people off the 
land and towards insurgent groups. Richard Holbrooke, 
then US Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
admitted that opium poppy eradication alienated “poor 
farmers ... growing the best cash crop they could … in a 
market where they couldn’t get others things to market”, 
with the result that, “we were driving people into the 
hands of the Taliban.”
54
 
Relationships between insurgents and drug trafficking 
groups can flourish despite there being strong, often 
ideological, differences between them,
55
 as with the 
Marxist revolutionary FARC in Colombia, who have 
consistently used drug production and trafficking to fund 
their operations.
56
 In addition, the smuggling networks 
of DTOs and TOCs can be used by insurgents to transport 
weapons, or be taxed to raise cash. As long ago as the 
1980s, Peruvian President Fernando Belaunde Terry, 
described the Maoist insurgency group The Shining Path 
as “narco-terrorists’’, alleging that they were involved in 
drug production and trafficking.
57
 More recently, it was 
discovered that, in Brazil, smuggling networks associated 
with the illegal drug trade were supporting a parallel 
criminal market economy in consumer goods that was 
costing the nation over $10 billion in lost tax revenues.
58
It is important to note, however, that the extent of the 
“drugs-terror nexus” may sometimes be exaggerated for 
political or economic reasons. Authorities may wish to 
blame criminal drug activity on insurgent groups in order 
to increase their own law enforcement funding, or as a 
distraction from their own illicit activities. For example, 
research initially suggested that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) and other Islamist groups in West Africa 
have been using cigarette smuggling, drug trafficking and 
kidnapping to provide them with funds, but news reports 
of this were overstated or unsubstantiated. AQIM may be 
Mali
In Mali, where Islamist fighters seized control 
of the north in 2012, drug trafficking has 
exacerbated the conflict. A 2013 UN Security 
Council report on West Africa and the Sahel 
recognised the impact of corruption from drug 
trafficking as a factor that contributed to state 
weakness in countries within the region, notably 
Mali and Guinea-Bissau.
63 
In June 2015, foreign minister Abdoulaye Diop 
called on the UN to provide a peacekeeping force 
to help regain control from the militias and for a 
major anti-drug trafficking operation to be put in 
place because he argued: “We will never achieve 
a definite settlement for this crisis without this 
initiative because drugs are fuelling all sides in 
this conflict”.
64
 Mali therefore found itself calling 
for the UN to send in forces to deal with a problem 
that was being simultaneously fuelled by the UN-
administered global drug control regime.  
providing armed escorts to cocaine traffickers for a fee 
of between 10-15% of the value of the drug,
59
 an activity 
that could have netted them up to $65 million since 2008 
and helped them to become a serious political force.
60
 
However, this forms only a part of their funding stream.
61 62
 
2. Displacing resources toward enforcement
Greater funding for the militarisation of drug law 
enforcement can starve vital social programmes of the 
resources and focus they need. This so-called “policy 
displacement”
65
 results in domestic and international 
drug control interventions and aid resources being 
heavily skewed towards military and law enforcement 
solutions, rather than policies focusing on improving 
development, health and human rights. Just as a balanced 
programme of spending to benefit all citizens contributes 
to security, so an unbalanced programme that favours 
weapons over access to education, healthcare and 
economic opportunities, undermines security.
On a national level, this is perhaps best seen in the US, 
where the threat-based approach and harsh sentencing 
for drugs offences has resulted in the disproportionate 
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mass incarceration of people from poor areas. The 
prison industry has swollen, in both financial and human 
resources terms, while many urban centres are left to 
decay without adequate investment, with few jobs outside 
the criminal economy. 
The numbers are staggering: America’s prison and jail 
population has increased sevenfold from 1970 until today, 
from some 300,000 people to 2.2 million – the largest 
prison population in the world. With less than 5 percent 
of the world’s inhabitants – the US has about 25 percent 
of its prisoners.
66
 
Internationally, resources can be similarly skewed to 
focus on enforcement and punishment. Since the 1980s, 
the US has instigated a series of aid programmes – such 
as the Andean Initiative, Plan Colombia and the Merida 
Initiative – that focus specifically on bolstering the ability 
of military and law enforcement agencies in the region to 
reduce the supply of drugs into the US. One of the major 
drivers behind these programmes was the alleged threat 
to the US’s national security, rather than the actual needs 
of the populations receiving aid.
67
In 1999, Colombia’s President Andrés Pastrana requested 
US assistance in addressing the country’s drug problem, 
and emphasised the need to prioritise development and 
social programmes over law enforcement and military 
agendas. But the US wanted the focus to remain on drug 
war approaches: of the $860 million given to Colombia, 
$632 million went on security agencies and only $227 
million was earmarked for economic development and 
other social priorities.
68
 Security spending has increased 
massively in Colombia since the beginning of Plan 
Colombia, with the US spending about $8 billion,
69
 and 
from 2000-09 Colombia’s defence spending nearly tripled 
to $12 billion.
70
 
In 2000, President Bill Clinton urged Congress to support 
the plan by emphasising the national security of both 
Colombia and the US. He argued that: “Colombia’s drug 
traffickers directly threaten America’s security”.
71
 While 
things have improved in Colombia, the results of fighting 
the drug war remain overwhelmingly disastrous: murders 
and kidnappings remain high,
72
 the number of internally 
displaced persons has barely altered,
73
 the amount of 
cocaine entering the US has not decreased,
74
 and coca 
production in Colombia rose from 48,000 hectares in 2013 
to 69,000 hectares in 2014.
75
3. How the balloon effect 
impacts on security
The last of the UNODC’s “unintended consequences” of 
the war on drugs that specifically impacts on security 
is the balloon effect.
76
 This has serious implications for 
national and international security, because DTOs will 
successively target alternative regions; as enforcement 
efforts encroach on their territory, they simply move 
elsewhere. This means the negative impacts of the drug 
war and illicit trade are spreading across multiple regions, 
and present an ongoing threat to any fragile state or area 
that could be used for drug production or trafficking.
• Coca production has repeatedly shifted between 
Peru, Colombia and Bolivia, as a response to localised 
enforcement efforts
77
• In recent years, as enforcement disrupted established 
drug trafficking routes from Latin America via the 
Caribbean to Europe, West Africa has become a new 
transshipment point for cocaine. This has had a 
hugely destabilising effect on an already vulnerable 
part of the world and is undermining security at 
state, regional and international levels
78
• As Colombians started to regain control over their 
country and crack down on TOCs and DTOs, the 
violence and corruption moved to Mexico. It has 
been argued that, in turn, the best Mexico can hope to 
achieve is to apply pressure to  the cartels so that they 
move elsewhere. To some extent, this appears to have 
happened, with Mexican cartels setting up operations 
in Central American countries such as Guatemala
79
 
and Honduras,
80
 which are even less well equipped to 
cope with them than Mexico
“The illicit drug economy threatens 
security and development in countries 
already stricken by poverty and 
instability, but its deadly tentacles 
penetrate every country on the planet.”
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
2010
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Are there benefits?
For citizens in countries where corruption is endemic and 
where the state is fragile or absent, some stability (at least 
in the short term) can be provided by a combination of 
state apparatus and the power and largesse of organised 
crime groups working together, as occurs in places such 
as Burma
81
 and Tajikistan (see chapter 3).
82
   
For those states seeking to achieve security primarily 
through a militarised response to existential threats, the 
global drug war provides ample opportunities to wield 
military and police power. However, the evidence is clear 
that this does not provide any long-term security benefits, 
and more commonly achieves the exact opposite. 
 
 
How to count the costs?
When the UNODC identified the five major “unintended 
consequences” of enforcing the UN drug control system in 
2008, the question of whether the intended consequences 
outweighed the “unintended” ones arose. That question 
is only now beginning to be seriously debated at the 
international level. Because of the gravity of the harms 
created by the drug control system, it is incumbent upon 
all UN member states to have systems in place to measure 
positive and negative outcomes, in order to assess overall 
effectiveness, and for the relevant UN agencies to collate 
these responses in order to provide a global picture of 
costs against benefits. Indicators relating to the three 
pillars of the UN – peace and security, development and 
human rights – are currently almost absent from this 
“We are now helping other countries, 
the Caribbean countries, Central 
American countries, Mexico, 
because our success means more 
problems for them... There is the 
balloon effect.”
Juan Manuel Santos 
President of Colombia 
2010
scrutiny, throwing into doubt the claim that the drug 
control system has any meaningful evidence base at all. 
Peace and security is absolutely fundamental to the 
workings of the UN, and identifying indicators that assess 
security impacts of drug control efforts is an essential 
part of this. In the absence of such indicators, member 
states are doomed to repeat the failings of the past.
Conclusions
Illicit drug production and trafficking has not appeared 
from nowhere; it is a direct consequence of global 
prohibition in the context of rising demand, and the 
increasingly “threat-based” enforcement responses 
adopted by member states, with the tacit approval of 
the UN drug control agencies. But while people who use 
drugs have never been a genuine threat to society, the 
criminal entrepreneurs profiting from the illicit market 
that supplies them under prohibition, are now genuinely 
putting society in jeopardy. As a result, the UN now faces 
a major international security threat of its own making. 
A growing number of governments are beginning to 
recognise that this is the case. At the UN Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs in 2009, Ecuador described its approach 
as a “De-securitisation of drug policy which allows us to 
address the problem from the perspective of health and 
human rights”.
83
 
However, not only are many countries moving away from 
enforcement-led approaches with regard to drug users, 
supply-side reforms that reduce the illicit trade – and 
accompanying security threat – are also becoming a reality. 
The then president of Uruguay, José Mujica, for example, 
has stated that the decision to establish a government-
controlled cannabis market “began essentially as a 
security issue”.
84
 Evidence of the impacts on security of 
such reforms should be increasingly apparent as more 
US states, and other countries follow Uruguay in legally 
regulating cannabis, and shifting from a threat-based 
to a health and human rights-based approach (see case 
studies chapter). 
Rather than viewing drug trafficking in isolation of its 
policy context, the UN Security Council should, using the 
UNODC’s analysis, categorise the punitive enforcement-
based drug control system as a threat to international 
peace and security. And all member states must, as a 
matter of urgency, review the security impacts of the 
drug war domestically and internationally, if true peace 
and stability is to be realised.
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Two parallel UN drug control systems: only one creates war and insecurity
The 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs created parallel drug control systems: one that 
treats some drugs as a threat, the other that treats some of the same drugs as resources to be traded.
Drug war 1: created by  
1961 UN Single Convention 
 
The state criminalises non-medical drug users, 
suppliers and producers to combat the “evil of 
addiction” through global prohibition
Massive criminal market created
Organised crime groups accrue wealth and firepower 
to threaten states
Drug war 2: created by UN Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Drugs 1988
Targets transnational organised crime groups
Further militarisation creates more conflict and 
violence, spreads it to more countries without 
reducing the global criminal drugs market
Drug war 1 and 2 fought harder with same results
 
 
Increasing conflict and insecurity
Regulated medical drug trade: created by 
1961 UN Single Convention 
 
The state licenses farmers/pharmaceutical companies 
to produce and manufacture drugs, and doctors and 
pharmacists to supply users 
 
Legally regulated market created 
No disruption of peace and security
51
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Introduction
Development is one the three pillars of the United Nations’ 
work, alongside peace and security, and human rights. 
Wars always undermine these three pillars; indeed, the 
emergence of the UN in the post-World-War era was, in 
significant part, an effort by the global community to 
reduce and ultimately prevent precisely these harms 
from occurring again.
Yet under the auspices of the UN, the war on drugs’ 
punitive, enforcement-led model, based on police and 
military suppression of drug markets and punishment 
of drug users, has dominated the global response to 
drugs over the past half century. As described in the 
preceding chapter, this is the result of taking a “threat-
based” approach to drugs, in which drug use is presented 
as an existential threat to society to justify the imposition 
of increasingly extreme enforcement measures while 
evidence-based policy, human rights, health, and 
development norms are marginalised. 
In both its execution and outcomes, the war on drugs is 
not a rhetorical construct - it is often indistinguishable 
from more conventional conflicts. The similarities may be 
most obvious in its militarised supply side interventions, 
but they are also evident in the uneven burden of the 
drug war’s cost across the global population. Like all 
wars, this burden invariably falls most heavily on the 
marginalised and vulnerable, who are the primary  targets 
of development efforts. This includes the poor, children 
and young people, women, minority and indigenous 
populations, and people who use drugs. 
It is a terrible irony for the UN that the drug policy model 
it champions is actively undermining peace and security, 
development and human rights, when these are its raison 
d’être.
Given the cross-cutting nature of development, there is 
inevitably considerable overlap with themes explored in 
the other chapters of this report. 
 
Drugs and development
It is important to be clear from the outset that the various 
development costs created or exacerbated by the war 
on drugs are separate from very real health costs (and 
any related development impacts) associated with drug 
misuse per se, such as overdose and dependence. The 
“unintended” costs of the war on drugs specifically result 
not from drug use itself, but from choosing a punitive 
enforcement-led approach that, by its nature, abdicates 
control of the trade to organised crime, and criminalises 
and punishes people who use drugs, or who are involved 
in drug production or drug markets. 
At the root of these problems is a dynamic in which 
rising demand for drugs has collided with   prohibition, 
inevitably creating growing profit opportunities for 
criminal entrepreneurs, and pushing production, supply 
and consumption into a parallel illicit economy. 
Drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) and transnational 
criminal organisations (TCOs) can be more confident 
of a cheap and reliable supply of key drug crops (coca 
leaf, opium poppy or cannabis) if state institutions 
are weak, authorities can be kept at bay, and if local 
populations have few viable alternatives to working in 
the illicit drug economy. As a result, DTOs and TCOs often 
gravitate to already underdeveloped areas with little 
economic infrastructure and weak  governance, targeting 
geographically remote regions and already fragile or 
failing states to produce and transit drugs. In the absence 
of formal market regulation, they then protect and 
expand their interests using violence, intimidation, and 
The war on drugs is actively undermining development in many of 
the world’s most fragile regions and states. The impacts of drug 
market-related corruption and violence are undermining governance, 
exacerbating existing problems and throwing vulnerable producer 
and transit regions into permanent underdevelopment. This chapter 
overlaps with, and should be read with, chapter 2, which explores the 
security impacts of the drug war.
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corruption. The resulting instability and criminalisation 
of the economy has a series of knock-on effects that 
further undermine development.  
Despite the obvious and profound development 
implications of global drug policy, historically there 
has been a lack of engagement in the drugs issue by the 
development community, at civil society, government and 
UN level. This is now  changing, with some substantive 
NGO work being undertaken, notably by Health Poverty 
Action and Christian Aid within the development field 
(see box, p. 54). At the UN level, important work on drugs 
as a development issue has also now emerged in the form 
of a groundbreaking report from the United Nations 
Development Programme (see p. 57). 
What is “development”?
Development is one of the “three pillars” of the United Nations, alongside human rights, and peace and security, but 
is a broad and poorly defined concept that encompasses a range of overlapping analysis and disciplines. 
These include economic development (improving economic health and standard of living) and social development 
(socio-cultural evolution, and development of civic institutions). International development (often closely related 
to economic development) stemmed from post-Second World War international institution building. However, it 
now often includes not just a country’s gross domestic product or average per capita income, but life expectancy, 
human rights and political freedoms, or areas such as literacy and maternal survival rates, in a holistic and multi-
disciplinary context of human development. 
This is a newer concept that incorporates elements of economic and social development into a focus on personal 
and community wellbeing, defined by the United Nations Development Programme as “the process of enlarging 
people’s choices”, allowing people to “lead a long and healthy life, to be educated, to enjoy a decent standard of 
living”, as well as “political freedom, other guaranteed human rights and various ingredients of self-respect”.
1
    
Sustainable development is the concept of achieving human development whilst preserving and protecting natural 
resources and ecosystems – most prominently in the context of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.
2
“Evidence shows that in many parts of 
the world, law enforcement responses 
to drug-related crime have created 
or exacerbated poverty, impeded 
sustainable development and public 
health and undermined human rights of 
the most marginalized people.”  t
he 
United Nations Development Programme
2015
The war on drugs is undermining development in already fragile regions and states
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The UNODC has highlighted that the current approach 
has created a criminal market “of staggering proportions” 
which undermines governance, and creates violence 
and insecurity. It has noted the “right to development” 
in its annual World Drug Report, and has recognised 
the “vicious cycle” of drug production, trafficking and 
poverty.  The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has 
identified illicit drugs and related crime as a “severe 
impediment” to achieving sustainable development, as 
well as to securing human rights, justice, security and 
equality for all, urging Member States to ensure “that 
drug control and anti-crime strategies are sensitive to the 
needs of development”.
3
The development costs of the 
war on drugs
1. Fuelling conflict and violence
Any form of development is undermined by conflict and 
violence and, particularly in key producer and transit 
regions, the concept of a drug “war” has moved from 
political rhetoric to bloody reality. The abdication of 
control of the lucrative and growing illicit drugs market 
to adaptable and ruthless criminal entrepreneurs – and 
subsequent police and militarised responses to them – are 
the core dynamics by which the drug war fuels violence.
“Drug cartels are spreading violence 
in Central America, Mexico and the 
Caribbean. West Africa is under 
attack from narco-trafficking. 
Collusion between insurgents 
and criminal groups threatens the 
stability of West Asia, the Andes and 
parts of Africa, fuelling the trade in 
smuggled weapons, the plunder of 
natural resources and piracy.” 
he 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
2009
Calls for the development field to 
engage in the drugs issue
“While law-enforcement agencies 
and the UN have set out on a one-
dimensional quest to tackle the illicit 
drugs trade, development agencies have 
tended to ignore the problem altogether. 
Reluctant to engage in the ‘war on 
drugs’, we have tended to view the illicit 
economy as something entirely separate 
from the work of development. That is 
no longer possible. Like it or not, the 
drugs trade and other illicit activities are 
now part of the lives of millions of the 
people we aim to support”4
– Christian Aid (2015)
“Just like tax dodging, climate change 
and unfair trade rules, current global 
drug policies undermine global efforts to 
tackle poverty and inequality. Yet, unlike 
with these issues, the development 
sector has remained largely silent 
when it comes to drug policy. If, as 
international NGOs, we are serious 
about dealing with the root causes of 
poverty and not just the symptoms, 
we cannot afford to ignore drug policy. 
It’s time we recognised the threat that 
unreformed global drug policy poses 
to our attempts to tackle poverty 
worldwide. The sector can no longer 
be absent from debates on drug policy 
reform”5
– Health Poverty Action (2015)
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In the absence of any formal market regulation, violence 
becomes the default regulatory tool in the illicit trade, 
and the means by which DTOs secure and expand their 
business. State enforcement interventions against 
organised crime groups can then turn drug policy into 
a very real battle zone. As state responses intensify, 
DTOs naturally fight back with ever increasing ferocity 
– and particularly when state enforcement becomes 
increasingly militarised, these clashes can precipitate a 
terrifying spiral of violence. Drug-related profits are so 
high this can even include equipping private armies, or 
financing insurgent or terrorist groups powerful enough 
to defeat state enforcement. 
Police and military “crackdowns” against lower level 
players in the drug trade and people who use drugs can 
often involve significant violence in themselves. For 
example, there were 2,819 extrajudicial killings under 
the banner of the Thailand government’s war on drugs in 
2003 (a 2007 government committee investigation found 
that 1,400 of the killings were either non-drug dealers or 
no reason could be found for their death).
6
  
While perhaps counterintuitive, research suggests that 
enforcement responses against drug markets have tended 
to increase rather than decrease violence.
7
 Even nominally 
successful enforcement actions against one organisation 
can create spikes in violence as other groups fight to take 
over the market. Similarly, high profile “decapitation 
strategies” that target the cartel bosses can destabilise 
criminal organisations and fuel internecine violence as 
different factions battle to assume control. In the longer 
term, endemic violence can traumatise populations for 
generations, in particular fostering a deeper culture of 
violence among young people.  
It is invariably the poor, marginalised and vulnerable 
who suffer the most on the frontline of such conflict, 
and the negative development implications of pervasive 
violence are huge. Of low-income fragile or conflict-
affected countries, not one has achieved a single 
Millennium Development Goal.
8
 According to the World 
Bank, on average, countries where violence takes root 
have poverty rates more than 20 percentage points higher 
than in other countries. In addition, people in fragile and 
conflict-affected states are:
• More than twice as likely to be undernourished as 
those in other developing countries
• More than three times as likely to be unable to send 
their children to school 
• Twice as likely to see their children die 
before age five
9
The burden of drug-war violence on civic institutions, the 
undermining of the rule of law, the corrosive impact on 
community relations, and the economic burden it imposes 
have a disastrous combined impact on development, 
including acting as a block to future progress.    
 
2. Increasing corruption and 
undermining governance
Good governance and robust institutions are key 
requisites for long-term development. The war on drugs 
and the huge criminal profits it has fuelled have led to 
the corruption of institutions and individuals at every 
level in affected countries blighted by poverty and weak 
governance. (See preceding chapter for more detail.) 
This is the inevitable result of the huge funds high-level 
players in the illicit trade accrue, combined with their 
readiness to threaten violence to force the unwilling 
to take bribes (as they put it in Mexico “plata o plomo” 
“To deal with drugs as a one-
dimensional, law-and-order issue is 
to miss the point ... We have waves 
of violent crime sustained by the 
drug trade, so we have to take the 
money out of drugs.
“The countries in [Latin America] 
that have been ravaged by the armed 
violence associated with drug cartels 
are starting to think laterally about a 
broad range of approaches and they 
should be encouraged to do that. 
They should act on evidence.”
Helen Clark
Head of the United Nations Development Programme
2013
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Colombia: a case study in drug war 
conflict as an obstacle to social and 
economic development
Since the 1970s, Colombia has been at the epicentre of 
illicit cocaine production. The vast profits generated 
have fuelled a disastrous expansion of the already 
problematic internal armed conflict between 
the government and guerrilla movements, most 
significantly FARC, and has driven corruption at all 
levels of police, judiciary and politics. Despite recent 
progress towards a peace settlement, the nexus 
of drug money, internal conflict and corruption 
continues.  
• Colombia’s armed conflict and related human 
rights abuses had, by 2010, displaced over 4.9 
million people
10
• US funding for anti-drug operations has 
become increasingly militarised and largely 
indistinguishable from counterinsurgency. The 
US has also pushed aerial crop eradication that 
has had little impact on coca cultivation, but 
serious impacts on human health, indigenous 
cultures and the environment (aerial crop 
spraying with glyphosate in Colombia was 
suspended in 2015 after WHO declared it was 
probably carcinogenic)
• Transparency International has described how 
Colombia has suffered underdevelopment and 
lawlessness as a result of the illicit drug trade, 
reporting that: “A World Bank survey released 
in February 2002 found that bribes are paid in 
50 per cent of all state contracts. Another World 
Bank report estimates the cost of corruption 
in Colombia at US $2.6 billion annually, the 
equivalent of 60 per cent of the country’s 
debt.”
11
– “cash or lead”). Corruption can have a dire impact on 
social and economic development – distorting economies, 
further undermining the functioning of institutions, and 
creating obstacles to development aid.
Transparency International note:
12
   
“Corruption not only reduces the net income of the 
poor but also wrecks programmes related to their basic 
needs, from sanitation to education to healthcare. 
It results in the misallocation of resources to the 
detriment of poverty reduction programmes …” 
 
And as the UN Drug Control Program described as far 
back as 1998:
“The magnitude of funds under criminal control 
poses special threats to governments, particularly in 
developing countries, where the domestic security 
markets and capital markets are far too small 
to absorb such funds without quickly becoming 
dependent on them. It is difficult to have a functioning 
democratic system when drug cartels have the means 
to buy protection, political support or votes at every 
level of government and society. 
“In systems where a member of the legislature or 
judiciary, earning only a modest income, can easily 
gain the equivalent of some months’ salary from a 
trafficker by making one ‘favourable’ decision, the 
dangers of corruption are obvious.”
13
3. Economic underdevelopment and 
opportunity costs 
The progressive shift of labour and capital into 
the unregulated criminal sector creates a range 
of macroeconomic distortions that fundamentally 
undermines key foundations of sustainable economic 
development. As the economy and institutions of a 
country become progressively more criminalised, other 
illegal businesses under the ownership or protection of 
criminal cartels can gain preferential treatment, making 
it more difficult for legal enterprises to compete. They are 
forced  to either bear a greater burden of taxation and 
regulation, or be drawn into corruption or payment for 
protection. 
Rising levels of drug market related violence can 
compound such economic destabilisation by deterring 
inward investment from both indigenous and external 
businesses. High-profile spikes in drug-market violence 
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can also deter visitors, devastating established tourist 
industries, as has happened even in high-flying resorts 
such as Acapulco.
14
     
While any approach to drugs requires funding, the current 
scale of expenditure on a policy that is not even delivering 
its intended goals represents a huge opportunity cost 
for other areas of development and social policy. As a 
result, many of the poorest areas of affected countries 
are being further impoverished by wasting money on 
counterproductive enforcement that could have been 
invested in public health and education programmes, 
infrastructure and institution building – or any number 
of vital development initiatives. 
As the UN Development Programme has noted: 
 
“The international drug control system seems to have 
paid less attention to consequences for human rights 
and development than to enforcement and interdiction 
efforts. Evidence shows that the economic, human 
and social costs of the implementation of drug policy 
have been enormous. Current drug policies have also 
diverted public institutional and budgetary resources 
away from development priorities. As an example, 
globally, the budget for drug-related law enforcement 
exceeds $100 billion annually, almost the net 
amount of bilateral Official Development Assistance 
(US$134 billion) disbursed by Member countries of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in 2013”
15
 
Health Poverty Action have contextualised the $100+ 
billion annual drug war spend by noting that “the 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI) estimates that 
the additional financing needed to meet the proposed 
Sustainable Development Goal of universal health 
care is US$37 billion a year”.  The Harm Reduction 
International 10 by 20 campaign has similarly observed 
that the UNAIDS estimate of resources needed for 
comprehensive harm reduction coverage for low- and 
middle-income countries is just $2.3 billion per year – 
but current international spending is $170 million.
16
  
Development aid itself can also become distorted. The 
US, and other countries, have diverted aid budgets 
from where it would be most effective, blurring it into 
military spending for its allies in the war on drugs  – most 
significantly in Latin America.
17
  
4. Criminalisation: adding to the burden 
of poverty and marginalisation
Drug crop production is concentrated in socially and 
economically marginalised populations that are not made 
rich by their involvement in the trade. Farmers earn only 
around 1% of the overall global illicit drug income. Most 
of the remaining revenue is earned by the traffickers, 
and most of the mark up occurs once drugs have reached 
consumer market destination countries. 
The problem with “alternative 
development”
A cornerstone of the international response to the 
illicit drug trade has been ‘alternative development’ 
(AD), where drug crop producers are supported 
in shifting to the legal economy by growing licit 
crops such as wheat or fruit. When undertaken 
appropriately, AD can help illicit crop growers 
make the transition to non-drug livelihoods, and 
support localised development and infrastructural 
growth. But there are major problems with many 
AD programmes. A critique of AD produced by the 
Global Drug Policy Observatory notes:  
“Evidence from thirty years of AD programming 
demonstrates limited success in supply reduction 
and that poorly monitored and weakly evaluated 
programmes cause more harm than good; there 
has been little uptake of best practice approaches, 
cultivators rarely benefit from AD programmes, 
the concept of AD is contested and there is no 
shared understanding of ‘development’”
18
But there is also a bigger issue. Like eradication 
efforts, in the long term AD does not impact on 
overall drug crop production. Localised impacts 
merely displace production (and the accompanying 
problems) to another region or country; another 
dimension of the “balloon effect”. So there is no 
overall development benefit, and there may be a net 
cost from drawing other populations into the illicit 
trade.  Even the UNODC – a leading champion of AD 
approaches – has noted that:  
 “Alternative development projects led by 
security and other nondevelopment concerns 
were typically not sustainable – and might result 
in the spread or return of illicit crops or in the 
materialization of other adverse conditions.”
19
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Drug control responses in these areas usually take the 
form of crop eradication, alternative development (see 
box) and punitive enforcement targeting growers and 
traffickers. The results, in terms of sustainable reductions 
in poverty, have been mainly negative and there has 
certainly been no reduction in total drug production – 
which has more than kept pace with rising global demand.
Opium bans and crop eradication programmes in South-
East Asia, Colombia and Afghanistan have been linked 
with increasing poverty among farmers, reduced access 
to health and education, increased indebtedness, large-
scale displacement, accelerated deforestation, and social 
discontent. They have also resulted in an increase in young 
ethnic minority women entering the sex trade, often 
through human trafficking. Drug control measures can 
also drive sections of the population to support insurgent 
groups, or seek employment with criminal gangs, further 
undermining security and governance, and with it the 
prospects for development.
Criminalisation of poor and indigenous communities 
for involvement in the illicit drug trade also exacerbates 
the stigma and resulting discrimination they face 
more broadly in society. This results in a range of 
negative impacts explored in chapters 1 and 7 of this 
report, on health, and on stigma and discrimination, 
including reduced access to health care and education, 
disproportionate imprisonment, and targeting by police 
and security forces.
 
5. Increasing deforestation and pollution
An often overlooked cost of the war on drugs is its negative 
impact on the environment and sustainable development 
– mainly resulting from eradication and aerial spraying 
of drug crops in ecologically sensitive environments, 
such as the Andes and Amazon basin. Eradication not 
only causes localised deforestation, but has a devastating 
multiplier effect because drug producers simply deforest 
new areas for cultivation – the “balloon effect” in action 
again. This problem is made worse because protected 
areas in national parks – where aerial spraying is banned 
– are often targeted. Colombia announced a suspension 
of aerial spraying in 2015 following a WHO report stating 
that glyphosate (the chemical used) was “probably 
carcinogenic”
22
 – but manual eradication is ongoing, and 
glyphosate eradication continues elsewhere, including in 
South Africa.
23
 
The past 20 years have seen the bulk of coca cultivation 
shift from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia, and then from 
region to region within Colombia, or more recently, back 
to Peru. In an example of this futility, the US Office of 
Most drug crop farmers have only small landholdings, and 
face high transport-to-market costs from isolated areas, 
and significant wastage of perishable crops. Adaption 
to grow alternative legitimate crops would require high 
levels of investment and exposure to volatile markets in 
products that offer small and vulnerable profit margins. 
Most have only limited access to credit. For example, in 
Myanmar and Lao PDR, drug-growing households are 
estimated to earn just $200 cash per annum, and drugs 
are grown in areas where poor health and illiteracy 
prevail, where physical and social infrastructures are 
negligible, and populations find themselves marginalised 
and discriminated against by the dominant ethnic group.
20
Involvement by poor farmers in drug crop production 
can therefore generally be seen as resulting from a lack of 
options; the “migration to illegality” driven by “need not 
greed”, as the Transnational Institute describes it.
21
  
“Governments devote ever increasing 
resources to detecting, arresting 
and incarcerating people involved 
in illicit drug markets – with little 
or no evidence that such efforts 
reduce drug related problems or 
deter others from engaging in similar 
activities ... Subsistence farmers and 
day labourers involved in harvesting, 
processing, transporting or trading, 
and who have taken refuge in the 
illicit economy purely for reasons of 
survival, should not be subjected to 
criminal punishment. Only longer-
term socio economic development 
efforts that improve access to land and 
jobs, reduce economic inequality and 
social marginalisation, and enhance 
security can offer them a legitimate 
exit strategy.”
Global Commission on Drug Policy
2014
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6. Fuelling HIV infection and other 
health impacts
The war on drugs creates or exacerbates a number 
of health-related harms that inevitably impact on 
development – creating human costs for individuals and 
communities, and avoidable burdens on scarce health 
and social care resources. Firstly, levels of drug use and 
the associated direct health harms tend to rise in the 
vulnerable and marginalised countries and areas used 
for producing and transiting drugs, as availability rapidly 
increases, including from employees being paid in drugs. 
Secondly, criminalising people who use drugs increases 
health risks; pushing use into unhygienic marginal 
environments and encouraging risky behaviours such 
as sharing injecting equipment, whilst simultaneously 
creating practical and political obstacles to proven health 
interventions, including prevention, harm reduction and 
treatment. These factors have fuelled epidemics of HIV 
and hepatitis B and C among people who inject drugs in 
many developing countries. Roughly, one tenth of new 
HIV infections result from needle sharing among people 
who use drugs, with this figure rising to just under a 
third outside of Sub-Saharan Africa, and approaching or 
exceeding a half in some regions, including many former 
Soviet republics. 
 
7. Undermining human rights, 
promoting discrimination
The protection of human rights is central to the 
achievement of human development. Human rights 
abuses, and unaccountability for those who perpetrate 
them, fundamentally undermines development more 
broadly. The UN is tasked with both promoting human 
rights and overseeing the international drug control 
regime, yet human rights abuses in the name of drug 
control are commonplace. State violence, including 
corporal punishment, executions and extrajudicial 
killings are frequently associated with drug enforcement. 
In direct contravention of international law, over thirty 
countries maintain the death penalty for drug-related 
offences with estimates of 1000 such executions taking 
place annually.
24
 China is the worst offender, even 
marking UN International Anti-Drugs Day with mass 
public executions of drug offenders.
The widespread use of disproportionate punishments 
for minor drug offences can overwhelm criminal justice 
systems, draining scarce resources, and fuelling prison 
National Drug Control Policy admitted that despite record 
aerial spraying of over 1,300 km² of coca in Colombia 
in 2004, the total area under coca cultivation remained 
“statistically unchanged”. Recent official claims of 
reduced areas under cultivation are likely to have been 
compensated for by increased productivity following 
selective breeding (also now allowing cultivation in 
lower lying regions), and more sophisticated farming 
techniques. 
Illicit, unregulated processing of drug crops is also 
associated with localised pollution as toxic chemicals 
used in crude processing of coca and opium are disposed 
of in local environments and waterways. Concerns 
have also been raised about the myco-herbicides (killer 
fungi) engineered to attack opium poppies and coca 
bushes; scientists fear they may affect food crops, wipe 
out entire plant species and seriously harm ecosystems. 
“Developed countries – the major 
consumers – have imposed harmful 
policies on the drug-producing 
countries. These policies have had dire 
consequences … for the economic 
development and political stability 
of the producer countries. The ‘war 
on drugs’ strategy did not have a 
significant impact on its goals to 
increase the street price of drugs 
and to reduce consumption. Instead 
… prohibition created economic 
incentives for traffickers to emerge 
and prosper; crop eradication in 
the Andean region helped increase 
the productivity of the remaining 
crops; and the fight against the 
illegal heroin trade in Afghanistan 
mostly hurt the poor farmers and 
benefited the Taliban.”
Fernando Henrique Cardoso
34th President of Brazil
2010
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Are there benefits?
The claims that the war on drugs can reduce or eliminate 
drug production and availability are simply not borne out 
by the experience of the past half-century. Production 
and supply of key drug crops and related products have 
more than kept pace with demand, with a long term trend 
of falling prices and rising use and availability. As already 
noted, localised enforcement “successes” simply displace 
production and related problems geographically. 
The key beneficiaries of the war on drugs are those who 
use it for political ends, whether for populist political 
reasons, or to justify military interventions, as well as the 
military and suppliers of military/police hardware, and 
the criminals who end up in control of the trade. 
Drug production and trafficking does, however, represent 
real economic activity, and illegal earnings also feed 
into local economies when spent in legal markets. For 
certain populations and individuals with limited options, 
drug production, or involvement in the criminal supply 
chain, offers one of the few sources of income, albeit with 
substantial risks attached. 
The intersection of licit and illicit economies has become 
increasingly complex and entrenched. Christian Aid has 
highlighted how, in many developing regions:
“... the licit and illicit economies are no longer two 
separate entities: they are often one and the same 
thing. Mafias provide much-needed jobs, investment 
and stability; drug lords are elected into government 
office; criminals are given sanctuary by the poor 
people they are supposed to prey on; criminal 
syndicates serve as shadow subcontractors of 
state security.” 
Getting to grips with these new realities presents a 
profound challenge for both drug policy and development 
discipline – and how the two need to work together in 
future. Clearly any change in drug control policy must 
consider the development impacts – particularly for the 
majority of individuals involved in the illicit economy, who 
do not fit the stereotype of the billionaire drug barons.
27
 
overcrowding and related health and human rights 
harms. People who use or grow drugs are also easy targets 
for ill-treatment by police, subject to violence, torture or 
extortion of money using threats of detention, or drug 
withdrawal to coerce dependent users into providing 
incriminating testimony. 
Criminalisation of drug treatment and harm reduction 
activities also remains widespread. Established opiate 
substitution therapy such as methadone  remains illegal in 
some countries, such as Russia, despite methadone being 
on the WHO list of essential medicines, and its use defined 
as best practice in WHO, UNAIDS and UNODC guidelines. 
Similarly, criminal laws banning syringe/needle provision 
(and possession) create a climate of fear for people 
who use drugs, driving them away from life-saving HIV 
prevention and other health services, and encouraging 
high risk behaviours. People who use drugs are also often 
discriminated against when accessing healthcare, such as 
antiretroviral and hepatitis C treatment. 
In China and South-East Asia, those arrested for 
possession and use of illicit drugs are often subject to 
arbitrary detention without trial in the form of forced 
or compulsory “treatment” in facilities where further 
human rights abuses are common, for periods from a few 
months to years.
25
 Estimates of numbers detained in such 
‘treatment’ centres in China alone are as high as 500,000.
26
As the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has 
observed: “millions of people worldwide who require 
essential medicines for pain, drug dependency and other 
health conditions find that availability is often limited or 
absent”. The Special Rapporteur on the right to health 
has also noted that access to these medications is often 
excessively restricted for fear that they will be diverted 
from legitimate medical uses to illicit purposes.
Crop eradication efforts, as well as having the 
environmental costs already mentioned, can also 
impact basic rights. Chemical spraying can lead to 
health problems, for example the glyphosate sprayed by 
US planes over coca fields has caused gastrointestinal 
problems, fevers, headaches, nausea, colds and vomiting. 
Legal food plants are additional casualties. The spraying 
has sometimes forced whole villages to be abandoned 
and the rapid elimination of farmers’ primary source of 
income results in economic and social harm. 
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Inadvertent benefits? Heroin and stability in Tajikistan
De Danieli’s case study for Christian Aid of the illicit opiate economy in Tajikistan
28
 – an important transit route 
from Afghanistan to Russia and Western Europe – forces the development field to reconsider many assumptions 
and policy responses.  
When state institutions were too weak to impose order, 
government actors realised it was easier to obtain through 
working with, rather than against, local strongmen. So 
compromises were sought with the organised criminal 
organisations in effective control of parts of the country 
and economy. Informal agreements were made in the 
“shadow bargaining” of the 1997 peace talks, giving 
warlords financial incentives to disarm and become 
legitimate actors in the post-conflict political system. The 
lucrative illicit drugs trade – which had funded different 
sides in the civil war – was ‘allowed’ to continue as long 
as local drug traffickers pledged their political loyalty. 
Collusion, in return for a share of the business, became 
widespread. But more importantly, drug mafias helped 
preserve order. 
This led to the creation of an oligopoly of 20 to 30 groups in the drugs trade, and more stable local political 
economies. Poor local communities found a steady source of income, and criminal organisations became de facto 
subcontractors of security, relieving the government of the burden of governing remote and unruly areas of the 
country. Cash-rich criminals – who wanted more efficient and predictable supply chains – became the only effective 
source of investment in a cash-starved, infrastructure-poor and unstable economy. 
Over time, these symbiotic relationships consolidated. In 2007, a group of scholars concluded that opiates trafficking 
added at least 30% to the GDP of Tajikistan, and that “The leaders of the most powerful trafficking groups occupy 
high-ranking government positions and misuse state structures for their own illicit businesses.” These important 
actors – warlords or criminals turned statesmen – are often missed in development or peacebuilding analysis. Such 
figures operate in the grey area of crime and business, often as legitimate entrepreneurs enjoying protection from 
authorities. But their main interest is the control of illegal markets, and they can resort to violence to settle disputes 
in what is a risky business. 
When there is competition without agreement on who controls the wealth a commodity brings – whether drugs, 
gold, diamonds, or oil – disorder often follows. But when different groups can arrive at a settlement, even illicit 
drugs can provide the basis for stability. So in Tajikistan’s fractured society, mafias now fulfil the role of social glue.
But not only has the opiate trade consolidated the Tajik state’s coercive apparatus, so has counter-narcotic 
assistance, designed to combat drugs related insecurity, because the drug-control “results” delivered were largely 
the elimination of smaller competitors in illicit enterprises. So stand-alone attempts to destroy drugs trafficking 
without considering the context, and how the various players are involved, may have unintended consequences. 
Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon. The illicit opiate trade 
consolidated the Tajik state’s coercive apparatus
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How to count the costs?
Governments and international bodies have failed 
to properly assess the impacts of global drug control 
policies, including on development, for decades - let 
alone meaningfully explore the alternatives. But the real 
obstacles to proper evaluation are political not practical; 
the emotive and highly politicised nature of the debate 
around drugs has led to the war on drugs becoming 
largely immune from scrutiny. Worse still, as underlined 
repeatedly by the evidence in this report, harms caused 
by the drug war itself are routinely conflated with those 
from drug use, to bolster the apparent “drug menace” 
narrative then used to justify continuation of the same 
failed approach. 
The Global Commission on Drug Policy, comprised of 
former world leaders and UN luminaries, has noted how 
“official government and UN evaluations of drug policy 
are preoccupied with metrics such as arrests and drug 
seizures. These are process measures, reflecting the scale 
of enforcement efforts, rather than outcome measures 
that tell us about the actual impacts of drug use and drug 
policies on people’s lives. Process measures can give the 
impression of success, when the reality for people on the 
ground is often the opposite.”
30
Citing the commission and building on this narrative, 
the UNDP has made it clear that “the development of a 
comprehensive set of metrics to measure the full spectrum 
of drug-related health issues, as well as the broader 
impact of drug control policies on human rights, security 
and development would be an important contribution to 
the discussion on the development dimensions of drug 
policy”.
31
 The UNDP goes further, outlining the range of 
metrics related to goals, targets and indicators needed 
to count the costs of current policy models, and evaluate 
alternative approaches. 
There have also been discussions and proposals relating 
to the drugs-specific Sustainable Development Goal, and 
the relevance of the SDGs more broadly to assessing 
impacts of drug enforcement. As Health Poverty Action 
has stated:
32
“The dominant prohibitionist approach to global drug 
policy is significantly impacting on progress to achieve 
sustainable development. It is time the development 
sector engaged seriously with the issue of drug policy 
to address these impacts by rectifying the policy 
incoherence between a ‘war on drugs’ approach and 
sustainable development. The SDGs and UNGASS 2016 
present key opportunities to ensure that development 
policies and drug control efforts work side by side 
Guinea Bissau: an unwanted new 
challenge to an already 
struggling state 
Growing demand for cocaine in Europe, combined 
with the increased policing of Caribbean drug transit 
routes has displaced transit routes to West Africa – 
yet another example of “the balloon effect” in action.
 
Guinea Bissau, already experiencing weak 
governance, endemic poverty and negligible police 
infrastructure, has been particularly affected - 
with serious consequences for one of the most 
underdeveloped countries on Earth. 
In 2006, the entire GDP of Guinea-Bissau was only 
$304 million, the equivalent of six tons of cocaine sold 
in Europe at the wholesale level. UNODC estimates 
approximately 40 tons of the cocaine consumed in 
Europe passes through West Africa each year. The 
disparity in wealth between trafficking organisations 
and authorities has facilitated infiltration and 
bribery of the little state infrastructure that exists. 
Investigations show extensive involvement of police, 
military, government ministers and the presidential 
family in the cocaine trade, the arrival of which has 
also triggered cocaine and crack misuse.
29
The war on drugs has turned Guinea Bissau from 
a fragile state into a failed narco-state in less than 
a decade, creating an institutional environment in 
which nascent development processes are curtailed 
or put into reverse. Other countries in West Africa 
are also being impacted or under threat, as are 
all fragile states with the potential to be used as 
producer or transit countries.
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There are other options (explored in Chapter, 10, Options 
and alternatives) that move away from the war mentality 
of the past, that can be explored at national, regional and 
international scale. These options should be debated and 
explored using the best possible evidence and analysis. 
Because if there is one thing development experts 
agree on, it is that development in a war zone is next 
to impossible, and the issues outlined in this report are 
neither unclear nor hidden. 
There are signs in the NGO sector, and at the UN, that the 
drugs issue is finally moving towards the mainstream 
of the development discourse. Key forces within the 
development sector now have a responsibility to seriously 
engage with far more than the shallow analysis and calls 
for alternative development that have characterised the 
discourse to date. If they fail to do so, they will stand guilty 
of neglecting the marginalised populations they claim 
to represent. 
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Introduction
Of the five “unintended consequences” of global drug law 
enforcement identified by the UNODC,
1
 only the final one 
points towards the potential for human rights abuses. In 
terms of “the way the authorities perceive and deal with 
the users of illicit drugs” the agency notes:
“A system appears to have been created in which 
those who fall into the web of addiction find 
themselves excluded and marginalized from the 
social mainstream, tainted with a moral stigma, and 
often unable to find treatment even when motivated 
to seek it.”
 
Like all wars, the burden of the drug war’s costs tends to 
fall most heavily on the most vulnerable and marginalised 
members of society. The human rights costs detailed 
in this chapter, however, go some way beyond those 
identified by the UNODC as being paid by people who are 
dependent on drugs. 
Crucially, these are not costs that result from drug use 
itself, but from the choice of a punitive enforcement 
strategy. As the Executive Director of the UNODC observed 
in a 2010 discussion paper on drugs, crime and human 
rights: “Too often, law enforcement and criminal justice 
systems themselves perpetrate human rights abuses.”
But these human rights violations are frequently only 
considered in isolation – a drug user beaten by police to 
extract information; a drug courier executed by firing 
squad; a family killed at a military checkpoint; an HIV 
worker imprisoned for distributing harm reduction 
information; a family displaced by aerial fumigation of 
their crops; a drug user detained for years of forced labour 
and beatings on the recommendation of a police officer; a 
cancer sufferer denied pain-killing medicine. But they are 
not isolated. They are all a direct consequence of the war 
on drugs.
Positioning drugs as an existential threat, and putting 
policy on a war footing, has helped create a political climate 
in which ‘extraordinary measures’ are justified, and drug 
enforcement is frequently not required to meet human 
rights norms. In fact, despite being one of the three pillars 
of the UN’s work (along with development, and peace and 
security), the international agreements that underpin the 
global drug control system lack any obligation to ensure 
compliance with human rights. In over one hundred 
articles, human rights appear specifically only once (in 
relation to crop eradication) – a staggering omission in 
treaties negotiated and adopted post-World War II, in the 
era of the modern human rights movement.
This omission is now reflected in national law and policy 
worldwide. Through production, transit, sales and use, the 
responses to every stage in the illicit-drug supply chain 
are characterised by extensive human rights violations, 
committed in the name of supply and demand reduction. 
As the outcomes described in this chapter make clear, 
whatever the original intention,  the UN Drug Conventions 
have, in their implementation, effectively licensed and 
incentivised human rights abuses to such a degree, that 
they are now undermining the founding purpose of the 
UN, as set out in the UN Charter itself:
2
 
“To achieve international co-operation... in promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion…”
In every region of the world the war on drugs is severely undermining 
human rights. It has led to a litany of abuse, neglect and political 
scapegoating through the erosion of civil liberties and fair trial 
standards; the denial of economic and social rights; the demonisation 
of individuals and groups; and the imposition of abusive and inhuman 
punishments. This chapter should be read in conjunction with 
chapter 7, which explores how the war on drugs promotes  
stigma and discrimination.
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The human rights costs of               
the war on drugs
1. Drug use and criminalisation
Global drug consumption has risen dramatically since the 
war on drugs began in earnest in the middle of the 20th 
century, despite the application of criminal penalties for 
drug possession in most countries. The UNODC currently 
estimates, probably conservatively, that 246 million 
people worldwide used illicit substances at least once 
in the last year.
3
 Global lifetime usage figures are much 
higher, probably approaching one billion. Yet a punitive 
response to drug use remains at the core of the war on 
drugs philosophy. There is no specific right to use drugs, 
nor is an argument for one being made here. However, 
debates around the rights and wrongs of individuals’ 
drug use should not obscure the fact that criminalising 
the consenting activities of hundreds of millions of people 
involves substantial human costs, and impacts on a range 
of human rights, including the right to health, privacy, 
and freedom of belief and practice. The centrality of 
criminalisation means that in reality a war on drugs is, to 
a significant degree, a war on drug users – a war on people.
The impact of criminalisation and enforcement varies, 
with sanctions against users ranging from formal or 
informal warnings, fines and treatment referrals (often 
mandatory), to lengthy prison sentences and punishment 
beatings. Within populations impacts also vary, but 
are concentrated on young people, certain ethnic and 
other minorities, socially and economically deprived 
communities, and people with drug problems.
Punishments for drug possession/use are frequently 
grossly disproportionate, violating another key tenet of 
international law.
• In Ukraine, the possession of minimal amounts of 
drugs (from 0.005g) can lead to three years in prison
4
• In Russia, a person can be imprisoned for one and a 
half years for solution traces in a used needle
• In Georgia, urine tests for drugs can serve as a basis 
for imprisonment
5
The war on drugs has led to widespread human rights abuses
“Protecting public health is a 
legitimate aim, but imposing criminal 
sanctions for drug use and possession 
for personal consumption is neither 
necessary nor proportionate.”
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
2015
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2. The right to a fair trial and due process  
    standards
The marginalisation of human rights in drug law 
enforcement can be witnessed in the widespread erosion 
of due process in dealing with drug offenders.
Alternative justice systems
In many countries, drug offenders are subject to parallel 
systems of justice that do not meet internationally 
recognised fair trial standards. For example, in Iran, drug 
trafficking defendants are tried before revolutionary 
courts where defence counsels may be excluded from 
the hearing and appeals are not allowed on points of 
law. Similarly in Yemen, drug defendants are subject 
to trial before “specialised courts”, where “trials are 
generally reported to fall short of international standards 
of fair trial”,
11
 according to Amnesty International. 
Many of the trials that are held before these courts are 
death penalty cases. 
In Egypt, defendants have been included in decades-
old emergency laws that allow certain drug cases to be 
tried in emergency or military courts which lack the due 
process protections of civilian courts. These courts have 
also been empowered to rule on death penalty cases.
Support for decriminalising drug possession and/or use 
comes from a range of human rights-focused civil society 
organisations and UN agencies. The UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, for example, advocates 
an end to criminal penalties for drug possession and use, 
on the grounds that they constitute an “obstacle to the right 
to health”.
6
 At least nine other UN agencies – including 
the WHO, the World Bank, UN Development Programme, 
UNAIDS and UNICEF – have also unambiguously called for 
decriminalisation, either in their own reports or public 
statements, or in joint reports or statements.
7
 
8  
Many of 
these calls were made with reference to the human rights 
dimension of drug policy.
Most notably, the UNODC – the agency charged with 
overseeing the punitive global drug control regime – has 
shifted its stance on the issue of decriminalisation. In 
2015, the UNODC produced a briefing paper explicitly 
calling on UN member states to decriminalise personal 
drug possession and use of drugs. Political considerations 
led to the paper being withdrawn pre-publication, but it 
was already in the public domain and widely circulated.
9
 
Crucially, the paper stated: “decriminalising drug use 
and possession for personal consumption is consistent 
with international drug control conventions and may be 
required to meet obligations under international human 
rights law [emphasis added].”
10
 Laws are supposed to 
respect and promote human rights, but as multiple UN 
agencies – including the UNODC – have stated, criminal 
drug laws are doing the precise opposite, jeopardising 
fundamental freedoms intended to improve global 
health and wellbeing. 
 “Criminalizing people for the 
possession and use of drugs is 
wasteful and counterproductive.
It increases health harms and 
stigmatizes vulnerable populations, 
and contributes to
an exploding prison population. 
Ending criminalization is a 
prerequisite of any genuinely
health-centered drug policy.”
Global Commission on Drug Policy 
2014
 “Subjecting people to criminal 
sanctions for the personal use of 
drugs, or for possession of drugs 
for personal use, infringes on their 
autonomy and right to privacy ... 
Human Rights Watch research 
around the world has found [also] 
that the criminalization of drug use 
has undermined the right to health.”
Human Rights Watch 
2013
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Detention without trial
Malaysia’s Dangerous Drugs Act empowers authorities to 
detain drug trafficking suspects for up to 60 days without 
a warrant or court appearance. The detention orders may 
be extended, which then requires a court appearance. 
However, unless the court grants the suspect release, the 
detainee can be held for successive two-year intervals. As 
of the end of 2008, more than 1,600 people were detained 
under this act.
14
Compulsory drug detention centres
In some countries, notably in India, East and Central Asia, 
drug users are routinely sent to drug detention facilities, 
without trial or due process – for example, on the word 
of a family member or police officer – for months, or 
even years. While sometimes termed “treatment” or 
“rehabilitation” facilities, they are no more than detention 
centres, often indistinguishable from prisons (except that 
those in prison have at least often seen a lawyer and a 
courtroom). Often run by military or public security 
forces, and staffed by people with no medical training, 
these centres rarely provide treatment based on scientific 
evidence. Instead, military drills and forced labour are 
often the norm, with detainees denied access to essential 
medicines and effective drug treatment, and subjected to 
HIV testing without consent.
• In 2013, China had 227,000 drug users in compulsory 
detoxification centres and another 36,000 in 
mandatory treatment in the community
15
• In Malaysia, if an individual tests positive for use of 
an illicit substance and is judged to be a dependent 
user by a government medical officer, they are 
mandated to two years in a detention centre, 
followed by two years of community supervision 
upon release
• In China and Cambodia, more than 90% of heroin 
users have been reported to relapse following 
release from drug detention centres
16 17
 
3. Torture and cruel, inhuman or  
    degrading treatment or punishment
People who use drugs, or who are arrested or suspected 
of other drug offences, are frequently subject to serious 
forms of cruel and unusual punishment. This includes 
abuses such as death threats and beatings to extract 
Presumption of guilt
Elements of drug law enforcement in many countries 
have seen a reversal of the burden of proof, with the 
presumption of innocence effectively replaced with a 
presumption of guilt. It is the erosion of one of the most 
fundamental due process guarantees in international 
human rights law.
12
 The phenomenon is most commonly 
associated with threshold quantities for drug possession:
13
 
if the threshold is exceeded, there is a presumption 
of a supply/trafficking offence, invariably triggering a 
dramatically more severe sentence. In some countries, 
the death penalty is mandatory for possession of an illicit 
substance above a certain threshold quantity. 
Even when penalties are not as severe, the effects on 
the presumption of innocence are clear. Since 2005, 
in the UK, for example, an arrest for certain trigger 
offences (even before being charged for any crime) 
leads to a compulsory drug test, the refusal of which is 
an imprisonable offence. If the test is positive, even if 
no charge is brought, the individual is then mandated 
to attend a medical assessment, refusal of which is also 
criminal and punishable by incarceration.
 “The current international system of 
drug control has focused on creating 
a drug free world, almost exclusively 
through use of law enforcement 
policies and criminal sanctions. 
Mounting evidence, however, 
suggests this approach has failed ... 
While drugs may have a pernicious 
effect on individual lives and society, 
this excessively punitive regime has 
not achieved its stated public health 
goals, and has resulted in countless 
human rights violations.”
Anand Grover 
UN Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health
2010
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and can lead to profound psychological damage as well as 
physical injury.
25
 Related harms can be particularly acute 
for vulnerable populations of people who use drugs, a 
disproportionate number of whom suffer from mental 
health problems, or are living with HIV. 
4. The death penalty and extrajudicial  
     killings
 
33 jurisdictions currently retain the death penalty for drug 
offences, with thirteen having a mandatory death penalty 
for certain categories of drug offences.
26
 Most executions 
occur in China, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Vietnam. Methods 
of execution include hanging, firing squads, beheading 
and use of lethal injections. These killings have been 
clearly identified as a violation of international law 
by the UN.
Deaths in relation to drug offences also include both 
extrajudicial killings and targeted killings. Police drug 
crackdowns have often included extrajudicial violence. 
Despite being flagrantly illegal under international law, 
the US has a policy of openly targeting alleged drug 
traffickers for assassination.
27
 The Pentagon announced 
in 2009 that 50 Afghan drug traffickers had been placed 
on a list of people to be “killed or captured”,
28
 a list that 
included both combatants and non-combatants. The 
UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions has made it clear that: 
“To expand the notion of non-international armed 
conflict to groups that are essentially drug cartels, 
criminal gangs or other groups that should be dealt 
with under the law enforcement framework would 
be to do deep damage to the IHL [International 
Humanitarian Law] and human rights framework.”
29
• Precise numbers of those executed for drug related 
offences are unknown due to the secrecy of some 
states, but previous estimates have suggested over 
1,000 annually
30 31
  
• However, as of 2015, there are believed to be almost 
900 people on death row for drugs in Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Thailand and Pakistan alone
32
• In recent years Iran has seen a sharp rise 
in reported executions. The UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office estimated there were 650 
executions in 2010, 590 of which were for drug-
related offences.
33
 Amnesty International have 
estimated Iran executed at least 830 people between 
information; extortion of money or confessions through 
forced withdrawal without medical assistance; judicially 
sanctioned corporal punishment for drug use; and 
various forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
in the name of “rehabilitation”, including denial of meals, 
beatings, sexual abuse and threats of rape, isolation, and 
forced labour.
18
• Ukrainian police have used physical and 
psychological abuse against drug users, including 
severe beatings, electroshock, partial suffocation 
with gas masks, and threats of rape, often to extort 
money or information
19 20
• In Cambodia, abuses have included: detainees being 
hung by the ankle on flagpoles in midday sun;
21
 
shocking by electric batons; whipping by cords, 
electrical wires, tree branches and water hoses; 
and rape – including gang rape and forcing women 
into sex work. Abuses are not only carried out by 
the staff, but delegated to trusted detainees to carry 
out against fellow inmates. Such abuses are also 
perpetrated against children, who comprise around 
25% of those in compulsory drug detention centres
22
• In China, detainees in compulsory detention 
centres have been forced to participate in unpaid 
labour, day and night, while suffering the effects 
of withdrawal. Access to methadone is denied and 
payment demanded for other medications that help 
with withdrawal. Beatings (some causing death) are 
commonplace, with chosen detainees also carrying 
out physical violence against fellow inmates
23
Over 40 countries maintain corporal punishment as 
a sentence of the courts or as an official disciplinary 
punishment
24
 – at least twelve in relation to drug and 
alcohol offences, including for their consumption and for 
relapse (Singapore, Malaysia, Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, Brunei Darussalam, Maldives, Indonesia [Aceh], 
Nigeria [northern states], Libya and UAE).
Judicial corporal punishment is absolutely prohibited in 
international law because it is a form of torture or cruel, 
inhuman and degrading punishment. This is reflected 
both in international human rights treaty law, and is 
a recognised rule of customary international law. Its 
application to people who use drugs or alcohol is, simply 
put, illegal. 
Corporal punishment is used in some countries as a main 
punishment or in addition to imprisonment. Whipping, 
flogging or caning is often carried out in public to 
intentionally escalate feelings of shame and humiliation – 
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5. Over-incarceration and arbitrary  
    detention
Punitive drug law enforcement has fuelled a dramatic 
expansion of prison populations over the past 50 years. 
While significant numbers are still incarcerated for 
possession or use alone, many more are incarcerated 
for low-level growing/production, trafficking and selling 
of drugs. A larger proportion are imprisoned for “drug-
related” offending - involvement in drug market violence 
and gang activity, or low-income dependent users 
offending to support their use – the “low-hanging fruit” 
often picked up by target-driven enforcement efforts. 
There has also been a growing use of arbitrary detention 
under the banner of “drug treatment”, and the use of 
extended pre-trial detention for drug offenders.
6. The right to health
The “right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health” is a fundamental 
right first articulated in the 1946 Constitution of the World 
Health Organization, and included in many subsequent 
international human rights treaties, including the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.
The right to health includes access to health-related 
education and information; the right to be free from non-
consensual medical treatment; the right to prevention, 
treatment and control of diseases; access to essential 
medicines, including those controlled under drug control 
systems; and participation in health-related decision 
making at the national, community and individual 
levels. Good quality health provision should be available, 
accessible, and acceptable without discrimination – 
specifically including on the grounds of physical or mental 
disability, or health status.
41
 In country after country 
around the world, however, the right to health is denied 
to people who use illegal drugs.
Punitive drug law enforcement often runs contrary to the 
right to health when dealing with drug-using populations, 
most prominently by increasing health harms, denying 
equal access to treatment and harm reduction services, 
and creating practical and political obstacles to getting 
essential medicines. This creates serious health costs, 
particularly for people who inject drugs – an estimated 
15.9 million people,
42
 in at least 158 countries and 
territories around the world.
1 January and 1 November 2015, the “vast majority” 
for drug offences
34
• In 2003, the Thai government launched a war 
on drugs crackdown, the first three months of 
which saw 2,800 extrajudicial killings. These were 
not investigated and the perpetrators were not 
prosecuted or punished. The Thai Office of the 
Narcotics Control Board admitted in November 
2007 that 1,400 of the people killed in fact had no 
link to drugs
35
 
The US – the “great incarcerator”
• As of 2015, almost half – 46.5% – of federal 
prison inmates in the US were incarcerated 
due to a drug offence
36
• The US imprisons more people for drug 
offences than the EU does for all offences, even 
though the EU’s population is 40% higher than 
that of the US
37
• Of US state prisoners serving sentences for 
drug offences in 2005, 45% were Black, 20% 
Hispanic and 28% White.
38
 Yet 13% of the US 
population is Black, 15% Hispanic and 80% 
White. Levels of drug use are similar across 
these different ethnic groups
39 40
The majority of federal prison inmates  in the US were 
incarcerated for drugs offences as of December 2015
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on the World Health Organization’s essential medicines 
list. (For more detail, see chapter 1.) 
The criminalisation of drug use, and the stigma and 
discrimination that often accompany it, contribute to the 
reluctance of people who inject drugs to utilise treatment 
and harm reduction services (see chapter 7). This is 
especially the case where laws against the carrying of 
injecting paraphernalia are in place (contrary to the 
UN’s International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human 
Rights), or when police have a high presence near 
service providers. 
Global drug control efforts intended to prevent the 
non-medical use of opiates have had a chilling effect 
on the medical use of these substances for pain control 
and palliative care. Unduly restrictive regulations and 
policies, such as those limiting doses and prescribing, or 
banning particular preparations, have been imposed in 
the name of controlling the illicit diversion of narcotic 
drugs. According to the World Health Organization, these 
measures result in 5.5 billion people – including 5.5 million 
with terminal cancer – having low to nonexistent access 
to opiate medicines. More powerful opiate preparations, 
such as morphine, are unattainable in over 150 countries 
in the world.
7. The right to social security and an 
adequate standard of living
The war on drugs has created far wider human rights 
costs through a series of disastrous negative impacts on 
development, security and conflict in many of the world’s 
most fragile states. (For more detail, see chapter 3.)
Some drug-war enforcement efforts have far more direct 
impacts, notably militarised crop eradication programmes 
– particularly those involving aerial fumigation. These 
have led to human displacement, food insecurity, and 
denial of welfare and livelihoods to those displaced.
• On average, 10,000-20,000 indigenous people 
were displaced each year in Colombia due to crop 
eradication, although aerial fumigation has now 
been suspended
44
• In Nangarhar, Afghanistan, forced eradication, bans 
on cultivation, threats of NATO bombing campaigns, 
and the imprisonment of farmers led to a decrease 
in opium production. An additional consequence 
of this was a 90% drop in incomes for many, and 
internal displacement and migration to Pakistan
45
Injecting drug use causes one in ten new HIV infections 
globally, and up to 90% of infections in regions such as 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
43
 Despite this, in many 
of these areas, access to proven harm reduction measures 
– including needle and syringe exchanges programmes 
(NSP) and opioid substitution therapy (OST) – is extremely 
limited or entirely unavailable. Yet these interventions 
are recognised by UN human rights monitors as a 
requirement of the right to health for people who inject 
drugs, while methadone and buprenorphine for OST are 
“Repressive responses to inter alia 
drug use, rural crop production, and 
non-violent low level drug offences 
pose unnecessary risks to public 
health and create significant barriers 
to the full and effective realisation of 
the right to health, with a particularly 
devastating impact on minorities, 
those living in situations of rural and 
urban poverty, and people who use 
drugs.
“A range of drug control measures 
undertaken to reduce the supply of 
illicit drug crops have had significant 
impacts on the mental and physical 
health of communities, particularly 
those affected by crop eradication. 
Epidemic levels of violence in 
communities located along illicit 
transit routes and affected by 
militarised State responses are of 
particular concern.”
Dainius Pūras
UN Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health
2015
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• Children who inject drugs are denied access to harm 
reduction, based on their age
52
• Children are beaten and sexually abused in drug 
detention centres
53
• Street children are subjected to police violence due 
to suspected involvement in drug dealing
54
• Children are tortured to extract evidence
55
• Aerial fumigation in Colombia damages children’s 
physical and mental health
56
 
It is a tragic irony that the good intentions of many who 
defend the status quo, with the aim of protecting and 
defending the rights of young people, have in practice 
exposed them to dramatically increased levels of risk and 
actual harm. 
As Dainius Pūras, UN Special Rapporteur on the right 
of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health, has noted:
“One of the arguments used in support of the ‘war 
against drugs’ and zero-tolerance approaches is the 
protection of children. However, history and evidence 
have shown that the negative impact of repressive 
drug policies on children’s health and their healthy 
development often outweighs the protective element 
• Conviction for drug offences can also result in the 
removal of social welfare, including public housing 
(e.g. in many US States
46
), and denial of federal 
funding for students – an extra punishment in 
addition to potential incarceration and lifelong 
criminal records. The result is a worsening cycle 
of poverty, marginalisation and criminality for 
individuals and families
8. The rights of the child
Children are at the forefront of political justifications for 
drug control. Indeed, there are few more politically potent 
justifications for any policy than child protection. But the 
reality is that children’s rights have been increasingly 
violated through drug control measures, while drug use 
and drug-related harms among children have continued 
to rise. (For more detail, see chapter 9.)
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child is the 
core international treaty setting out a comprehensive 
set of rights protections for children. All but two states 
(Somalia and the US) have agreed to be bound by its 
terms. It includes protection from drugs (Article 33), 
with states being required to: “take all appropriate 
measures, including legislative, administrative, social and 
educational measures, to protect children from illicit use 
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances as defined 
in the relevant international treaties and to prevent the 
use of children in the illicit production and trafficking of 
such substances.”
 
The key question, when counting the costs to child 
rights of the war on drugs, is this: Are current policies 
“appropriate measures”, particularly given the outcomes?
• As many as 1,000 children have been killed to date in 
the Mexican war on drugs, and up to 50,000 have lost 
at least one parent
47
• Children are used to fight against the drug 
cartels in Mexico
48
 
• Children grow up in prison when their parents are 
convicted of minor drug offences
49
• Children are subjected to invasive searches 
for drugs
50
• Random school drug testing takes place, in violation 
of the child’s right to privacy
51
“Human rights violations continue to 
occur in the implementation of drug 
control policies by States. Violations 
of the right to life, the right to health, 
the prohibition of torture and other 
forms of ill treatment, the prohibition 
of arbitrary detention, the right to 
equality and non-discrimination, the 
rights of indigenous peoples and the 
rights of children are all sources of 
serious concern”
Navanethem Pillay
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
2014
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Are there benefits?
The historical absence of human rights from the high 
level drug policy discourse means that – unlike health, 
security, or child protection benefits, for example – 
there are relatively few specific claims for human rights 
benefits made for punitive drug law enforcement, which 
has generally not been framed in these terms. Where 
attempts have been made,
60
 these have tended to focus on 
arguments that enforcement helps guarantee the rights of 
the child (specifically by ensuring drug-free lifestyles) that, 
as explored above, reflect misunderstandings of the nature 
of the relevant human rights law and its interpretation.
61
Many claim that having an international consensus on 
how to deal with drugs is both an indicator of success 
and of support for the status quo. However, as this 
chapter demonstrates, the human rights outcomes of this 
consensus are overwhelmingly negative, and the process 
by which the international consensus is maintained is 
one that, historically at least, has - until very recently - 
actively precluded debate on alternatives that could 
achieve better outcomes. There is every reason to believe 
that a new international consensus could be achieved 
and maintained around a system of drug control that is 
meaningfully based upon the three pillars of the UN – 
peace and security, development and human rights.
How to count the costs?
International human rights law provides a wide range 
of broad, legally binding indicators against which to 
measure the costs or benefits of drug policies. Detailed 
indicators relating to specific areas of policy should be 
developed from these, and existing indicators structured 
to better understand a human rights-based approach to 
drug control.
A range of evaluative and comparative tools exist, 
including a well-established body of research on human 
rights impact assessments. At national level, human rights 
must be incorporated into planning, implementation and 
evaluation of all programmes and policies. Similarly, 
international funding of all drug policy interventions 
must pass through human rights scrutiny (something that 
is conspicuously not happening at present
62
). At the UN 
level, the drug control system must begin to operate as 
a set of mechanisms to deliver, not undermine, human 
rights. The UNODC has made progress in this area through 
the adoption of new human rights guidelines for country 
teams – although UNODC spending is not yet all subject to 
its own human rights scrutiny guidelines.
behind such policies, and children who use drugs are 
criminalized, do not have access to harm reduction 
or adequate drug treatment, and are placed in 
compulsory drug rehabilitation centres.”
57
 
9. Cultural and indigenous rights
The war on drugs has led to decisions being made about 
long-established uses of drug crops by indigenous peoples 
without their participation – effectively criminalising 
entire cultures and putting UN drug treaty commitments 
in direct conflict with the UN treaty on Indigenous Rights. 
(For more detail, see chapter 7.)
Human rights violations in Mexico’s 
“war on drugs”
• Complaints made to national human rights 
commissions regarding military and police 
abuses have increased by 900% since the 
beginning of the militarised “war on drugs” 
in 2006
• Attacks on journalists, human rights 
defenders and migrants by criminal groups 
and security forces have gone uninvestigated. 
For example, more than 100 journalists 
and media workers have been killed or 
disappeared since 2007
58
 
• Children and entire families have been killed 
at drug-war military checkpoints. These 
include Bryan and Martin Almanza, aged five 
and nine, killed when soldiers opened fire 
on their vehicle in April 2010. In June 2007, 
two women and three children, aged two, 
four, and seven, were shot and killed when 
they failed to stop at a military checkpoint 
involved in “the permanent campaign 
against drug trafficking”. A child of fifteen 
and his father were killed by soldiers in 
Monterrey, with relatives saying they were 
shot without any indication to stop
59
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The UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs must play a role 
in discussing, at a political level, human rights concerns 
relating to drug policies, and the International Narcotics 
Control Board must incorporate human rights into its 
scrutiny of state practices. 
In order to achieve this, civil society engagement is 
essential. Otherwise, the true human rights picture will 
never become clear.
 
Conclusions
Some human rights are absolute and many of the abuses 
documented in this chapter are inexcusable, regardless of 
the context in which they take place, or the aims pursued. 
These include freedom from torture, execution and 
arbitrary detention, and there are many clear-cut examples 
of drug policies or practices violating these rights. 
Some other rights, such as the exercise of indigenous 
and cultural rights, may be lawfully restricted. But this 
poses a crucial question for the current drug control 
system.
63
 The test for when restrictions on human rights 
are permissible does not and should not lie in drug 
control legislation or policies; it lies in human rights law. 
Broadly speaking, any restriction on human rights must 
be prescribed by law, in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and 
be proportionate to the aim pursued. In considering this 
question, the seriousness of the restriction (which varies 
depending on the right and individual circumstances), its 
breadth (in this case global and applicable to everyone), 
and its duration (in this case perpetual) are key. 
However, in the final analysis, the question is rather 
simple: If a law or policy cannot achieve its aim, or has 
proven incapable of doing so over a considerable length 
of time (in this case more than half a century), then can 
the restrictions on human rights that stem from it ever be 
proportionate and therefore permissible? 
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Introduction
In its simplest formulation, the link between the global 
drug control regime and crime creation was identified by 
the very UN agency that oversees it, the UNODC, which in 
2008 noted:
“The first unintended consequence is the creation 
of a criminal black market. There is no shortage of 
criminals interested in competing in a market in which 
hundredfold increases in price from production to 
retail are not uncommon.”
1 
This chapter provides a fuller account of this unintended 
consequence of the current approach to drugs, and its 
impact across the world. 
The 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
2
 – the 
legal basis of the global war on drugs – has two parallel 
functions. Alongside establishing a global prohibition of 
some drugs for nonmedical use, it also strictly regulates 
many of the same drugs for scientific and medical uses. 
In stark contrast to the Convention’s language describing 
medical use, the rhetoric on non-medical use frames it as 
a threat to the “health and welfare of mankind”, and a 
“serious evil” which the global community must “combat”, 
setting the tone for the “war” on drugs that has followed.
The convention’s parallel functions have also led to 
parallel markets – one for medical drugs controlled and 
regulated by the state and UN institutions, the other for 
non-medical drugs controlled by organised criminals and 
paramilitaries. There is a striking comparison to be made 
in the level of criminality associated with production and 
supply in these parallel trades. The legal medical opiate 
market, for example, accounts for around half of global 
opium production
3
 but entails none of the organised 
crime, violence and conflict associated with its illicit twin.
By the mid-1980s the emphasis and rhetoric of 
international drug policy had shifted, from its earlier 
focus on drug use, towards a growing concern with the 
problems relating to organised crime involvement in 
drug markets.
4
 This trend was reflected in law, specifically 
the third of the UN drug conventions, which focuses on 
tackling the dramatic increase in the “illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances” that had 
taken place since the 1961 Single Convention.
Drug-war politics over the last 50 years, has witnessed the 
threat to public health from drug use become increasingly 
interwoven with the threat to public safety (and national 
security) from drug market-related crime. “Drugs and 
crime” have become fused together in political rhetoric 
(the “drug threat” or “world drug problem”), in institutions 
like the UNODC, and in domestic policy and law. This has 
led to an anomalous and malfunctioning system in which 
drug use is acknowledged as being primarily a public 
health issue, yet most of the responses to it, and resources 
addressing it (see chapter 6), are administered by the 
criminal justice system, primarily in the form of punitive 
police and military enforcement targeted at drug users, 
dealers and producers. 
Ironically, as the UNODC has belatedly acknowledged, it 
is these same punitive, enforcement-led policies that are 
creating, or fuelling, much of the drug market-related 
criminality in the first place.
A key strand of the drug-war narrative has been the fight against 
crime. In reality, the basic economics of prohibiting a substance 
for which there is high demand inevitably creates a huge criminal 
market. As a result taking an enforcement led approach has had 
the disastrous consequence of creating crime at all levels – from 
staggeringly violent and wealthy cartels, to acquisitive crime by low-
income, dependent users.
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The economic dynamics of illegal 
drug markets and criminality
The links between drugs and crime are complex. However, 
a key aspect of the link is the economic dynamics of their 
prohibition in the context of high demand which, actively 
fuels the criminality that enforcement is supposed to 
eliminate. The squeezing of supply in a demand-led 
market has two key criminogenic effects, resulting mainly 
from the inflation of drug prices under prohibition. The 
first is the creation of a huge profit incentive for criminal 
entrepreneurs to become involved in the drug trade. The 
second is acquisitive crime committed by low-income 
dependent drug users to support their habits. 
This price increase reflects both enforcement risks being 
incorporated into illicit drug pricing, and unregulated 
profiteering that occurs in an unregulated criminal 
marketplace. This is the “alchemy of prohibition”
5
 by 
which low-value agricultural products become literally 
worth more than their weight in gold. (For more detail, 
see chapter 6.)
 
Making a bad problem worse
 
Drug law enforcement can also have a Darwinian “survival 
of the fittest” effect. The least competent criminals are not 
only caught more often by law enforcement (especially 
when driven by arrest targets), but are also more likely to 
be successfully convicted, leaving the market to the most 
powerful, efficient and ruthless.
While enforcement can show seemingly impressive results 
in terms of arrests and seizures, impacts on the market 
are inevitably marginal, localised and temporary. Indeed, 
as the UNODC acknowledges,
6
 one of the unintended 
consequences of the war on drugs is the so-called “balloon 
effect”, whereby rather than eliminating criminal activity, 
enforcement merely displaces it somewhere else. When 
enforcement does take out criminals, it also creates a 
vacuum, and often more violence, as rival organisations 
fight for control, or organisations are destabilised by 
internal power struggles. 
The crime costs of the  
war on drugs
1. Street crime
There is an active debate over how much drug-related 
street crime results from drug policy and laws, as 
opposed to drug use and intoxication, or to what extent 
involvement in crime leads to drug use, rather than the 
other way round.
7
 There are also many cultural and 
economic factors, including inequality and deprivation, 
that impact on both street crime and drug use.
However, while estimates are hard to formulate and often 
contentious,
8
 it is clear that a significant proportion of the 
street crime blighting many urban environments has its 
roots in the criminal trade which is fuelled by the war on 
drugs. 
From Mexico to London, drug gang activity, especially 
turf wars over territory and markets, is a major source of 
violence, intimidation and other antisocial and criminal 
behaviour, with vulnerable young people in particular 
being drawn into such patterns of offending.
The war on drugs has put organised – and often violent – criminals in control of the drug trade
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By contrast, these problems are virtually absent from legal 
alcohol and tobacco markets, underlining that such issues 
stem from drug prohibition and the current enforcement-
based approach, rather than drug use per se. While there 
is, of course, criminality involved in alcohol and tobacco 
smuggling (and a smaller proportion of counterfeiting), 
and also street crime associated with alcohol intoxication, 
there are few if any of the problems of street dealing 
(licensed sales negating the need), violence between rival 
retailers (brewers, pub landlords and tobacconists do not 
attack each other), or fundraising crime committed by 
dependent users (alcohol or tobacco dependence can be 
maintained at a fraction of the price of heroin or crack 
cocaine dependence).
2. Criminalising people who use drugs
Despite the specific drug-war aim of significantly reducing 
or eliminating illegal drug use, and ultimately the creation 
of a drug-free world, global consumption and the size of 
the drug market serving it has risen dramatically since 
the war on drugs started. The UNODC estimates, probably 
conservatively, that nearly a quarter of a billion people 
(5.2% of 15- to 64-year-olds) used illicit substances at 
least once in 2013, the most recent year for which there 
is data.
18
 Global lifetime usage figures probably approach 
one billion.
• According to the US Department of Justice, 900,000 
criminally active gang members – a third of them 
juveniles
9
 – in 20,000 street gangs, in over 2,500 
cities, dominate the US drugs trade
10
 
• A relatively small number of people with 
problematic drug dependencies and low-incomes 
commit large volumes of property crime to fund 
their habits. A study by the UK Prime Minister’s 
Strategy Unit in 2003 stated that this population are 
responsible for 56% of all crimes, including: “85% 
of shoplifting, 70-80% of burglaries, [and] 54% of 
robberies”
11
• Some people with problematic drug dependencies 
and low-incomes (mostly women) also resort to 
street sex work to buy drugs.The UK Home Office 
estimated that 80-95% of street sex work is drug-
motivated. Studies from Asia, Russia and Ukraine 
show people who inject drugs are more likely than 
other sex workers to engage in street soliciting.
12
 
Drug-using street sex workers also face increased 
risk of arrest, and of violence from clients, pimps 
and police
13
Drug law enforcers highlight the futility of drug law enforcement
 “I invite you all to imagine that this year, all drugs produced and trafficked around the world, were seized: 
the dream of law enforcement agencies. Well, when we wake up having had this dream, we would realize that 
the same amount of drugs – hundreds of tons of heroin, cocaine and cannabis – would be produced again next 
year. In other words, this first dream shows that, while law enforcement is necessary for drug control, it is not 
sufficient. New supply would keep coming on stream, year after year.”
14
 
Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the UNODC, 2007 
“If demand [for drugs] persists, it’s going to find ways to get what it wants. And if it isn’t from Colombia it’s 
going to be from someplace else.”
15
 
Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense, 2001 
“As long as there is a demand for drugs in this country, some crook is gonna figure out how to get ’em here...”
16
  
George W Bush, US president, 2002 
“Over the past 10-15 years, despite interventions at every point in the supply chain, cocaine and heroin 
consumption have been rising, prices falling and drugs have continued to reach users. Government 
interventions against the drug business are a cost of doing business, rather than a substantive threat to the 
industry’s viability.”
17
   
UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit Drugs Report, 2003
85
Wasting billions, undermining economiesCreat ng crime, enriching criminal
came to the same conclusion, stating: “we did not in our 
fact-finding observe any obvious relationship between 
the toughness of a country’s enforcement against drug 
possession, and levels of drug use in that country”.
20
 
Ultimately, enforcement-related deterrence is, at best, 
marginal compared to the wider social, cultural and 
economic factors that influence drug use (for more detail, 
see chapter 10). 
3. Mass incarceration
The criminal justice-led approach to drugs has fuelled 
a huge expansion of prison populations over the last 50 
years. While significant numbers are incarcerated for 
possession or use alone, far more are imprisoned for 
minor drug market offences (growing, transporting or 
selling) or drug-market related offending (such as drug 
gang violence and disorder), overloading the criminal 
justice systems of countries all over the globe.
21
These are mainly low-level players in the illicit trade, and 
people with problematic drug dependencies and low-
incomes  offending to support their use as described above. 
There has also been a growing use of arbitrary detention 
masquerading as “drug treatment” in centres that are 
often no more than prisons, as well as the use of lengthy 
pre-trial detention for drug offenders (see chapter 4).
4. Organised crime
The opportunity created by the collision of drug 
prohibition and high demand for drugs has been seized 
by organised crime with ruthless efficiency, and at 
devastating cost. Since 1961 the illicit trade has grown 
to become one of the biggest revenue generators for 
organised crime worldwide.
22
 It has spawned a range of 
other criminal activities, including international money 
laundering and widespread corruption. The untaxed 
profits are also often reinvested in expanding criminal 
operations in other areas such as extortion, kidnapping 
and robbery. 
5. Violent crime
In place of the formal regulation used in the legitimate 
economy – such as trading standards bodies, contract 
enforcement, unions, ombudsmen and consumer groups 
– it is violence that is the default regulatory mechanism in 
the illicit drug trade. It occurs through enforcing payment 
of debts, rival criminals and organisations fighting to 
protect or expand their market share and profits, conflict 
with drug law enforcers, or intimidation of the public.
The impact of criminalisation and enforcement varies 
widely, with sanctions against people who use drugs 
ranging from formal or informal warnings, fines and 
treatment referrals (often mandatory), to lengthy prison 
sentences and punishment beatings. Within populations 
impacts also vary, but tend to be concentrated on young 
people, certain ethnic and other minorities, socially and 
economically deprived communities, and people who 
inject drugs. 
But whatever the penalties deployed, there is a startling 
lack of evidence that the intensity of drug law enforcement 
makes a significant difference to the number of people 
using drugs. For example, a 2008 large-scale study using 
World Health Organization data from 17 countries 
found: “Globally, drug use is not distributed evenly and 
is not simply related to drug policy, since countries with 
stringent user-level illegal drug policies did not have 
lower levels of use than countries with liberal ones”.
19
 
And a 2014 evidence review by the UK Home Office 
“Prohibition creates violence 
because it drives the drug market 
underground. This means buyers 
and sellers cannot resolve their 
disputes with lawsuits, arbitration or 
advertising, so they resort to violence 
instead. Violence was common in 
the alcohol industry when it was 
banned during Prohibition, but not 
before or after. Violence is the norm 
in illicit gambling markets but not in 
legal ones. Violence is routine when 
prostitution is banned but not when 
it’s permitted. Violence results from 
policies that create black markets, 
not from the characteristics of the 
good or activity in question.”
 
Jeffery Miron 
Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics, 
Harvard University
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can traumatise populations for generations, in particular 
fostering a culture of violence among young people.
• The opium trade earns the Taliban and other 
extremist groups along the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
border up to $500 million a year, similar to the 
cocaine revenues that fund Colombia’s FARC 
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
28
• At the height of the Colombian drug wars in 1990, 
the annual murder rate was one per 1,000 of the 
population – three times that of Brazil and Mexico, 
and ten times that of the US
29
• In Southeast Asia, the growing methamphetamine 
trade is linked to regional instability and conflict. 
Minority groups from the Wa and Shan states are 
funding insurgency operations against Burma’s 
military junta through the manufacture and 
wholesale distribution of methamphetamine and 
opium to Thailand, China and other countries 
in the region
30
• A 2011 UNODC global study into homicide estimated 
that in countries with high murder rates due to 
organised crime, such as those in Central America, 
men have a one in 50 chance of being murdered 
before they reach the age of 31
31
• Mexico’s drug war violence became so acute after 
the government crackdown, it caused male life 
expectancy rates to drop on average 0.6 years 
between 2005 and 2010, reversing a decade of public 
health improvements. Male life expectancy fell 
by three years in Chihuahua state, which includes 
Ciudad Juárez – once considered the murder capital 
of the world
32
Gangs or cartels that are primarily financed by the sale 
of illicit drugs have been implicated in a substantial 
proportion of street violence and homicides. In the USA 
it has been estimated that 13% of homicides are gang 
related, rising to 50% in Los Angeles and Chicago – with 
drugs the driver of gang crime most frequently cited 
by authorities.
23
 However, far from law enforcement 
reducing violence, it often exacerbates the problem. As 
a comprehensive review by the International Center for 
Science in Drug Policy states:
“Contrary to the conventional wisdom that increasing 
drug law enforcement will reduce violence, the 
existing scientific evidence strongly suggests that drug 
prohibition likely contributes to drug market violence 
and higher homicide rates.”
24
These findings are: 
“consistent with historical examples such as the steep 
increases in gun-related homicides that emerged under 
alcohol prohibition in the United States and after the 
removal of Colombia’s Cali and Medellin Cartels in 
the 1990s. In this second instance, the destruction 
of the cartels’ cocaine duopoly was followed by the 
emergence of a fractured network of smaller cocaine-
trafficking cartels that increasingly used violence to 
protect and increase their market share.”
Even the illegal cannabis market has reached a scale that 
means it is increasingly characterised by violence. Supply 
to the US is now a major part of Mexican drug cartels’ 
profits -– credible estimates are around 15%,
25
 with a value 
of around $1.5 billion.
26
 Similarly, the cannabis market 
in British Columbia, Canada, is estimated to be worth 
about C$7 billion annually, mainly through supplying the 
US. It is the lucrative nature of this market that has led 
to a ferocious gang war being waged for control of the 
available profits.
27
 These profits have recently begun to be 
undermined by legal market regulation in some US states. 
Moves towards legal regulation are likely to have an 
increasing impact with further reform initiatives in the 
US pending, as well as reforms in Canada, and Mexico.
Drug profits are also fuelling violence in wider national 
and regional conflicts. Many affected countries, such as 
Colombia, Afghanistan and Burma, have long histories of 
internal and regional conflict. However, drug money has 
played a major role in motivating and arming separatist 
and insurgent groups, and domestic and international 
terror groups, blurring the distinction between them and 
criminal gangs (see chapter 2). In the longer term, violence 
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7. Economic costs of drug war-related  
    crime and enforcement
The costs of proactive drug law enforcement run into 
the tens of billions, but create even greater reactive 
costs dealing with drug market-related crime across the 
criminal justice system. (For more detail, see chapter 6.) 
Are there benefits?
The key benefit promised 50 years ago for instigating a 
criminal justice-led drug control system was to reduce, 
or eliminate, the “evil” of drug addiction.
39
 This, it was 
argued, would be achieved through enforcement-led 
supply restrictions and a reduction in levels of demand 
6. Crimes perpetrated by governments /  
     states
There are a range of illegal acts perpetrated by states or 
governments under the banner of the war on drugs. These 
include use of the death penalty; extrajudicial killings and 
assassinations; arbitrary detention without trial; corporal 
punishment and other forms of torture; and cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. (For 
more detail, see chapter 4.)
Drug-related violence in Mexico
The explosion of violence in Mexico since a major military-led crackdown against the drug cartels was 
announced by former President Calderón in 2006 
has been a startling demonstration of the potential 
unintended consequences of the war on drugs:
• Estimates of deaths from violence related to the 
illegal drug trade in Mexico since the war on 
drugs was scaled-up in 2006 range from 60,000 
to more than 100,000.
33
 Mass killings, beheadings 
and public displays of the dead have become 
commonplace
• Violence against journalists has had a chilling 
effect on freedom of expression, with many 
reporters and editors explicitly threatened with death if they publish negative stories about Mexico’s 
drug cartels or the politicians and officials linked to them. The choice is simple: censor or die.
34
 Estimates 
vary, but it is thought that more than 100 journalists and media workers have been killed or disappeared 
since 2007.
35 36 
The deaths undermine Mexican democracy and the rule of law, contributing to a culture of 
impunity
• Historically, victims of drug-related violence have been mainly young males. But increasingly women 
and children are becoming victims too. Between 2006 and 2010 alone, as many as 4,000 women and 1,000 
children were killed in drug-market-related conflict, and around 50,000 children lost at least one parent
37
 
• A 2010 US State Department report revealed the extent of the violence that Mexican cartels are capable 
of perpetrating: “They employ advanced military tactics and utilize sophisticated weaponry such as 
sniper rifles, grenades, rocket-propelled grenades and even mortars in attacks on security personnel. 
[Drug trafficking organizations] have openly challenged the [Mexican government] through conflict and 
intimidation and have fought amongst themselves to control drug distribution routes. The results led to 
unprecedented violence and a general sense of insecurity in certain areas”
38
Drug-war killings in Mexico since the launch of President Calderón’s 
offensive on drug cartels
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Conclusions
The battle cry to fight a war against drugs has had such 
political potency that its negative costs have undergone 
little proper scrutiny. Evaluation of drug law enforcement 
still invariably focuses on process measures, like arrests 
and drug seizures, rather than more meaningful outcome 
indicators that might demonstrate failure – such as levels 
of availability, or wider health and social costs, including 
the creation of crime.
47
 When these wider costs have been 
considered, the conclusions have often been suppressed 
or drowned out by shrill drug-war rhetoric and law-and-
order populism. 
Worse still, a self-justifying false logic now prevails: as 
the criminal justice problems associated with illegal drug 
markets get worse, these same problems are used to justify 
an intensification of the very enforcement measures that 
are fuelling them. As a result, while many governments, 
and the UNODC, publicly acknowledge the unintended 
crime costs of the current system, just as with all the 
other costs in this report, they have yet to meaningfully 
measure them, let alone examine policy alternatives that 
might reduce them. It is this lack of political will that is the 
main obstacle to progress, not methodological challenges 
in making such assessments.
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Introduction
The war on drugs has led to the creation of the world’s 
largest illegal commodities market. Far from producing 
a “drug-free world”,
1
 prohibitionist policies have simply 
abdicated control of the drug trade to violent criminal 
profiteers. Despite at least $100 billion spent every year 
on tackling this trade, the illicit market has continued to 
expand, and is now estimated by the UNODC to have a 
retail value of $320 billion
2
 – a figure that dwarfs the gross 
domestic product of even many developed countries.
3
 
 
The scale of profits generated by criminal drug 
organisations enables them to undermine state institutions 
through corruption and intimidation, blur the boundaries 
between the legal and illegal economies, and threaten the 
economic stability of entire countries and regions.
To begin examining how the war on drugs negatively 
impacts on the legitimate economy, it is necessary to look 
at how the trade came to be in the hands of organised 
crime in the first place.
The 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 
international treaty that provides the legal justification for 
the global drug war, has two parallel functions. Alongside 
establishing a global prohibition of certain drugs for 
non-medical use, the convention also strictly regulates 
many of the same drugs for scientific and medical uses. 
These parallel functions have led to parallel markets: 
one for medical drugs, controlled and regulated by state 
and UN institutions; the other for non-medical drugs, 
unregulated and controlled by organised criminals. 
 
For economists and businesspeople, this is a predictable 
result. Squeezing the supply (through enforcement) of 
products for which there is high and growing demand 
dramatically increases their price, creating an opportunity 
and profit motive for criminal entrepreneurs to enter the 
trade. 
Prices are then further inflated as suppliers’ compensate 
themselves for the risks of arrest and incarceration, 
and for the risk of harm by other criminals and market 
competitors. Through this alchemy of prohibition,
4
 low-
value agricultural products become literally worth more 
than their weight in gold – and it is organised criminals 
who benefit.
Given that enforcement policies have essentially created 
this criminal market – and by inference much of the 
criminality and costs associated with it – it is startling 
to note that these approaches have not been subject to 
meaningful economic analysis and scrutiny. At a time 
of global economic vulnerability, it is all the more vital 
to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of all major public 
expenditure, and assess whether funds could be better 
The economic costs of the war on drugs include a significant wasteful 
expenditure of valuable resources at a time of global economic 
uncertainty; the negative impact on legitimate economies and 
economic development; the costs to lawful businesses;  
and the wider economic costs resulting from a violent and 
unregulated criminal market.
“The first unintended consequence 
[of the current drug control system] 
is a huge criminal black market that 
now thrives in order to get prohibited 
substances from producers to 
consumers. Whether driven by a 
‘supply push’ or a ‘demand pull,’ the 
financial incentives to enter this [illicit 
drug] market are enormous. There is no 
shortage of criminals competing to claw 
out a share of a market in which hundred 
fold increases in price from production 
to retail are not uncommon.”
Antonio Maria Costa
Executive Director of the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime
2008
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Despite this expenditure, opium poppy production 
has soared and is now at or near record levels
10
• Enforcement spending tends to dominate total 
drug policy budgets even in countries where harm 
reduction is prioritised over use reduction. In 
Australia for example,  enforcement accounts for 
55% of the $1.3 billion spent on proactive drug 
control programs (with 23% on prevention, 17% 
on treatment, 3% on harm reduction), and the 
majority of the $1.9 billion spent dealing with the 
consequences of drug use and markets, related to 
crime costs.
11
 Similarly, enforcement accounted for 
75% of the Netherlands’ €2.185 billion spending on 
drugs in 2003
12
• In 2010, the Mexican government spent $9 billion 
fighting drug trafficking
13
 
These and other examples indicate it is likely that between 
a third and a half of proactive drug-related expenditure 
globally is spent on enforcement, with a considerably 
larger sum spent on dealing with fallout from the criminal 
market it has fuelled. While precise figures are impossible 
to formulate (and would be subject to variation according 
to definitions and inclusion), it is safe to say that the world 
spends well in excess of $100 billion annually on drug law 
enforcement.
Value for money?
In the highly politicised and often emotive drug policy 
debate, economic analysis offers a useful level of 
objectivity, focusing exclusively on costs and benefits in 
ways that can be easily compared and understood. To 
assess whether drug law enforcement represents value 
for money, we must simply look at what we are spending, 
spent elsewhere. After more than half a century of the 
war on drugs, it is time to look more closely at the return 
we are getting on our investment.
The costs of the war on drugs to 
the economy
1. Billions spent on drug law enforcement
Despite the difficulties in calculating the precise amount 
of money spent pursuing the war on drugs, some tentative 
estimates and comparisons can be made:
 
• Total expenditure on drug law enforcement by the 
US has been estimated at over $1 trillion over the 
last 40 years.
5
 Federal spending on drug control in 
the US is officially around $14.9 billion on domestic 
and international supply reduction, compared 
to $10.7 billion on treatment and prevention.
6
 
It is much more difficult to obtain accurate data 
regarding state and local government expenditure, 
though one estimate of drug-related criminal justice 
expenditure alone is $25.7 billion
7
• The total proactive annual government expenditure 
on drug policy in the United Kingdom was £1.46 
billion in 2011/12, out of a total spend of £2.5 
billion.
8
 Only £7 million is spent on information and 
education campaigns. By contrast, it is estimated 
that the total reactive government expenditure on 
drug-related offending across the criminal justice 
system is £3.35 billion
9
• Since the beginning of the 2001 conflict, the US alone 
has spent $7.6 billion on enforcement-led efforts to 
reduce the size of the opium trade in Afghanistan. 
Billions of dollars a year are wasted on ineffective drug law enforcement
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what we are getting in return, and whether the return 
achieves the stated aims of drug policy.
 
The overarching practical aim of international supply-
side drug enforcement is to eliminate or significantly 
reduce the availability and use of illegal drugs.
14
 Yet 
despite decades of growing enforcement budgets globally, 
each year we are further from the unrealistic goal of a 
“drug-free world”. Instead, global drug markets have 
expanded and use has continued to rise.
15
 
On this basis, the past half-century clearly indicates that 
drug law enforcement offers very poor value for money, 
yet there remains a conspicuous absence of government-
led economic or cost-benefit analyses in this field. Indeed, 
no government or international body in the world has 
undertaken a sufficiently sophisticated assessment.
Opportunity costs
Particularly, at a time with government austerity 
measures adopted by many countries, growing drug law 
enforcement budgets translate into reduced options for 
other areas of expenditure – whether other enforcement 
priorities, other drug-related public health interventions 
(such as education, prevention, harm reduction and 
treatment), or wider social policy spending. 
Further opportunity costs accrue from the productivity 
and economic activity that is forfeited as a result of the 
mass incarceration of drug offenders. In the US, for 
example, the number of people imprisoned for drug 
offences has risen from approximately 38,000 to more than 
500,000 in the last four decades.
16
 The lost productivity of 
this population was valued at approximately $40 billion 
annually by the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP) in 2004.
17
Methodological challenges
It should be relatively simple to calculate what is 
spent on drug law enforcement. Unfortunately, 
governments rarely produce transparent and 
accessible breakdowns of all relevant expenditure. 
There are various reasons for this: 
• Drug-related expenditure is distributed 
across multiple government sectors (e.g. 
health, border control, policing, defence)
• There is a distinction between proactive and 
reactive spending. The former is supply-side 
drug law enforcement, which has its own 
discrete, labelled budget allocation; the latter 
is expenditure across the criminal justice 
system, used to deal with drug offenders 
and drug-related crime. This reactive spend 
is inevitably a much larger sum, and is also 
harder to define and measure – not least 
because measurements are retrospective
• It is difficult to make comparisons between 
countries because they may use different 
methodologies to calculate drug-related 
spending, data may not be available for 
the same year, and is subject to currency 
fluctuation
• Many countries publish little or no 
meaningful figures on drug policy-related 
spending, including some with very hard-
line policies, including Russia, Thailand, 
Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China
“If [drug cartels] are undermining 
institutions in these countries, 
that will impact our capacity to do 
business in these countries.”
Barack Obama
President of the United States
April 2012
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Lost tax revenue is another opportunity cost of the war 
on drugs. Under prohibition, control of the drug market 
defaults to unregulated and untaxed criminal profiteers, 
meaning governments forgo a significant potential source 
of income. Relatively little work has been done in this area, 
and there are a large number of variables to consider in 
terms of potential tax revenue estimates from a legally 
regulated drug trade (including levels of use, prices and 
tax rates). However, some indications are available from 
emerging legal or quasi-legal cannabis markets; tax on 
recreational cannabis in Colorado state in the US reached 
over $120 million in the second year of sales,
18
 while the 
Dutch coffee shops, reportedly pay over €300 million in 
tax annually, and turn over in the region of €1.6 billion.
19 
A more speculative report by Harvard economist Jeffrey 
Miron found that legalising and regulating drugs in the 
US would yield tens of billions of dollars annually in both 
taxation and enforcement savings.
20
2. The creation of a criminally controlled,   
     illegal drug market
The size of the illegal market 
Estimating the size and value of illegal drug markets has 
important implications for policy making but presents 
serious methodological challenges. Drug producers, 
traffickers and dealers naturally do their best to remain 
hidden, so do not list themselves on stock exchanges, file 
How the price of drugs is inflated through the illicit market
UK 
street 
price
UK 
street 
price
69% mark-up
269% mark-up
Entering 
the UK Entering 
the UK
292% mark-up
151% mark-up
Caribbean 
dealers
280% mark-up
South American 
dealers
Turkish 
dealers
Farm gate cocaine £325
£2,050 £450
Heroin
£75,750 
per kilo
Cocaine
£51,659 
per kilo
£30,600
£20,500
£8,150
£7,800
550% mark-up
1,800% mark-up
Farm gate heroin
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tax returns, or publicly audit their accounts. Despite the 
unreliable nature of much of the data, the UNODC has 
made the following cautious estimates:
 
• In 2005, the global drug trade was worth $13 billion 
at production level, $94 billion at wholesale level, 
and $320 billion at retail level – on a par with the 
global textiles trade
21
 (note: figures are for market 
turnover rather than profits)
• In 2009, the global cocaine market was worth $85 
billion,
22
 and the global opium market was valued at 
$68 billion, of which $61 billion was for heroin
23
• Research based on UN Food and Agriculture 
Organisation and UNODC data suggests that 
cannabis is now the world’s biggest cash crop in 
revenue terms (see graphic on previous page)
24
The economic dynamics of an unregulated 
criminal market 
The illicit drug trade is extremely resilient. The theory 
behind supply-side enforcement is to restrict production 
and supply through crop eradication or interdiction, 
thereby either directly reducing availability or pushing 
up prices and, in turn, reducing consumption. However, 
in an essentially unregulated market in which the laws 
of supply and demand are preeminent, increasing prices 
only serves to increase the profit incentive for new 
producers and traffickers to enter the market. Supply 
then increases, prices fall, and a new equilibrium is soon 
established. As a result, enforcement pressure on one 
production area or transit route, at best, simply displaces 
illegal activity to new ones, making any gains localised 
and short-lived. This is the now well-documented “balloon 
effect” that has, for example, seen coca production shifting 
between countries in Latin America, and transit routes 
shifting from the Caribbean to West Africa and Mexico – 
analogous to how, when pressure is applied to one area of 
a balloon, air is displaced into another, less resistant area 
which then expands.
While there is a 635% mark-up from farm gate to 
consumer in the price of a serving of a legal drug, coffee, 
the percentage price mark-up for a single serving of 
cocaine, has been estimated at over 6,000%.
25
 Most of the 
price effects of prohibition are due to what are known as 
the “structural consequences of product illegality” (i.e. 
inefficiencies generated by producers, traffickers and 
dealers having to operate covertly). 
Although it is clearly true that the simple illegality of 
drugs artificially inflates prices far beyond what they 
would be in an unrestricted commercial legal market, 
the intensity of supply-side enforcement seems to make 
little difference. A 2014 review of the relevant literature 
concluded: “…there is little evidence that raising the risk 
of arrest, incarceration or seizure at different levels of the 
distribution system will raise prices at the targeted level, 
let alone retail prices.”
26
 A key issue here is that farm-gate 
drug prices are so low relative to street-level prices that 
even if drug production levels are significantly reduced, 
or if seizure rates increase dramatically, any impact on 
the final prices paid by users will most likely be negligible; 
increased production costs can easily be absorbed due to 
the huge mark-ups that are applied throughout the supply 
chain.
27
 
As such, despite ever-increasing resources devoted to 
supply-side enforcement, evidence suggests that drug 
prices, while remaining far higher than legal commodities, 
have generally decreased over the past three decades. 
Internationally, the long-term trend is of price declines 
despite ever-increasing resources directed towards 
interdiction – the direct opposite of the effect predicted 
by enforcement advocates. Data from official surveillance 
systems show that, over the past two decades, while 
seizures of heroin, cocaine and cannabis in major 
production markets have generally increased, the average 
inflation-adjusted and purity/potency-adjusted prices of 
these drugs has decreased dramatically:
28
• In the US, average prices of heroin, cocaine 
and cannabis decreased by 81%, 80% and 86% 
respectively, between 1990 and 2007
• In Europe, during the same period, the average price 
of opiates and cocaine decreased by 74% and 51% 
respectively
• In Australia, the average price of cocaine decreased 
by 14%, while heroin and cannabis prices decreased 
49% between 2000 and 2010
There are many possible explanations for this change: the 
increased efficiency and improved strategising of dealers 
and traffickers; a globalised economy, which offers more 
and cheaper distribution channels and makes it easier 
to recruit drug producers and couriers; and increased 
competition, as larger cartel monopolies have been 
broken up and replaced by numerous smaller and more 
flexible criminal enterprises. Whatever the reason, during 
a period of increasing enforcement activities designed to 
drive up prices, significant and long-term price decreases 
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are another indicator of the futility of supply-side 
interventions in a high-demand environment.
There are additional direct economic costs associated with 
the crime implicit in a large-scale, criminally controlled 
drug market. This includes activity associated with the 
trade itself, alongside the acquisitive crime committed 
by some people with drug dependencies in order to 
fund their use. Regarding the latter, it is important to 
note that the crime costs related to dependent drug use 
vary significantly depending on the policy environment. 
There is, for example, little or no acquisitive crime 
associated with fundraising to support alcohol or tobacco 
dependence because they are relatively affordable. 
Supporters of drug law reform have argued that reduced 
drug prices would correspondingly reduce acquisitive 
crime costs.
31
 This suggestion is supported by evidence 
that when dependent heroin users move from a criminal 
supply to prescribed medical provision, their level of 
offending falls dramatically.
 
As with the crime costs associated with the illegal drug 
trade, its health costs, too, have a significant economic 
impact. Drugs bought through criminal networks are 
often cut with contaminants; dealers sell more potent and 
risky products; and high-risk behaviours such as injecting 
and needle sharing in unsupervised and unhygienic 
environments are commonplace. The resulting increases 
in hospital visits and emergency room admissions for 
infections, overdoses, and poisonings, combined with 
increased treatment requirements for HIV/AIDS, hepatitis 
and tuberculosis, can place a substantial additional 
burden on already-squeezed healthcare budgets.
3. Undermining the legitimate economy
Corruption
Corruption inevitably flows from the huge financial 
resources that high-level players in the illicit drug trade 
have at their disposal. The power that comes with such 
resources enables drug cartels to secure and expand their 
business interests through payments to officials at all 
levels of the police, judiciary and politics, harming wider 
society in the process. The potency of this corruption 
is enhanced by the readiness of some organised crime 
groups to use the threat of violence to force the unwilling 
to take bribes (as they put it in Mexico, “plomo o plata” 
– “lead or silver”), and by the vulnerability of targeted 
institutions and individuals due to poverty and weak 
governance in the regions where drug production and 
transit is concentrated.
Banks and the illegal drug trade
Although legitimate businesses and financial 
services are often unaware of their involvement 
in laundering drug money, there is strong 
evidence that some of the world’s largest banks 
deliberately “turn a blind eye” allowing the 
practice to prosper. 
Wachovia29
In 2010, one of the largest banks in the United 
States, Wachovia, was found to have failed to apply 
proper anti-laundering strictures to the transfer 
of $378.4 billion into dollar accounts from casas 
de cambio (CDCs), Mexican currency exchange 
houses. According to the federal prosecutor in 
the case: “Wachovia’s blatant disregard for our 
banking laws gave international cocaine cartels a 
virtual carte blanche to finance their operations.”
For allowing transactions connected to the drug 
trade, Wachovia paid federal authorities $110 
million in forfeiture and received a $50 million 
fine for failing to monitor cash which was used 
to transport 22 tons of cocaine. These fines, 
however, represented less than 2% of the bank’s 
profit in 2009.
HSBC30
In 2012, HSBC was fined a record $1.9 billion by 
US authorities for its complicity in laundering 
drug money. Despite the risks of doing business in 
the country, the bank put Mexico in its lowest risk 
category, meaning $670 billion in transactions 
were excluded from monitoring systems. Among 
other cases, a Mexican cartel and a Colombian 
cartel between them laundered $881 million 
through HSBC. The US Department of Justice 
said the bank’s executives were not made to face 
criminal charges because the scale of HSBC’s 
assets, subsidiaries and investments meant doing 
so might destabilise the global financial system 
– the bank was effectively deemed too big to 
prosecute.
In the cases of both Wachovia and HSBC, money 
laundering has served to blur the boundaries 
between criminal and legitimate economies.
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Money laundering
The vast profits accrued from organised crime have to 
be hidden from law enforcement, which necessitates 
large-scale money laundering operations. Disguising the 
money’s illicit origins, and making it appear legitimate, 
involves multi-tiered processes of placing the money 
within the financial system, reinvesting it, and moving it 
between jurisdictions.
35
 
More specifically, the “dirty” money is “cleaned” through 
a range of methods, including the use of front companies, 
tax havens, internet gambling, international money 
transfer services, bureaux de change, transnational 
precious metal markets, real estate markets, and 
businesses with a high cash turnover, such as pizzerias 
and casinos.
 
Funds generated by the illegal drug market are also 
laundered through legitimate financial institutions 
such as international banking corporations. Many are 
seemingly unaware of the origins of these funds, yet in 
some cases banks have been complicit or implicated
in criminal activity, showing wilful disregard for anti-
money laundering laws. 
 
The scale of laundered drug money is such that it may 
have even played a part in saving certain banks from 
collapse during the 2008 economic crisis. According to the 
former head of the UNODC, Antonio Maria Costa, there 
was strong evidence that funds from drugs and other 
criminal activity were “the only liquid investment capital” 
available to some banks at the time. He said: “inter-bank 
loans were funded by money that originated from the 
drugs trade,” and that, “there were signs that some banks 
were rescued that way.”
36
 
Estimates of the value of global money laundering 
vary, due to the complex and clandestine nature of 
the practice and the fact that the proceeds of different 
criminal ventures are often intermingled. However, 
available estimates do at least indicate the vast scale of 
the operations, with drug profits probably second only to 
fraud as a source of money laundering cash. It is clear, 
both national and global financial institutions - and by 
inference some of those who work for them - have been 
corrupted by drug money.
• In 2009, the UNODC put the figure at 2.7% of global 
GDP, or $1.6 trillion
37
• The UNODC has stated that the largest income 
for organised crime groups comes from the 
 
• According to Transparency International’s 2014 
Corruption Perceptions Index, the public sectors 
of the world’s two main opium producing nations, 
Myanmar and Afghanistan, are amongst the most 
corrupt  in the world, ranked at 156 and 172 
respectively out of 175 countries
32
• Mexican authorities have stated that drug cartels 
pay around 1.27 billion pesos (some $100 million) 
a month in bribes to municipal police officers 
nationwide
33
• Drug money has been shown countless times to 
have a corrupting effect on law enforcement. As 
the escape of Sinaloa drug cartel leader Joaquin ‘El 
Chapo’ Guzman Loera from a Mexican jail in July 
2015 has shown, corruption reaches all levels of the 
justice system. So far, seven prison officers have 
been charged with complicity
34
“The drugs trade has a range of terrible 
impacts on legitimate business. For 
example, there is not a level playing field: 
we cannot compete with associates 
of cartels who use their businesses to 
launder drug money. This is a major 
problem in tourism and real estate, and 
we also see it in agriculture and ranching. 
Businesses are also closing down because 
of extortion by the drug cartels, and in 
some areas most of the entrepreneurial 
class, doctors, skilled workers – basically 
anyone who can – has moved out.” 
Armando Santacruz
CEO, Grupo Pochtecha, and Director of México Unido 
Contra la Delincuencia 
2012
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Deterring investment
Corruption increases the cost of doing business, and 
creates uncertainty over the credibility of contracts. This 
discourages investment in affected regions and can greatly 
reduce competitiveness in global markets. Studies have 
shown that aggregate investment is 5% lower in countries 
identified as being corrupt. For Mexico, this translates 
into investment losses of up to $1.6 billion annually.
42
 
Drug-related violence and conflict is an additional 
deterrent for investors. Transnational corporations 
in particular do not want to employ personnel in an 
environment in which they may be in jeopardy, or in which 
they would have to pay inflated salaries to compensate 
for the risks involved. A 2011 survey in Mexico of more 
than 500 business leaders by the American Chamber of 
Commerce revealed that 67% felt less safe doing business 
in Mexico compared with the previous year.
43
 
Migration is a further consequence of violence, as people 
move away to safer regions out of fear for their lives. In 
Tamaulipas in Mexico, drug-war migration has left virtual 
ghost towns across the region and many businesses have 
relocated as a result.
44
 
Drug cartels empowered by drug profits have expanded 
into other forms of criminality. In Mexico, extortion has 
become a growing problem: the cartels often act with 
impunity, deploying threats of extreme violence (often 
very publicly carried out) if payments are not made. It 
has been estimated that 85% of Mexico’s extortion cases 
go unreported,
45
 as rather than report the crime to police 
(who have themselves sometimes been implicated in 
extortion rings), or risk violent reprisals from criminals, 
many small business owners unable to pay the fees simply 
decide to close down.
46
Unfair competition
Front companies that launder illicit drug money do not 
need to turn a profit, and so may squeeze legitimate 
competitors out of the market by underselling goods or 
services. Consequently, there is the potential for entire 
sectors to come under the unique control of illegal 
enterprises.
47
 
Especially during difficult economic times, with high 
inflation and interest rates, legitimate businesses can 
struggle to obtain the cash they need to survive. By 
contrast, liquidity is not a problem for those with access 
to laundered drug money. In this environment, many 
sale of illegal drugs, accounting for a fifth of 
all crime proceeds
38
• According to a US Senate estimate in 2011,
39
 Mexican 
and Colombian drug trafficking organisations 
generate, remove and launder $18 billion and $39 
billion a year respectively in wholesale distribution 
proceeds
Macroeconomic distortions
At the macroeconomic scale, drug money laundering can 
have a profoundly negative effect. Criminal funds can 
distort economic statistics, with knock-on distortions in 
policy analysis and development.
40
 
Another effect is drug money causing “Dutch disease”. 
As the UNODC has noted,
41
 a large influx of illicit funds 
stimulates booms in certain sectors of the economy, 
leading to the overvaluation of a country’s currency. This 
in turn makes the country’s exports more expensive, and 
imports relatively cheaper. The result is that domestic 
production decreases as local producers cannot compete 
with the cheap prices of imported goods, and the economy 
becomes more dependent on drug money as a result.
Destabilising developing countries
The illegal drug economy is hierarchical in nature, with 
profits accruing to those at the top of the pyramid, while 
those who grow or manufacture the product receive 
very little by comparison. But drug profits not only 
fail to significantly impact on poverty in producer and 
transit countries, they also actively destabilise them by 
being used to finance regional conflicts, insurgencies 
and terrorism, and undermine state institutions at every 
level (see chapters 2 and 3). Drug crop eradication efforts 
in these countries also mean that many farmers lose 
their livelihoods, particularly when no viable economic 
alternatives are available or provided by the state. 
4. The costs to business
The war on drugs is a major concern for legitimate 
businesses – particularly in producer and transit regions. 
They are burdened by a broad range of additional costs 
beyond the negative impacts on economic development 
and stability already mentioned. The examples below are 
from Mexico, a country on the front line of the drug war, 
but are applicable to varying degrees in every country 
significantly impacted by the illegal trade in drugs.
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companies either go under, or fall into the hands of drug 
trafficking organisations.
48
 
Underlining the extent to which drug money provides 
an unfair financial advantage, a number of drug cartel 
leaders have featured on the Forbes World Billionaires 
List. As Forbes itself has said:
“The reason for including these notorious names 
has always been, and continues to be, quite simple: 
they meet the financial qualifications. And they run 
successful private businesses – though their products 
are quite illegitimate.”
49
Loss of tourism
Drug market-related insecurity and violence can lead to 
reductions in levels of tourism in many areas. This has 
direct impacts on businesses such as hotels, restaurants 
and bars in particular, with negative knock-on impacts 
for regional economies. In 2011, for example, following 
a spike in drug market related violence, the number of 
US holidaymakers visiting Acapulco, one of Mexico’s 
main tourist destinations, on spring break fell by 93% 
from 2010.
50
Increasing sector volatility
Legitimate business can be threatened by the unreliable 
nature of the funds generated by the illicit drug trade. 
Investments made by dealers and traffickers often depend 
on the continuation of their illegal activity. However, 
once their income streams have been disrupted by law 
enforcement or rival criminal enterprises, they may no 
longer be able to meet the terms of their investment. 
This leads to boom and bust cycles in sectors that are 
often targets for drug money, such as construction and 
real estate, again with serious repercussions for local or 
regional economies.
51
Are there benefits?
Substantial ongoing, indeed growing, drug enforcement 
expenditure is delivering the opposite of its stated goals – 
to say nothing of the wider, uncounted costs it produces. 
But while the average taxpayer may have little to show 
for their investment in the war on drugs, there are those 
in society who have benefitted economically from it, and 
these groups should not be overlooked when analysing 
the value and impact of current policy.
52
• In some key producer countries, state security 
agencies and the military often benefit greatly 
from increased enforcement efforts. In Colombia, 
for instance, defence expenditure increased from 
3.6% of GDP in 2003 to 6% in 2006. This resulted in 
an actual increase of security forces from 250,000 
(150,000 military plus 100,000 police) to 850,000 over 
the four years
• Manufacturers of military and enforcement 
technology profit financially from the expansion and 
increased militarisation of drug law enforcement
• The prison systems of many major consumer 
countries – often involving profit-making enterprises 
– can benefit from the increased incarceration 
of drug offenders. For example, in the US, as the 
number of those imprisoned for drug offences 
soared in the 1980s, so too did prison spending – by 
approximately 127% between 1987 and 2007
53
 
In addition, the illicit market itself has benefitted certain 
populations:
 
• Although the farmers who cultivate illegal drug 
crops are by no means rich, and are exposed to 
considerable risks, these crops provide better 
returns than most licit crops, as well as being more 
easily stored and transported (compared to fresh 
fruit or vegetables, for example). In Mexico, one 
kilo of corn, as of 2007, has a market value of four 
pesos. A kilo of opium, meanwhile, can fetch up to 
10,000 pesos
54
• The profits from the illegal market have also been 
shown to trickle down into the licit economy in 
other ways. For example, Colombian drug smugglers’ 
demand for luxury villas has significantly benefitted 
local construction businesses
55
• People with criminal records or no qualifications, 
who struggle in the legal job market, are often able 
to find work in the criminal trade operating on their 
doorstep. Even low-level trafficking and dealing, 
for example, can be relatively profitable, paying 
substantially more than most minimum-wage jobs
• According to a detailed economic analysis of 
Colombia’s drug economy, only 2.6% of the total 
street value of cocaine produced remains within the 
country. The other 97.4% of profits are reaped by 
international criminal syndicates, and laundered by 
banks, in first-world consuming countries
56
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How to count the costs?
The economic impacts and implications of drug law 
enforcement have never been adequately assessed. 
Evaluations of current drug policy tend to be heavily 
skewed towards process measures, such as arrests and 
seizures. These tell us how laws are being enforced, but 
provide no indication of actual outcomes in terms of 
impacts on drug availability, drug-related health costs, or 
wider social and economic costs.
 
Economic analysis lends itself to precisely this kind 
of challenge, yet it is studiously avoided by those 
implementing current policies. Few governments have 
ever conducted a cost-benefit analysis of drug policy; 
commissioned an independent audit of enforcement 
spending; undertaken an economic impact assessment 
of the primary legislation; or explored alternative policy 
approaches or legal frameworks that might offer better 
value for money.
 
The problem, however, appears to be a political rather 
than practical one. In some cases, political constraints or 
legal mandates actively prevent exploring alternatives.
57 
When those responsible for developing and implementing 
drug policies are unable to assess options that at least 
have the potential to deliver better economic outcomes 
(whether one agrees with them or not), it is clear that we 
are operating in a political arena shaped by something 
other than evidence of cost-effectiveness.
Conclusions
Drug law enforcement is exceptionally poor value for 
money. Spending billions of dollars a year of scarce 
public resources on demonstrably ineffective and 
counterproductive drug policies appears impossible to 
justify.
 
But it is not just about the poor value for money of current 
spending, and its opportunity costs in terms of investment 
in health and social development. These policies, and 
the criminal markets they have created, have a direct 
negative impact on the economies of key producer and 
transit regions – by deterring investment, harming 
legitimate businesses, and undermining governance 
through corruption and violence. In a globalised world, 
this has a knock-on effect for any company – or country – 
seeking to do business in affected regions.
Despite well-intentioned attempts to restrict access to 
drugs, it is now clear that with easily cultivated agricultural 
commodities, grown in a world with no shortage of poor 
and marginalised people willing to produce, transport 
or sell them in order to survive, short of ending global 
poverty and drug demand, there is little hope of bringing 
about a meaningful reduction in supply.
 
It is important to recognise that the war on drugs is a 
policy choice. That is why political leaders across the 
world are beginning to call for other options – including 
less punitive enforcement, decriminalisation and models 
of legal market regulation – to be debated and explored 
using the best possible evidence and analysis. Without 
question, this should include assessing the economic 
impacts.
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Introduction
Despite mounting evidence that more punitive drug 
laws do not significantly deter drug use, criminalisation 
remains the primary weapon in the war on drugs. 
But using the criminal justice system to solve a public 
health problem has proven not only ineffective, but 
socially corrosive, too. It promotes stigmatisation and 
discrimination, the burden of which is carried primarily 
by already marginalised or vulnerable populations, many 
of whom the policy is nominally designed to protect.
Discrimination is the prejudicial treatment of a person 
based on the group, class or category to which that person 
belongs. It is inevitably linked to stigma, which is the 
social and practical manifestation of “a distinguishing 
mark of social disgrace”.
1
Although all drug use – particularly when associated 
with public intoxication – has been associated with 
social disapproval, there is a striking variation in how 
this is expressed for different drugs and drug-using 
environments. While it certainly surrounds users of 
illicit drugs, stigma, as defined above, can be amplified 
by political rhetoric and manufactured moral panics 
around certain drugs, groups or populations. Stigma is 
also markedly less evident for users of licit drugs such 
as alcohol or tobacco in most countries. Social and legal 
controls exist in relation to alcohol and tobacco; these 
mostly relate to certain behaviours – such as smoking 
in public places, or public drunkenness –  and are by 
and large desirable, helping to establish healthy societal 
norms that minimise potential harms. However, these 
sanctions are of a different order to “social disgrace”, the 
severe form of public disapproval reserved for people 
involved with illicit drugs.
This disparity is not explained by differences in the 
effects or potential harms of drugs – indeed drug harm 
rankings consistently rate alcohol and tobacco as equal 
to or more risky than many illicit drugs.
2
 Instead, it is the 
product of policies that, for historically discriminatory 
reasons, have created parallel yet dramatically divergent 
approaches to managing the production, supply and use 
of various comparable substances. This can, in part, be 
traced back to the xenophobic social climate in the US 
during the 19th and early 20th centuries. The emergence 
of laws criminalising certain drugs was significantly 
associated with immigrant populations perceived to be 
the most prolific users: Chinese users of opium,
3
 African 
Americans users of cocaine,
4
 and Hispanic users of 
‘marijuana’. The cultural and legal association of these 
drugs with “otherness” and deviance, as distinct from 
alcohol and tobacco, continues to this day.
The 1961 UN Single Convention on Drugs, which 
remains the fundamental legal instrument of the war 
on drugs, refers to drug addiction as “a serious evil 
for the individual”, a “threat” which the international 
community has a “duty” to “combat”, because it is 
“fraught with social and economic danger to mankind”.
5
 
The use of such language appears to be specifically 
intended as stigmatising, creating the “mark of social 
disgrace” by presenting people with drug dependencies 
as a threat to society. 
The absence of alcohol and tobacco from such international 
controls again highlights the arbitrary moral distinctions 
they propagate. Indeed, while tobacco is associated with a 
level of addiction and health harms that eclipses all other 
drugs, both legal and illegal, it is nonetheless subject to 
its own UN convention. The Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control has a comparable number of state 
signatories to the three prohibitionist drug conventions, 
but contains none of the stigmatising language, and 
by contrast to the 1961 Single Convention, outlines a 
series of legal, market control measures – not punitive 
prohibitions – for the non-medical use of a high-risk 
drug. The arbitrary moral distinction between “good” 
and “bad” psychoactive substances, and the prohibitions 
established as a result of this distinction, are in themselves 
a form of discrimination. 
The war on drugs has fuelled the stigmatisation and discrimination 
of a range of groups, including ethnic minorities; women; children 
and young people; people living in poverty; people who use drugs 
– particularly dependent users, and certain people who produce 
or supply drugs. The term “war on drugs” is a misnomer: it is more 
accurately a war on people.
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The criminalisation of people who 
use drugs
As with other criminalised behaviours, drug use (or the 
criminalisation of possession for personal use, which in 
practice amounts to the same thing) and in particular drug 
dependence/addiction, is taken by many to be an indicator 
of certain objectionable character traits or dissolute 
lifestyle choices. Across many countries, drug addiction 
is the most strongly stigmatised of a range of health and 
social conditions, including homelessness, leprosy, being 
dirty or unkempt, and possessing a criminal record for 
burglary.
6
 This stigma has a range of knock-on effects, all 
of which further marginalise and threaten the wellbeing 
of people who use drugs. 
The relationship between criminalisation, stigma 
and discrimination is undoubtedly complex. While 
criminalisation is an inherently stigmatising process that 
often leads to discrimination, it is discrimination at wider 
social and political levels that initiates this process. Many 
of the most acutely affected populations – young black 
males living in socially deprived urban environments, 
for example – will experience multiple forms of 
discrimination. The criminalisation implicit in a “war 
on drugs” will tend to amplify preexisting inequalities – 
especially where such clusters of discrimination exist. 
 “The fifth unintended consequence 
[of international drug control] is the 
way we perceive and deal with the 
users of illicit drugs. A system appears 
to have been created in which those 
who fall into the web of addiction find 
themselves excluded and marginalized 
from the social mainstream, tainted 
with a moral stigma, and often unable 
to find treatment even when they may 
be motivated to want it.” 
Antonio Maria Costa
Executive Director, 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
2008
Punitive drug-war policies have led to the stigmatisation of a range of populations
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People who use drugs can be stigmatised or discriminated 
against irrespective of whether they have received a 
criminal record for their use. However, criminalisation 
compounds this stigma and discrimination, as there is an 
inevitable link between the labelling of an individual as a 
criminal and how they are perceived and treated by the 
rest of society. Indeed, as well as the potential sentence 
itself, the negative associations of criminalisation are 
intended to have a deterrent effect for others. In the case 
of drugs, although criminalisation has only a marginal 
impact on use,
7
 the negative associations can remain for 
years, often for life.
Media portrayals
Public antipathy towards people who use or are dependent 
on drugs is fuelled – or at least echoed and amplified – by 
inaccurate or offensive media reporting. While it is now 
rightly considered unacceptable to describe someone 
with mental health problems as a “psycho” or “lunatic”, 
equivalently stigmatising language still persists in media 
descriptions of people who use drugs. Terms such as 
“junkie”, or “clean/dirty” to describe an individual’s drug-
using status, are still widely used, essentially as bywords 
for social deviance. Their effect is to dehumanise, implying 
that a person’s drug use is the defining feature of their 
character. People with (prohibited) drug dependencies 
are one of the few populations that media commentators 
can still insult and demean with a large degree of impunity. 
Media coverage of drug-related deaths also reinforces 
the discriminatory distinction between “good” and “bad” 
drugs and drug users. While fatalities resulting from 
alcohol or prescription drugs go largely unreported, 
illegal drug deaths receive significant press attention. 
Research into coverage of drug poisoning deaths in the 
UK in 2008, for example, found that 2% of deaths were 
reported in the popular media for alcohol and methadone, 
compared to 9% for heroin/morphine, 66% for cocaine, 
and 106% for ecstasy (i.e. more deaths were reported than 
actually occurred).
8
Once identified as an illicit drug user by the media, the 
label can be hard to escape. News reports often reinforce 
and perpetuate the stigma of drug dependence, as the 
subject of an article can be referred to as a “former drug 
addict” even when the relevance of this information to 
the story is highly questionable.
“If every junkie in this country 
were to die tomorrow 
I would cheer”
On 18th February 2011, the Irish Independent 
published a column entitled “Sterilising junkies 
may seem harsh, but it does make sense”. The 
opinion writer for the newspaper described 
people who use drugs as “vermin” and as “feral, 
worthless scumbags”. He wrote: 
“Let’s get a few things straight – I hate junkies 
more than anything else. I hate their greed, 
their stupidity, their constant sense of self-
pity, the way they can justify their behaviour, 
the damage they do to their own family and 
to others.” 
He added that: “If every junkie in this country 
were to die tomorrow I would cheer.”
A complaint about the column made to the Irish 
Press Ombudsman was later upheld, finding that 
the newspaper:
“breached Principle 8 (Prejudice) of the Code 
of Practice for Newspapers and Magazines 
because it was likely to cause grave offence to 
or stir up hatred against individuals or groups 
addicted to drugs on the basis of their illness.”
This was a landmark ruling, according to the 
complainants: 
“We believe this to be the first time that 
drug users have been identified by a media 
watchdog as an identifiable group, entitled 
to protections against hate-type speech in 
the press. In this sense, we think the decision 
of the Press Ombudsman has international 
significance.”
9
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felonies – even crimes as serious as robbery or rape.
12
 
These measures are discriminatory because they only 
impact on those who are already poor enough to have 
qualified for these forms of support in the first place.
 
Voter disenfranchisement
An estimated 5.3 million Americans are denied the right 
to vote based on their felony convictions, 4 million of 
whom are not in prison. About a third of them are black, 
including 13% of all African-American men. Whilst 
specific numbers have been hard to pin down, it is clear 
that a substantial proportion, if not a majority, of these 
convictions are for drugs or drug-related offences.
Restricted access to healthcare
Criminalisation and the associated stigma and 
discrimination frequently push drug use into unhygienic 
and unsafe environments, increasing health risks. It can 
additionally deter the hardest to reach individuals from 
seeking treatment, for fear of condemnation, judgement 
or arrest.
In much of the world, including many middle- and high-
income countries,
13
 informal barriers effectively deny 
antiretroviral or hepatitis C treatment
14
 to people who use 
drugs. This is discrimination, given that, as the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the right to health has stated, treatment 
adherence among people who use drugs is not necessarily 
lower than those who do not, and should be assessed on 
an individual basis.
15
• Despite the fact that the right to the highest 
attainable standard of health is affirmed in the 
constitution of the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and several UN conventions,
16
 in many 
countries this right is denied to people who use 
drugs, as access to proven harm reduction measures 
– such as needle and syringe programmes (NSP) 
or opioid substitution treatment (OST) – is either 
extremely limited or prohibited outright
• According to WHO Europe, in Eastern European 
countries in particular, people who inject drugs have 
unequal access to antiretroviral treatment
17
• In Russia, healthcare personnel routinely violate 
the principle of medical confidentiality by sharing 
information about people registered as drug users
18
 
Limited employment prospects and life chances
The criminalisation of a personal decision to possess 
or consume a prohibited substance can dramatically 
impact on the career prospects of otherwise law-abiding 
individuals, as certain professions preclude employment 
for those with drug convictions or criminal records. 
Even where there is no formal ban on employment, the 
stigma attached to a record of drug use can lead to the 
same outcome anyway. This is evident from the strong 
association of drug use with long-term unemployment, 
and the receipt of social welfare, particularly where 
benefit claimants are subject to drug testing. 
For people who are or have been dependent on drugs, 
issues such as low self-confidence, mental or physical 
health problems, ongoing treatment or chaotic lifestyles 
will often already restrict employment opportunities; 
a criminal record is merely an additional impediment. 
This is particularly troubling in light of evidence that 
the creation of job prospects adds significantly to 
the willingness of unemployed drug users to enter 
treatment,
10
 and that steady employment is often a key 
part of stabilising a post-dependence lifestyle. 
Reduced standards of social welfare
Life chances can be significantly impacted by a reduction 
in the levels of social welfare to which those convicted 
for drug offences are entitled. In some parts of the United 
States, for example, a drug conviction can be grounds for 
eviction from public housing, the withholding of food 
stamps, the denial of benefits, and the refusal of federal 
loans and financial aid to students.
11
 These last three 
penalties are all the more discriminatory given that no 
parallel sanctions exist for people convicted of other 
“Governments across the world continue 
to incarcerate drug users, and the cycle 
of stigma, HIV infection, and mass 
inequity goes on.”
Stephen Lewis
Former Special Envoy to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
and Co-Director of AIDS-Free World 
2010
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• In China, detainees have been forced to participate 
in unpaid labour, day and night, while suffering the 
effects of withdrawal. Access to methadone is denied 
and payment demanded for other medications that 
help with withdrawal. Beatings – some causing 
death – are commonplace, with “chosen” detainees 
also carrying out physical violence against fellow 
detainees
24
• In Cambodia, abuses have included: detainees being 
hung by the ankle on flagpoles in midday sun;
25
 
shocking by electric batons; whipping by cords, 
electrical wires, tree branches and water hoses; 
rape (including gang rape); and forcing women into 
sex work. Abuses are not only carried out by the 
staff, but delegated to trusted detainees to carry 
out against fellow detainees. Not even children are 
spared such brutality, as they comprise around 25% 
of those in compulsory drug detention centres
26
The criminalisation of drug production and 
trafficking
The production, transportation and sale of illicit drugs 
are among the most strongly reviled and penalised 
criminal offences. However, the arbitrary nature of 
drug law enforcement is again evident in the fact that 
only the supply of some drugs is criminalised. In 2010, 
the then Executive Director of the UNODC stated (in 
comments echoed by domestic governments): “Drugs are 
not dangerous because they are illegal: they are illegal 
because they are dangerous to health”,
27
 yet did not 
issue similar condemnations of alcohol, tobacco, or the 
corporations that supply them. 
Indeed, the sale of legal drugs is often actively celebrated or 
encouraged, as the heads of successful drinks companies 
are lauded for their business acumen and alcoholic 
drinks win awards for their marketing campaigns. In the 
UK, an alcoholic  drinks company can win the Queen’s 
Award for Enterprise,
28
 but even relatively minor drug 
supply offences for prohibited drugs (often mistakenly 
associated with greed, wealth or violence) can lead to 
lengthy prison sentences. 
• Many people who inject drugs do not carry sterile 
syringes or other injecting equipment, even though it 
is legal to do so in their country, because possession 
of such equipment can mark an individual as a drug 
user, and expose him or her to punishment on other 
grounds
23 
Torture and abuse
In its most extreme form, stigma is a process of 
dehumanisation that can then give licence to the most 
serious abuses. People who use drugs are frequently 
subject to various forms of torture or cruel and unusual 
punishment. This includes abuses such as death threats 
and beatings to extract information; extortion of money 
or confessions through forced withdrawal without 
medical assistance; judicially sanctioned corporal 
punishment for drug possession; and various forms of 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment carried out in 
the name of “rehabilitation”.
Drug user registries 
In some countries, the stigmatisation of, and 
discrimination against, people who use drugs is 
effectively a formal process, conducted through 
a system of compulsory registration with the 
state. This system labels people as drug users 
for years, sometimes indefinitely, regardless of 
whether they have ceased using drugs.
19
    
• In Burma, people who use drugs must 
register, with their parents in attendance, 
to enter treatment, and must subsequently 
carry cards that identify them as drug 
users. Once on the list, it is unclear how 
their names are removed
20
 
• In Ukraine, state-registered dependent drug 
users are forbidden from holding a driver’s 
license
21
 
• In Thailand, once registered, drug users 
remain under surveillance by police and 
anti-drug agencies, and information about 
patient drug use is widely shared
22
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The stigma and discrimination 
costs of the war on drugs
1. Ethnic minorities
Over the past 50 years, drug law enforcement has 
frequently become a conduit for institutionalised racial 
prejudice. Nowhere is this problem more visible than 
in the United States, where certain ethnic minorities, 
primarily Black and Hispanic, are significantly more 
likely to be stopped and searched, arrested, prosecuted, 
convicted and incarcerated for drug offences – even 
though their rates of both drug dealing and drug use are 
almost identical to those of the rest of the population.
29
Despite the similarity in levels of drug use between 
black and whites, black people in the US are 10.1 times 
more likely to be imprisoned for a drug offence than 
white people.
30
 Similar levels of overrepresentation of 
minorities in the criminal justice system and prisons are 
observed in many other countries, such as the UK,
31
 and 
for aboriginal peoples in Canada
32
 and Australia.
33
While racism at the level of individual police officers is a 
factor in the disproportionate criminalisation of minorities, 
it is criminalisation itself that makes this disparity 
inevitable. Both drug purchases and drug possession/
use are consensual crimes, meaning police are alerted to 
them primarily through their own investigation, rather 
than victim reports. As a result, surveillance and “buy 
and bust” operations are the principal ways drug arrests 
are made. Returning to the earlier theme of multiple tiers 
of discrimination, this makes certain ethnic minorities far 
more likely to fall foul of drug law enforcement, as they 
are more likely to live in poor, urban neighbourhoods 
where the drug trade is more conspicuous, carried out in 
public areas, between strangers. 
In contrast, the illicit activity of white, middle-class drug 
dealers and users is relatively less easily detected. As the 
former New York Police Commissioner Lee Brown noted: 
“It’s easier for police to make an arrest when you have 
people selling drugs on the street corner than those who 
are [selling or buying drugs] in the suburbs or in office 
buildings. The end result is that more blacks are arrested 
than whites because of the relative ease in making those 
arrests.”
34
However, such a statement is effectively an admission 
of discrimination, as intent is not required for an act or 
policy to be considered discriminatory. The Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the UN 
body responsible for monitoring such discrimination 
globally, has formally stated that international law 
“requires all state parties to prohibit and eliminate racial 
discrimination in all its forms, including practices and 
legislation that may not be discriminatory in purpose, but 
in effect.”
35
2. Women
Although most commonly convicted for low-level, 
nonviolent drug offences, and not the principal figures 
in criminal organisations, women are disproportionately 
impacted by the war on drugs. 
Mandatory minimum sentencing for trafficking often fails 
to distinguish between quantities carried. Even lower-
end sentences are often very harsh. Rigid sentencing 
guidelines often limit a judge’s discretion, preventing 
them from considering mitigating factors that might 
reduce sentences. The result has been that many women 
involved in drug supply at a relatively low level are subject 
to criminal sanctions similar to those issued to high-level 
traffickers and other powerful market operatives. 
“The reality is that if you look for 
drugs in any community, you will find 
them – when the police go looking 
for drugs, and only looking for drugs 
in one community, they’re going to 
find them in that community and not 
in others. So, the war on drugs being 
concentrated in poor communities 
of color, the overwhelming majority 
of the people who are arrested, who 
are swept up, are black and brown, 
because it’s those communities that 
have been targeted.” 
Michelle Alexander
Legal scholar and author of The New Jim Crow: Mass 
Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness
2012
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atmosphere of violence and impunity created by the 
drug cartels has led to an environment in which women 
are deemed disposable and, as such, can be subjected to 
horrific forms of abuse.
38
• Globally, women are imprisoned for drug offences 
more than for any other crime
39
• One in four women in prison in Europe and Central 
Asia is incarcerated for drug offences, with levels as 
high as 70% in some countries
40
• From 1986 to 1996, the number of American women 
incarcerated in state facilities for drug offences 
increased by 888%, surpassing the rate of growth in 
the number of men imprisoned for similar crimes
41
• In Eastern Europe, women who have experienced 
domestic violence can be refused entry into women’s 
shelters if they are active drug users
42
• In Russia, opioid substitution therapy – which is an 
important and internationally recognised treatment 
option for pregnant women who use opiates – is not 
available and is actively opposed by the government
43
This results in particularly severe sentences for those 
women who carry illicit drugs from one country to 
another either in their luggage or inside their person, still 
frequently referred to in the media using the dehumanising 
and stigmatising term “drug mules”. Usually coming from 
socially and economically deprived backgrounds, such 
women are commonly driven to drug trafficking either 
by desperation (a lack of wealth and opportunity), or by 
coercion and exploitation from men further up the drug 
trading hierarchy. The prison sentences that they often 
receive are all the more excessive considering that these 
women often have low levels of literacy, mental health or 
drug dependence issues, and histories of sexual or physical 
abuse.
36
 Any dependents of these women are a frequently 
overlooked additional population of drug-war casualties. 
The war on drugs contributes to the sexual abuse and 
exploitation of women, with sex sometimes used as 
currency on the illicit drug market, or women being 
forced to have sex to avoid arrest or punishment by law 
enforcement. Reports from Kazakhstan, for example, 
have described police performing cavity searches on 
female injecting drug users found in areas near to known 
dealing points – with any seized drugs reclaimable in 
exchange for sex.
37
Expending resources on criminal justice responses to 
drug use, rather than investing in effective public health 
measures, further places an undue burden on women. 
Gender-specific treatment programmes that allow women 
to live with their children are often lacking in availability 
(where they exist at all), and in certain countries, pregnant 
dependent drug users do not have access to the safest and 
most appropriate treatment practices, compromising 
both their health and that of their unborn children. 
Drug-taking is often equated with negligence or 
mistreatment of children, as a woman’s drug use or 
dependence can be grounds for removing a child from 
her care. This is blanket discrimination on the basis of a 
lifestyle choice or health condition, and is often fuelled 
by populist political and media stereotypes (a prominent 
example being so-called “crack moms” in the US). Such 
weighty decisions should in fact be made on an individual 
basis, taking into account the real risk of abuse or neglect 
in each case. 
Drug-related violence, the victims of which have 
historically been young men, is now also claiming the 
lives of women. In Central America, some of this violence 
has been attributed to “femicides” – the murder of women 
because of their gender. Although a concrete link between 
the drug war and such killings is difficult to demonstrate, 
there is a growing consensus that in many regions the 
“No one should be stigmatized or 
discriminated against because of their 
dependence on drugs. I look to Asian 
Governments to amend outdated 
criminal laws that criminalise the most 
vulnerable sections of society, and 
take all the measures needed to ensure 
they live in dignity.”
Ban Ki-moon
UN Secretary-General 
2008
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• Many children are forced to grow up in prison when 
their mother or father is convicted of minor drug 
offences, or are taken into care so growing up without 
either parent
50
4. Indigenous peoples
International drug treaties have effectively criminalised 
entire cultures with longstanding histories of growing 
and using certain drug crops. A prominent example is the 
traditional use of coca for cultural and medicinal purposes 
in the Andean region. The 1961 UN Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs allowed a 25-year grace period for coca 
chewing, which has now long expired. After trying and 
failing to remove the ban on coca chewing from the 
convention through a formal amendment, the Bolivian 
government withdrew from it in 2011, before re-acceding 
with a reservation allowing for traditional uses of the coca 
leaf in 2013.
51
 Although 15 UN member states objected 
to Bolivia’s proposed reservation, it was not enough to 
prevent its approval. 
The whole episode underlined the way in which 
negotiations around the 1961 drug treaty (much of which 
was negotiated during the 1940s and 50s) took place 
without the participation of indigenous peoples, despite 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous 
3. Children and young people
Children and young people carry a disproportionate 
burden of the costs of the war on drugs – both as drug 
users, and through involvement in, or contact with, 
the criminal markets that supply them. Particularly in 
developing countries, children are driven by poverty 
and desperation into becoming drug-crop growers or 
foot soldiers of the cartels. The costs of the drug war for 
children and young people are explored in more detail in 
chapter 8.
• Early involvement in the drug trade has been well 
documented in Brazil, where drug gangs cultivate 
close ties with children and young people, building 
their trust by first paying them to perform simple, 
non-drug-related tasks, then recruiting them 
with the lure of weapons, power, drugs and sex.
44
 
It has been estimated that approximately 6,000 
children are directly involved in drug dealing in 
Rio de Janeiro alone
45
 
• As drug users, children can face discrimination when 
they attempt to minimise the potential harms of their 
use. In Central and Eastern Europe, for example, 
there are arbitrary age restrictions on access to sterile 
injecting equipment and opioid substitution therapy
46
• Drug testing in schools is a violation of the right to 
privacy, and can publicly label individuals as a “drug 
user” in need of help, despite such tests not being 
able to distinguish between occasional, recreational 
use and problematic use. The stigma of this label 
can impact on self-esteem and aspirations, drawing 
individuals into the net of counselling services, 
treatment programmes and the criminal justice 
system, from which it is difficult to escape
47
• Suspension or exclusion from school following a 
positive drug test or drug offence can jeopardise a 
child’s future, as reduced involvement in education 
and leaving school at an early age are associated with 
more chaotic and problematic drug use, both in the 
short and long term
48
• Children are also negatively impacted and stigmatised 
when a parent receives a drug-related conviction, 
is imprisoned, or is killed in drug-related violence. 
Drug-war violence in producer countries, too, has 
made orphans of countless children
49
“National laws that stigmatize and 
marginalize drug users also need 
to be addressed. Known drug users 
may lead to loss of employment 
opportunities, may deprive a person 
of a range of parental rights including 
custody, and may result in other legal 
rights being impaired. In some states, 
ethnic minority and marginalized 
groups living in poverty have also 
been the target of disproportionate 
drug enforcement efforts”
Navanethem Pillay
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
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turn restricts their ability to access health services and 
education, and in some cases results in higher rates 
of human trafficking and an increase in the number of 
women entering the sex trade.
• According to the UNODC, in the Wa Region of 
Myanmar, 82% of farmers cultivated opium to 
ensure food security, and opium accounted for 
73% of the total household income before the 2005 
opium ban. As a result, in 2006, annual household 
income in Wa dropped considerably, with serious 
consequences for food security
60
• In Brazil, the vast majority of those killed by police 
in their ongoing war against drugs have been poor, 
black, young boys from favela communities, for 
whom involvement in drug gangs is one of the few 
viable opportunities for employment
61
• In Afghanistan, impoverished farmers borrow 
money in order to meet the upfront capital 
investment needed for opium production. When 
the opium crops fail, or are eradicated by law 
enforcement, the only way some farmers can pay 
off their debt is by selling their daughters – some as 
young as six – to those higher up in the drug trade
62
Are there benefits?
That punitive drug enforcement policies promote stigma 
can be in little doubt. Indeed, many defenders of the war 
on drugs acknowledge its stigmatising effect. What they 
contend, however, is that such an effect is both necessary 
and desirable: it is a means of demonstrating society’s 
disapproval of a potentially dangerous activity, and in 
turn establishes social norms that discourage people from 
using certain drugs.
63
This position confuses the role of criminal law – which is to 
prevent and punish crimes, rather than to educate, “send 
messages”, or tutor on personal morality. This is not to say 
that such goals are undesirable, only that criminal law is 
not the tool for achieving them. A strong argument can be 
made that criminal law is both ineffective at the task (one 
far better achieved through public health and education 
interventions), as well as being disproportionate: the 
punishments far outweigh the harms they are intended 
to deter. 
The comparison with tobacco is instructive. Increased 
social disapproval has certainly been a factor in reducing 
levels of use in much of the developed world over the past 
three decades. This has been achieved through effective 
people having said it is “a generally accepted principle 
in international law that indigenous peoples should be 
consulted as to any decision affecting them.”
52
The now universally adopted Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples recognises this principle too, as well 
as the right of indigenous peoples to:
“[P]ractise and revitalize their cultural traditions 
and customs”, and to “maintain, control, protect and 
develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge 
and traditional cultural expressions ... including 
human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, 
knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora.”
53
5. People living in poverty
Despite common misconceptions of illicit drug use as the 
preserve of a marginalised underclass, being poor does 
not make someone more likely to use drugs. Living in 
poverty does, however, mean an increased likelihood of 
dependence on drugs and harm from drug use.
54
• A 2006 study found that drug dependence mortality 
rates were 82% higher in the most deprived areas of 
New York than in the least deprived.
55
 Additionally, 
in the city’s less affluent area of Brownsville, 
Brooklyn, the chances of being arrested for cannabis 
possession are 150 times higher than in the more 
affluent Upper East Side of Manhattan
56
• In 2002, Australian men classified as manual 
workers were more than twice as likely to die from 
illegal drug use than non-manual workers
57
• Drug-related emergency hospital admissions 
have been found to be 30 times higher in the 
most deprived areas of Glasgow in Scotland than 
the least deprived
58
On the supply side of the drug trade, too, poverty is 
effectively punished by current drug laws. The majority of 
those involved in the production of illicit drugs are poor, 
invariably from developing or middle-income countries 
or regions with negligible levels of social security. Their 
involvement in the drug trade is driven primarily by a lack 
of alternative means of survival. It is estimated that the 
farmers who grow drug crops earn only 1% of the overall 
global illicit drug income, with most of the remaining 
revenue going to traffickers in developed countries.
59
Eliminating these farmers’ primary source of income 
therefore leads to greater levels of poverty, which in 
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Conclusions
While a criminal justice-led approach to drugs has had 
great political potency, it has not been effective even 
on its own limited terms - but has succeeded in further 
marginalising some of the world’s most vulnerable 
populations, producing the range of negative costs outlined 
here and elsewhere is this report. An international drug 
control system that produces such negative effects is at 
odds with the UN’s commitment to invest in programmes 
that contribute to the social integration of people who 
use drugs,
64
 the wider drug treaty commitment to “the 
health and welfare of humankind”, and indeed the core 
UN pillars of human security, human development and 
human rights. 
Instead, if these commitments are to be honoured, the 
stigma and discrimination faced by people as a result 
of the war on drugs must not only be meaningfully 
counted, but also compared with the potential costs and 
benefits of alternative approaches (explored in chapter 
10), including a reorientation of enforcement away from 
those at the bottom end of the illicit drug market (such 
as small-scale farmers, low-level dealers and traffickers), 
decriminalisation of drug possession and use, and systems 
of legal market regulation. Only by counting the costs 
and exploring the alternatives will we be able to rectify 
the disastrous effects of half a century’s punitive drug 
policies that have fallen hardest on the most marginalised 
and vulnerable.
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Introduction
The war on drugs has long been justified on the grounds 
that it protects children and young people. Its supporters 
claim that people who use and supply drugs must be 
arrested, criminalised, and in some cases even imprisoned 
or executed, in order to keep drugs off our streets and 
society’s youth safe. But this approach has been tried for 
more than half a century now – and the evidence is clear. 
Any marginal benefits that the approach may bring are 
dramatically outweighed by the costs it generates: the 
drug war, far from protecting young people, is actively 
putting them in danger.
The current punitive approach has not only failed in its 
core mission to stop young people taking drugs; it has 
dramatically increased the risks for those who do take 
them and, as recognised by the UNODC, has produced 
additional harms that are both disastrous and entirely 
avoidable.
1
 Yet this reality is rarely recognised in the 
public debate on drugs. 
Harms that are a direct result of the drug war – such 
as children and young people injured or killed in drug-
market violence, the stigma and limited life chances that 
stem from a criminal conviction for drug possession, or 
deaths from contaminated street drugs – are confused or 
deliberately conflated with the harms of drug use per se.
Too often, such harms are then used to justify the 
continuation, or intensification, of the very policies that 
created them in the first place. Emotive appeals to child 
safety frequently play a part in this process. Populist 
political rhetoric and sensationalist media reports exploit 
parents’ greatest fears, characterising drugs (although, 
crucially, only illegal drugs) as an existential threat 
to society’s youth to be fought and eradicated, rather 
than a more conventional health and social issue to be 
pragmatically managed in a way that reduces harm. 
This discourse has served to suppress any meaningful 
scrutiny and evaluation of current policy, with those 
questioning its logic often dismissed as simply being “pro-
drugs”. In addition, it has created practical and political 
obstacles to prevention, treatment, and harm reduction 
interventions that have been shown to be effective. The 
terms of the debate need to change as the international 
community moves beyond the 2016 United Nations 
General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on Drugs and 
formulates the UN’s new 10-year drug strategy in 2019. 
Frank, evidence-based criticism of the current approach 
must be permitted, and alternatives seriously considered.
This briefing highlights the specific costs of the drug war 
for children and young people. It demonstrates how this 
war, while declared in the name of protecting young 
people from the “drug threat”, has ironically exposed 
them to far greater harm. The war on drugs is, in reality, 
a war on people. 
The war on drugs has long been justified on the grounds that it 
protects children and young people, but it does the opposite. It 
undermines their human rights; injures or kills them in drug-market 
violence; tears families apart; and for those who do take drugs, leads 
to stigma and limited life chances from criminal convictions for drug 
possession, or deaths from contaminated street drugs.
“Narcotics addiction is a problem 
which afflicts both the body and the 
soul of America … It comes quietly 
into homes and destroys children, 
it moves into neighborhoods and 
breaks the fiber of community which 
makes neighbors ...” 
Richard Nixon
President of the United States
1971
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The costs of the war on drugs to 
children and young people
1. Threatening young people’s health 
Maximising the risks of drug use
Drugs pose very real risks to children and young people.
2
 
While a majority do not use illegal drugs, and most who 
do experience little or no significant harm as a result, a 
small but significant proportion will experience problems 
– and the dangers they face are inevitably greater than 
those faced by adults.
Young people who use drugs are, in general, more 
physically and mentally vulnerable to drug risks; 
less knowledgeable about the potential effects of the 
substances they are consuming; more likely to take risks 
with their drug-taking; and more likely to become long-
term, dependent drug users in later life.
3 4 
Harsh drug laws may, intuitively, seem like an appropriate 
response to these elevated risks. However, evidence 
shows that punitive drug law enforcement does not 
deter children and young people from using drugs, nor 
does it significantly restrict their access to them. A 2014 
study by the UK Home Office,
5
 which reviewed evidence 
from around the world, concluded that the “toughness” 
of a country’s drug laws had no influence on its levels of 
drug use. Numerous similar studies, including from the 
European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction, 
the World Health Organization and the Organization of 
American States, have come to the same conclusion.
6 7 8  
Not only do harsher penalties or prohibitions fail to reduce 
drug use, they also make drug use far more risky, whether 
that use is problematic or not. The threat of criminalisation, 
and the associated stigma and discrimination, frequently 
pushes drug use into marginal, unsafe and unhygienic 
environments, further jeopardising the health of young 
people who use drugs. It can additionally deter the 
hardest-to-reach individuals from seeking treatment, for 
fear of condemnation, judgement or arrest.
9
Prohibition exacerbates this situation by ensuring that 
drug production and supply is completely unregulated 
and conducted without any formal oversight. Rather than 
governments, doctors and licensed vendors, it is criminal 
“Globally, drug use is not distributed 
evenly and is not simply related to 
drug policy, since countries with 
stringent user-level illegal drug 
policies did not have lower levels of 
use than countries with liberal ones.” 
‘Toward a Global View of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Cannabis, and Cocaine Use: Findings from 
the World Health Organization World Mental 
Health Surveys’
2008
Anti-drug war protest in Mexico (photo credit: Marco Ugarte)
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volumes of high-strength substances are more profitable 
and easier to transport than larger volumes of less potent 
ones. This is why, under alcohol prohibition in the US, 
bootleggers smuggled spirits rather than bulkier and 
weaker beers and wines.
Undermining youth-oriented health messages
The credibility of drug education is undermined when 
authorities that provide it are simultaneously attempting 
to punish or criminalise young people for using drugs. 
As a result, those most in need are often distrustful of 
programmes that seek to change their patterns of drug 
use, or prevent them from taking drugs altogether.
As well as creating an environment that is more conducive 
to drug education, it is important to ensure that such 
entrepreneurs who control the drug trade – those least 
likely or qualified to manage it responsibly. The result 
is that drugs of unknown potency and purity, often cut 
with dangerous adulterants,
10
 are sold to anyone who can 
afford them – regardless of their age. And since street 
dealers do not provide health warnings and safe-dosage 
information, novice users – who are most likely to be 
young – are at greater risk of experiencing adverse effects 
from their drug use. 
The likelihood of users suffering avoidable health harms, 
and even a fatal overdose, is further increased by the 
economics of the unregulated illicit trade. When drugs 
are banned, they will inevitably be produced in criminal 
markets in more potent forms.
11 
In order to avoid detection 
by law enforcement and at the same time maximise their 
profits, producers and traffickers prefer to deal with 
more portable, concentrated drug preparations; smaller 
Anyone’s Child: Families for Safer Drug Control
Following the death of her daughter, Martha, from an overdose of MDMA, Anne-Marie Cockburn has become an 
advocate for a more pragmatic approach to drugs. Along with other families negatively impacted by current drug 
laws, she has helped to establish a new campaign, called Anyone’s Child: Families for Safer Drug Control. This is 
her story.
“On 20th July, 2013, I received the phone call that no parent wants to get. The voice said that my 15-year-old 
daughter was gravely ill and they were trying to save her life. On that beautiful, sunny Saturday morning, Martha 
had swallowed half a gram of MDMA powder (ecstasy) that turned out to be 91% pure. Within two hours of taking 
it, my daughter died of an accidental overdose. She was my only child. 
“I was blissfully ignorant about the world of drugs before Martha died. Drugs are laughed about on sitcoms, joked 
about on panel shows. Much as I hate to admit it, they are a normal part of modern society. Young people witness 
their friends not dying from taking drugs all the time. So by simply spouting the ‘just don’t do it’ line and hoping 
that will be enough of a deterrent, we’re closing our eyes to what’s really going on. 
“The subject of drugs evokes so much emotion in people, it’s hard for many to imagine what moving away from 
prohibition would actually look like in practice. Many think it would result in a free-for-all, but that’s what we 
actually have at the moment. Drugs are currently 100% controlled by criminals, who are willing to sell to you 
whether you’re aged 5 or 55. Everyone has easy-access to dangerous drugs, that is a fact. I’ve said: ‘Martha wanted 
to get high, she didn’t want to die’. All parents would prefer one of those options to the other. And while no one 
wants drugs sold to children, if Martha had got hold of legally regulated drugs meant for adults, labelled with 
health warnings and dosage instructions, she would not have taken 5-10 times the safe dose.
“When I hear that yet another family has joined the bereaved parents’ club, I feel helpless as I wonder how many 
more need to die before someone in government will actually do something about it? As I stand by my child’s 
grave, what more evidence do I need that things must change? A good start would be to conduct the very first 
proper review of our drug laws in over 40 years and to consider alternative approaches. But the people in power 
play an amazing game of ‘let’s pretend’. Well there’s no way for me to hide – every day I wake up, the stark reality 
of Martha’s absence hits me once again.”
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accurate surveillance data only makes an already difficult 
challenge harder.  
Even when a need is identified, it can be extremely 
difficult for young people and children to access services, 
and they often face obstacles and discrimination when 
they attempt to minimise harms from their drug use. 
In Central and Eastern Europe, for example, there are 
arbitrary age restrictions on access to sterile injecting 
equipment and opioid substitution therapy, which can 
reduce the harms faced by young people who use drugs.
18
Reducing access to essential medicines
Fears about the diversion of certain medical drugs for illicit, 
non-medical use have led to overly restrictive drug policies. 
Most seriously, more than 80% of the world’s population 
– including 5.5 million people with terminal cancer – 
have little or no access to opiate-based pain medication. 
Inevitably, this means many of the world’s poorest people 
experience entirely unnecessary suffering. 
This failure on the part of the UN and domestic 
governments to ensure access to palliative care impacts 
on children in particular. Despite morphine being 
classified as an essential medicine by the World Health 
Organization, unwarranted fears about addiction have led 
healthcare professionals in some countries to be reluctant 
to prescribe the drug to children. In Kenya, punitive drug 
policies have served to foster the widespread perception 
that morphine is highly dangerous, rather than an 
essential, low-cost tool to alleviate pain when used in a 
medical setting. Not only are many young people in pain 
unable to access relief for themselves, but they may also 
have to watch their loved ones suffer, sometimes depriving 
them of support from parents or carers in the process.
19 20
 
This major, avoidable cause of young people’s suffering 
persists despite the avoidance of ill health and access to 
essential medicines being a key objective and obligation 
of the global drug control regime.
efforts are grounded in evidence. For decades, exclusively 
abstinence-based approaches have been the dominant 
model in most parts of the world – and they have not 
worked. Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE), the 
archetypal “Just Say No” prevention programme in the 
US, has been studied extensively, and researchers have 
concluded that children who participate in it “are just as 
likely to use drugs as are children who do not participate 
in the program.”
12
 Worse than simply being expensive and 
ineffective, there is some evidence that such programmes 
may even be counterproductive.
13
That is not to say that prevention can never work, or that 
it is not an important part of a wider harm reduction 
approach; from a public health perspective, it is obviously 
better to prevent drug use ever occurring than to deal 
with its consequences. But there is a need to be realistic. 
The best available evidence suggests that universal 
information provision alone does not change drug-taking 
behaviour.
14
 Decisions to begin or stop using drugs are 
complex, influenced by a range of social, cultural and 
environmental factors. According to research, addressing 
these factors – by, for example, teaching children to resist 
impulsive behaviour in general – is likely to be most 
effective in preventing or reducing drug use.
15
There is also a balance to be struck between positive 
efforts to encourage abstinence, and providing practical 
and targeted harm reduction advice to those for whom 
abstinence messages do not succeed. Because of a 
politically driven zero-tolerance approach to drugs, this 
latter group is often put at risk by a lack of information 
that could minimise the potential harms of their drug use.
Drug education, if it is to work, therefore needs to be 
based on science, rather than politics. But the drug war 
is a political construct: it has historically marginalised 
evidence and defaulted to simplistic scaremongering, 
driven by an ideological and implausible vision of a 
“drug-free world”. 
Restricting young people’s access to effective services
An estimated 15.9 million people aged 15 to 64 inject drugs 
worldwide. However, the number of people in this group 
who are under the age of 18, or under 18 and infected 
with HIV or hepatitis C, is unknown because this data is 
not routinely collected in most locations.
16
Delivering treatment and harm reduction services for 
under-18s is a complex and sensitive task, involving legal 
barriers, clinical considerations and widely varying socio-
economic contexts.
17
 But the longstanding absence of 
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in the midday sun; shocking by electric batons; whipping 
by cords, electrical wires, tree branches and water hoses; 
and rape – including gang rape and forcing young women 
into sex work. Abuses are not only carried out by the 
staff, but also delegated to trusted detainees to carry out 
against fellow inmates.
 
Undermining schooling and education
The politicised and emotive nature of the public debate 
on drugs has led many schools to adopt zero-tolerance 
policies. These are designed to reassure parents and 
fulfil politicians’ expectations, but they do not respond 
effectively to the realities of drug use in society, or to the 
complexities of most children’s lives.
These hard-line policies usually involve disproportionately 
punitive and ultimately counterproductive sanctions for 
drug use or drug dealing. Students who have committed 
even minor infractions are often suspended or excluded 
from school, rather than offered support from health and 
welfare services. Such sanctions can seriously jeopardise 
a child’s future, with reduced involvement in education 
and leaving school at an early age being associated with 
2. Undermining children’s rights
Abusive juvenile justice, punishment and incarceration
People who use drugs, or who are arrested or suspected of 
drug offences, including children and young people, are 
frequently subjected to imprisonment and serious forms 
of cruel and unusual punishment.
Many children and young people are deprived of their 
freedom for minor drug offences through unjust and 
disproportionate laws. This injustice is all the more acute 
given they are usually among the most marginalised and 
vulnerable in society, drawn into low-level drug dealing 
or trafficking as a direct result of poverty and a lack of 
alternative options. For most of these minor players, 
involvement in the illicit drug trade is necessary for their 
economic survival; it is not a sign of greed or wealth. Few 
match the stereotypes of moneyed gangsters portrayed in 
popular media and film: in 2009, 50% of those imprisoned 
for illicit drug sales in Mexico were selling products with 
a value of $100 or less, and 25% were making sales worth 
$18 or less.
21
In any country, poorer young people are also at greater risk 
than their wealthier counterparts of being apprehended 
by drug law enforcement. This is because they are more 
likely to live in deprived, urban neighbourhoods where 
the drug trade is more conspicuous, carried out in public 
areas between strangers. Once arrested, they are also 
more likely to be convicted and to go to prison than 
wealthier young people – particularly if they are from 
ethnic minorities.
22
 And when emerging from prison, the 
stigma and legal implications of a criminal record limit 
their options still further, creating obstacles to housing, 
employment, welfare and travel, making a return to drug 
use and the criminal economy more likely.
Catalogue of abuses against children and young people 
once they are within the criminal justice system can 
include police violence;
23
 death threats and beatings to 
extract information;
24
 being held in solitary confinement 
(for non-violent offences);
25
 extortion of money or 
confessions through forced withdrawal without medical 
assistance; judicially sanctioned corporal punishment 
for drug use; and various forms of cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment in the name of “rehabilitation”, 
including denial of meals, beatings, sexual abuse and 
threats of rape, isolation, and forced labour.
26
In Cambodia, where children comprise around 25% of 
those in compulsory drug detention centres,
27 
abuses 
include: detainees being hung by the ankle on flagpoles 
“[W]hat we know is that a 
consequence of [focussing on street-
level drug transactions] was this 
massive trend towards incarceration, 
even of non-violent drug offenders 
... I saw this from the perspective of 
a state legislator, this, just, explosion 
of incarcerations, disproportionately 
African American and Latino. And the 
challenge ...is, folks going in at great 
expense to the state, many times 
trained to become more hardened 
criminals while in prison, come out and 
are basically unemployable. And end 
up looping back in.”
Barack Obama
President of the United States
2015
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more chaotic and problematic drug use, both in the 
short and long term.
28
 Life chances and employment 
prospects can also be directly impacted. In the US, for 
example, many low-income students have been denied 
access to federal aid for college tuition due to minor drug 
convictions.
29
 Vulnerable young people with difficult 
home lives are already more likely to be involved in drugs, 
and excessively punitive, knee-jerk responses serve only 
to exacerbate the challenges they face.  
Both random drug testing and sniffer dogs are sometimes 
deployed for similar symbolic value – to demonstrate a 
school’s zero-tolerance credentials, or show that it is 
“taking a stand” against drugs. But neither has been 
shown to be effective in deterring drug use.
• A study in Michigan involving 76,000 pupils found 
no difference in levels of drug use among students in 
schools where drug testing was conducted compared 
with those where it was not
30
• The UK government’s expert group, the Advisory 
Council on the Misuse of Drugs, reviewed the 
available evidence in 2005 and specifically 
recommended against such policies, due to the 
“complex ethical, technical and organisational 
issues” involved, and the “potential impact on the 
school-pupil relationship”
31
As well as being an ineffective deterrent to drug use, testing 
and searches represent a violation of the right to privacy, 
and raise difficult ethical questions around both child and 
parental consent. Even if drugs or drug use are detected, 
this can lead to students being publicly labelled as a drug 
user in need of help, despite the inability of drug tests or 
low-level drug seizures to distinguish between occasional, 
recreational use and genuinely problematic use that 
requires the intervention of health or social services. The 
stigma of this label can impact on a child’s self-esteem 
and aspirations, drawing them into the net of counselling 
services, treatment programmes and the criminal justice 
system, from which it is difficult to escape.
32
 
3. Destroying families:  
the impact on parents and carers
While children and young people are often directly 
harmed by the war on drugs, many are also indirectly 
affected by the loss of parents or carers, who, due to 
criminalisation, incarceration or drug-war violence, are 
either absent, unable to adequately care for them, or dead.
Does the drug war protect  
children’s rights?
The protection of children’s rights has been a 
prominent theme in political justifications for 
punitive drug enforcement and opposition to 
reform.
33
 The UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child is the core international treaty setting out a 
comprehensive set of rights guarantees for children. 
All but two states, Somalia and the US, have agreed 
to be bound by its terms, which include protection 
from drugs – the right for children to, effectively, 
be “drug-free”. Signatories are required to: 
“... take all appropriate measures, including 
legislative, administrative, social and 
educational measures, to protect children from 
illicit use of narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances as defined in the relevant 
international treaties and to prevent the use of 
children in the illicit production and trafficking 
of such substances.” 
The key question, when counting the costs to child 
rights of the war on drugs, is: What constitutes 
“appropriate measures”? This is particularly 
important given the horrific litany of violence, 
abuse, disease and death that has resulted from 
the current enforcement-led system, alongside the 
failure to achieve the policy’s stated aims.
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child calls 
for the protection of children, not punishment and 
criminalisation. The war on drugs is at odds with 
the emphasis placed by the UN on human rights 
and health, and it is these considerations that 
should shape the development of drug policy for 
young people. 
• Since 2006, when Mexico intensified and militarised 
its approach to drug law enforcement, more than 
100,000 people have been killed in violence related 
to the country’s illegal drug trade, and over 20,000 
have disappeared.
34
 In 2010 it was estimated that as 
many as 50,000 children had lost one or more parents 
in this violence
35 36
  – a figure that is certain to have 
increased significantly in subsequent years
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poverty and, ironically, a need to support their children. 
Alternatively, their involvement may result from coercion 
and exploitation by men further up the drug-trading 
hierarchy.
This has become an acute problem in Latin America in 
recent years. Between 2006 and 2011, the region’s female 
prison population almost doubled, increasing from 40,000 
to more than 74,000, with the vast majority imprisoned 
for drug-related offences. Estimates range from 75-80% 
in Ecuador, 30-60% in Mexico, 64% in Costa Rica, 60% in 
Brazil, and 70% in Argentina.
42
Some children of women or men sentenced to long prison 
terms for drug crimes grow up inside prisons,
43 44 
many of 
which the United Nations Development Programme has 
• The use of incarceration for drug offences has 
deprived many children of their parents or carers. In 
the US, 55% of women and 69% of men held in federal 
prisons for drug offences have children; in state 
prisons, it is 63% of women and 59% of men.
37
 Being 
separated from a parent in this way can precipitate a 
range of emotional, psychological and social problems 
for children, many of whom will already be growing 
up in families struggling with poverty, discrimination 
and limited educational and employment 
opportunities.
38
 Children of incarcerated parents 
are at greater risk of suffering from depression and 
becoming aggressive or withdrawn,
39
 and boys with 
incarcerated fathers have substantially worse social 
and other non-cognitive skills at school entry
40
• Depriving children of one or both parents can also lead 
to their being raised by the state, something which 
is strongly associated with reduced life chances and 
poor outcomes for children. For example, children 
who grow up in UK local government care are four 
times more likely to require the help of mental health 
services; nine times more likely to have special 
educational needs requiring support or therapy; 
seven times more likely to misuse alcohol or drugs; 50 
times more likely to wind up in prison; 60 times more 
likely to become homeless; and 66 times more likely 
to have children needing public care themselves
41
Disproportionate sentencing
Women are most commonly convicted of low-level, non-
violent drug offences, and are not the principal figures 
in criminal organisations. However, since they are also 
most commonly a child’s key care provider, when they 
are criminalised or imprisoned due to drug-war policies, 
their children suffer too.
Mandatory minimum sentences for drug trafficking often 
fail to distinguish between quantities carried. Even lower-
end sentences are often very harsh. Rigid sentencing 
guidelines often limit judges’ discretion, preventing them 
from considering mitigating factors that might allow for 
reduced sentences or non-custodial alternatives. 
The result is that many women involved in drug supply 
at a relatively low level are subject to criminal sanctions 
similar to those issued to high-level market operatives 
and large-scale traffickers. This results in particularly 
severe sentences for so-called “drug mules” – women 
who transport drugs across borders. Usually coming from 
socially and economically marginalised backgrounds, they 
are commonly driven to drug trafficking by desperation, 
“A substantial percentage of women 
in prison are incarcerated for drug 
offenses – an estimated 70 percent 
in some countries in the Americas 
and in Europe and Central Asia – a 
significant number for low level, 
non-violent drug offenses. Many of 
them are young, illiterate or with 
little schooling, single mothers and 
responsible for the care of their 
children or other family members. 
While more men are incarcerated for 
drug offenses, the consequences of 
criminal punishment fall differently 
on women, and often have greater 
impact on their children and 
their families. Yet women’s caring 
responsibilities are not taken 
into account at sentencing, nor 
recognized or met at the prison.”
United Nations Development Programme
2015
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4. Fuelling crime and violence, 
creating new dangers
Research based on several decades of data shows that, 
counterintuitively, police and military enforcement 
against illicit drug markets actually increases, rather than 
reduces, gun violence and homicide rates.
47
 Historically, 
the victims of such drug-market-related conflict have 
predominantly been young males, but increasingly, 
women and children are becoming victims too. In Mexico, 
for example, as many as 4,000 women and 1,000 children 
were killed in violence linked to the drug trade between 
2006 and 2010 alone.
48
Children’s psychological development is also inevitably 
affected by exposure to the conflict and violence linked 
to the illegal drug trade. Research into the mental health 
of children and adolescents living in areas plagued 
by drug-war instability shows an association between 
living in violent surroundings and greater levels of social 
problems, rule-breaking and aggression.
49
 Post-traumatic 
stress disorder among school students has also been 
attributed to living in drug-war conflict zones.
50
The breakdown of social and political structures is 
another result of the volatility generated by the illegal 
drug trade and the enforcement response to it. Family 
and community norms, and functioning state services 
(most obviously education and healthcare) that could 
have mitigated the dire situation in which many children 
find themselves, are often eroded, completely absent, or 
in extreme cases, only available due to the largesse of the 
cartels that have displaced state actors.
51 
The recruitment of children is also common among drug 
cartels. Driven by poverty and desperation, many become 
drug-crop growers or foot soldiers for these violent 
organisations:
• In Mexico, from 2006 to 2011, more than 25,000 
children left school to join drug trafficking 
organisations
52
• Such early involvement in the drug trade has 
also been well documented in Brazil, where drug 
gangs cultivate close ties with children and young 
people, building their trust by first paying them 
to perform simple, non-drug-related tasks, then 
recruiting them with the lure of weapons, power, 
drugs and sex.
53 
As the country’s illicit drug trade has 
continued to grow, this exploitation of children has 
had increasingly fatal consequences. From 1980 to 
2010, Brazil’s homicide rate for people aged under 
described as “not fit to maintain the basic conditions to 
live with dignity”.
45
 In Bolivia, official estimates suggest 
there are at least 1,500 children being raised in jails by 
their parents.
46
Disproportionate responses to parental drug use
Drug-taking is often equated with negligence or 
mistreatment of children, and a woman’s drug use or 
dependence in particular can be grounds for removing 
a child from her care. Whether drug use is problematic 
or not, this is blanket discrimination, often fuelled by 
populist political and media stereotypes. News coverage 
of so-called “crack moms” in the US is a prominent 
example.
There is no doubt that problematic parental drug 
dependence places children at increased risk of neglect 
and abuse. But as is so often the case in the drugs debate, 
there is a risk of generalised assumptions: for many, it 
is difficult to accept that parental drug use is not always 
synonymous with child neglect. Parents who use drugs 
can also be good parents. Life-changing decisions about 
the custody of a child should therefore be made on an 
individual basis, taking into account the real risk of abuse 
or neglect in each case, and weighed against likely negative 
outcomes for the child if they are taken into state care. 
Beyond consideration of individual cases, as ever in public 
policy, prevention of a problem is best, so it is vital the 
most comprehensive health and social support possible 
is provided for all families who are, or might become, at 
risk of having a child removed because of problematic 
parental drug use. Unfortunately, rather than investing 
in such proven interventions, limited resources are 
instead expended on counterproductive criminal justice 
responses to drug use, which often place a further undue 
burden on women. 
Finally, gender-specific treatment programmes that allow 
women to live with their children are often limited (where 
they exist at all), and in certain countries, pregnant 
dependent drug users do not have access to the safest 
and most appropriate treatment practices, compromising 
both their health and that of their unborn children.
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Drug-crop eradication: devastating livelihoods and 
threatening health
Forced drug-crop eradication has had a range of 
severe negative consequences, including for children, 
contributing to human displacement, violence, food 
insecurity, and further poverty.
59 60 61
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In its 2006 report 
on Colombia, the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child stated it was “concerned about environmental 
health problems arising from the usage of the substance 
glyphosate in aerial fumigation campaigns against coca 
plantations (which form part of Plan Colombia), as 
these affect the health of vulnerable groups, including 
children.”
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The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) 
– a branch of the World Health Organization – stated 
in 2015 that glyphosate was “probably carcinogenic 
to humans”.
64
 Following the IARC announcement, the 
Colombian government belatedly declared that it will 
cease using Glyphosate (although not necessarily in all 
eradication efforts). However, use of the chemical agent 
continues elsewhere in drug-crop eradication, including 
in South Africa.    
• In Afghanistan, it is accepted at high levels that 
forced eradication has helped the Taliban to recruit, 
and that those who joined were mostly young men
• Eradication has also impacted on educational 
outcomes. Research conducted by the UNODC in 
the Kokang Special Region 1 in Myanmar (Burma) 
found that eradication led to a 50% drop in school 
enrolment
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For all these efforts, eradication has been staggeringly 
ineffectual at reducing the production or availability 
of any drug. Former US Special Envoy to Afghanistan 
Richard Holbrook called it “the least effective program 
ever.”
66
 At the end of coalition troops’ 13-year occupation 
of Afghanistan in 2014, opium production was at a record 
high, with 225,000 hectares under cultivation, compared 
to 82,000 hectares in 2000.
67
  
Are there benefits?
The main supposed benefit of the war on drugs in relation 
to children is that, while drug use may have increased 
over the past half-century, it is still lower than it would 
be under a more “liberal” approach, thereby protecting 
more young people from the harms of drug-taking (with 
some arguing that children have a right to be “drug-free”). 
19 grew by 346% to 13.8 per 100,000, almost three 
times the growth in the murder rate for the wider 
population (126%)
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The trafficking and enslavement of children
The illicit market created by the war on drugs is leading 
directly to the trafficking and enslavement of children. 
In Afghanistan, child labour – including forced labour 
– is used extensively in opium poppy production, and 
sometimes smuggling, including at a transnational 
level.
55
 Media reports have also noted the “opium bride” 
phenomenon, in which farmer families marry off their 
child-age daughters to settle debts to opium traffickers.
56
The war on drugs is also fuelling the trafficking and 
enslavement of children to work within Western drug 
markets, as this story about Vietnamese children 
trafficked to the UK to grow cannabis illustrates:
“Hien’s journey to the UK started when he was taken 
from his village at the age of five by someone who 
claimed to be his uncle. As an orphan, he had no 
option but to do as he was told. He spent five years 
travelling overland… before being smuggled across 
the Channel and taken to a house in London. Here 
he spent the next three years trapped in domestic 
servitude... He became homeless after his ‘uncle’ 
abandoned him. He slept in parks and ate out of bins. 
He was eventually picked up by a Vietnamese couple, 
who ...forced him to work in cannabis farms in flats 
in first Manchester and then Scotland...He was locked 
in, threatened, beaten and completely isolated from 
the outside world. ‘I was never paid any money for 
working there,’ he says. When the police came he 
told his story... but was still sent to a young offenders’ 
institution in Scotland... He was released only after the 
intervention of a crown prosecutor led to him being 
identified as a victim of trafficking.”
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This story is far from unusual. According to Anti-Slavery 
International, of the potential trafficking victims who 
were forced to cultivate cannabis in the UK, 96% were 
from Vietnam and 81% of those were children. The UK’s 
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
has also said that, between 2011 and 2012, of all the 
trafficked children who had disappeared in the previous 
year, 58% were being exploited for criminal activity, 
including cannabis cultivation.
58
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This appears, at face value, to be a reasonable position, 
but it is problematic for two reasons.
First, as already discussed, decades of evidence from 
all over the world show that the harshness of law 
enforcement has no meaningful impact on levels of drug 
use. However, using law enforcement in an attempt to 
restrict drug use unquestionably causes damage in itself. 
The threat of criminalisation is an unethical, ineffective 
and entirely disproportionate strategy for encouraging 
young people to make healthier lifestyle choices. And, 
as outlined above, enforcement measures that seek to 
prevent drug consumption by targeting the supply of 
drugs are both ineffective (and therefore, by definition, 
disproportionate) and actively undermine the safety of 
communities in which children live.
Second, in any case, levels of drug use are a poor measure 
of overall levels of health and social harms. While the 
use of some illicit drugs may be low in relative terms, 
prohibition ensures that the harm this use generates is 
very high. Indeed, many of the potential risks of illicit 
drugs are a product not just of their pharmacology, but 
of their being produced and supplied by an unregulated 
criminal market. Street heroin mixed with potent 
adulterants such as fentanyl, for example, carries far 
greater risks than pure, pharmaceutical-grade heroin 
(diamorphine).  
How to count the costs?
To meaningfully count the costs of the war on drugs to 
children, new policy aims and new ways of measuring 
policy effectiveness are required. That means moving 
beyond the narrow goals of use-reduction and abstinence, 
and beyond process indicators, such as arrests, seizures, 
and amount of drug crops destroyed. Instead, the analysis 
should be based on the actual quality of life, health  and 
wellbeing of children and young people.
The war on drugs, and potential alternative approaches, 
must therefore be evaluated against a far broader range 
of indicators – for health, human rights, human security 
and human development. Given that these are the 
key pillars of the UN’s work, it is a call that should be 
informing all of the agency’s discussions – from the 2016 
UNGASS on Drugs, the Sustainable Development Goals, 
the 2019 10-year UN drug strategy, and beyond. To do this 
effectively will require a commitment  to bring existing 
analytical frameworks – for example, those concerned 
with children’s rights and juvenile justice – to bear on the 
development and evaluation of drug policy, something 
“The planes often sprayed our 
community. People would get very sad 
when they saw the fumigation planes. 
You see the planes  coming – four or 
five of them – from far away with a 
black cloud of spray behind them. 
They say they are trying to kill the 
coca, but they kill everything. I wish 
the people flying those fumigation 
planes would realize all the damage 
they do. I wish they’d at least look at 
where they’re going to spray, rather 
than just spraying anywhere and 
everywhere. The fumigation planes 
sprayed our coca and food crops. 
All of our crops died. Sometimes 
even farm  animals died as well. 
After the fumigation, we’d go days 
without eating. 
“Once the fumigation spray hit my 
little brother and me. We were outside 
and didn’t make it into the house 
before the planes flew by. I got sick 
and had to be taken to the hospital. I 
got a terrible rash that itched a lot and 
burned in the sun. The doctor told us 
the chemical spray was toxic and was 
very dangerous. I was sick for a long 
time and my brother was sick even 
longer.”
Javier
Age 11
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that has been lacking in most UN and domestic political 
declarations to date.
68  
Technical challenges are not the problem here – this task 
simply requires political will from UN member states, 
and leadership from key UN agencies, key child-focused 
NGOs, and funding bodies, all of whom need to focus on 
redressing the historic deficit in evaluating the negative 
impacts of the war on drugs on children and young people. 
Conclusion
The protection of children is rightly a key concern in the 
debate about drugs and drug policy. But as this briefing 
demonstrates, far from protecting this most vulnerable of 
groups, the war on drugs exposes them to even greater 
risks: drugs cut with dangerous adulterants; a criminal 
record that can ruin lives from an early age; violent drug 
markets that blight entire cities; barriers to evidence-
based treatment and health interventions; and ineffective 
education inspired by ideological visions of a drug-free 
world.
Aside from these direct costs of the drug war to children, 
there are also huge opportunity costs that come with 
pursuing such an enforcement-based approach. The tens 
of billions of dollars poured annually into failed and 
counterproductive law enforcement each year are not far 
short of total spending on international aid.
69 
This money 
could be re-directed into health and social development 
programmes for vulnerable individuals and communities 
– including children and young people – that would 
reduce harms rather than fuel them. 
As a growing number of jurisdictions implement far-
reaching drug policy reforms, it is time for governments, 
international bodies and civil society to count the costs 
of the war on drugs and participate in the growing 
discussion on alternative approaches that could deliver 
better outcomes – especially for children and young 
people. As the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, has 
said, it is essential that the drug policy debate is “wide-
ranging [and] considers all options”
70
 – and that includes 
the decriminalisation of personal drug possession and the 
legal regulation of drug markets. 
There can be no further excuses for delaying a meaningful 
debate on reform. It is vital that the slogan of the 2016 
UNGASS on Drugs – “A better tomorrow for today’s 
youth’”– proves not to have been just more empty rhetoric 
designed to preserve the status quo. Because more of the 
same will mean a more dangerous world for young people 
to grow up in. 
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Yet despite the environmental toll of this counterdrug 
strategy, most nations have ratified the relevant 
international conventions requiring the eradication of 
certain drug crops. Article 14, paragraph 2, of the 1988 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, declares 
that: “Each Party shall take appropriate measures to 
prevent illicit cultivation of and to eradicate plants 
containing narcotic or psychotropic substances, such as 
opium poppy, coca bush and cannabis plants, cultivated 
illicitly in its territory.”
But the same article of this convention also states that: 
“The measures adopted shall respect fundamental human 
rights and shall take due account of traditional licit uses … 
as well as the protection of the environment.”
4
 
In practice, however, the environment – along with 
human rights and traditional uses of drugs – has not been 
given due consideration in either the war on drugs or the 
crop eradication campaigns carried out in its name.
5
 
The futility of drug crop 
eradication 
Although the logic of illicit crop eradications seems clear, 
such attempts to break the first link in the chain of the 
drug trade have been entirely ineffective in generating 
a sustained reduction in the quantity of drugs being 
produced. This is because without any significant, 
prolonged decline in demand, eradication simply 
increases the price of illicit drug crops: they become a 
rarer, yet equally sought after, commodity, which in turn 
provides a greater incentive to ramp up production. 
The lucrative nature of this cycle means that production 
is never eliminated, only displaced. This is an example of 
the so-called “balloon effect”: production in one region 
is squeezed by law enforcement, causing it to expand 
The environment is one of the forgotten costs of the war on drugs. 
The heavy emphasis on supply-side enforcement – particularly when 
involving crop eradication – has proved futile in reducing total drug 
production but has had disastrous environmental consequences in 
terms of deforestation and pollution in some of the world’s most 
fragile and biodiverse ecosystems.
Introduction
The war on drugs has created or exacerbated a series of 
serious environmental harms that have remained at the 
margins of both high-level drug policy and environment 
protection debates.
1 2
  
As part of ongoing international commitments to 
achieving a “drug-free world”, drug policies have, over 
the past half-century, placed a heavy emphasis on efforts 
to restrict the production and supply of drugs. Yet these 
supply-side interventions, while proving largely futile in 
reducing supply, are fuelling widespread environmental 
destruction. The most direct cause of this destruction is 
also the most direct means of disrupting illicit production 
and supply – drug crop eradication. Usually conducted 
without consent or forewarning, eradication involves 
either manually cutting down or uprooting plants, or 
the aerial spraying of chemical herbicides. Whatever the 
method used, this practice, directly and indirectly, leaves 
a catalogue of environmental harms in its wake.
3
 
The areas of land under cultivation for illicit drug crops 
are relatively small – at least when compared to more 
conventional food and industrial crops. Despite this, the 
combination of clandestine illicit production that carries 
no responsibility for secondary costs, and environmentally 
destructive forced eradication that merely displaces 
production, has meant that illicit drug production and 
related enforcement efforts have had a disproportionate 
negative impact on the natural environment.
Drug cartels target areas for production that are remote, 
have little economic infrastructure or governance and 
suffer from high levels of poverty, so farmers have few 
alternative means of earning a living outside of the drug 
trade. These areas include some of the most ecologically 
diverse and sensitive in the world. As a result, drug crop 
eradication threatens biodiversity, fuels deforestation, 
and drives illicit crop growers to pursue environmentally 
hazardous methods of drug production. 
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The environmental costs of the 
war on drugs
1. How chemical eradications threaten          
    biodiversity
Concerns over human and environmental health led Peru, 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Thailand to all ban the use of chemical 
agents in eradication efforts. But despite these concerns, 
for 21 years, the world’s second most biodiverse country, 
Colombia, still permitted aerial fumigations of coca, the 
plant which is used to make cocaine, using a chemical 
mixture primarily consisting of the herbicide glyphosate.
In 2015, the aerial fumigation programme was ended, 
following a declaration by the WHO’s International 
Agency for Research on Cancer, that glyphosate “probably” 
causes cancer in humans.
9
 The decision to shutter the 
programme was met with dismay by the US, which was 
the primary backer and funder of the initiative. While 
US officials have claimed the end of the programme will 
reduce Colombia’s ability to combat the illicit cocaine 
trade, there is ample evidence that aerial fumigations are 
both ineffective in bringing about long-term reductions in 
coca production and actively harmful to the environment.
in another region as drug producers mobilise to meet 
demand. Despite its continued support for eradication, 
the UNODC is fully aware of this effect, listing it as one of 
its five unintended consequences of current drug control 
in its 2008 World Drug Report, as well as highlighting 
numerous cases where, when eradications cause 
production to fall in one area, growers in another area 
pick up the slack.
6 7 8
  
Given that eradication efforts have so comprehensively 
failed to deliver their intended outcome, the need to 
scrutinise their unintended consequences is all the more 
urgent. From even a cursory examination of the evidence, 
however, it is clear that one of the most immediate and 
devastating impacts of drug crop eradications is on 
the natural environment of some of the world’s most 
ecologically valuable regions.
Current drug policies must be comprehensively evaluated in order to minimise their environmental impact 
“Spraying the crops just penalizes 
the farmer and they grow the crops 
somewhere else … This is the least 
effective program ever.”
    
Richard Holbrooke 
US Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan 
2002
134
The Alternative World Drug Report, 2nd edition
Although this programme has now come to an end, it is 
important to not lose sight of the devastation caused by 
more than two decades of aerial fumigations. The issue 
also remains relevant as it is possible the programme 
may be reinstated in Colombia, or adopted elsewhere 
in the future, and glyphosate spraying directed at illicit 
cannabis-growing, reportedly continued in South Africa 
during 2015.
13
 
Roundup
TM
: Colombia’s “poison rain”
Roundup is a commercial glyphosate-based herbicide, 
and was the main component of the mixture used in 
Colombia’s US-funded fumigation programme. Glyphosate 
is a non-selective herbicide, meaning any plant exposed 
to a sufficient amount of the chemical will be killed. In the 
mixture sprayed in Colombia, the toxicity of glyphosate is 
enhanced by the inclusion of a surfactant, an additive that 
enables it to penetrate further through leaves, increasing 
its lethality. 
The particular surfactant used in Colombia is not approved 
for use in the US and its ingredients are considered trade 
secrets,
14
 rendering any independent evaluation of its 
effects all the more difficult to conduct.
The destruction of plant life
The spraying of a herbicide designed to kill flora 
indiscriminately, across millions of acres of land, is 
concerning no matter what country it takes place in. But 
in Colombia’s case it was especially alarming, given its 
approximately 55,000 species of plants, a third of which 
are unique to the country. The imprecise nature of aerial
spraying maximises this threat to biodiversity, because 
rather than being applied directly, from close range (as 
instructions for the use of herbicides state), herbicides 
are sprayed from planes. This increases the likelihood of 
the wrong field being sprayed due to human error, and in 
windy conditions causes herbicide to be blown over non-
target areas. Consequently, drug crop eradications often 
wipe out licit crops, forests and rare plants.
In addition to the short-term loss of vegetation they cause, 
aerial fumigations can have a more long-lasting impact 
on plant life. The Amazon has a fragile soil ecosystem, and 
farmers report that areas which have been repeatedly 
fumigated are either less productive or yield crops that 
fail to mature fully.
15`
Aerial spraying: the potential 
human health costs
 
Despite the US government’s claims that the 
chemical agents used in aerial fumigations pose 
no significant health risk to humans, conflicting 
evidence comes from countless reports by local 
people and a range of academic studies. 
One of these concluded that the Roundup 
mixture used in Colombia is toxic to human 
placental cells and could lead to reproductive 
problems,
10
 while the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the Right to Health said after a visit to Ecuador 
in 2007:
“There is credible, reliable evidence that 
the aerial spraying of glyphosate along the 
Colombia-Ecuador border damages the 
physical health of people living in Ecuador. 
There is also credible, reliable evidence that 
the aerial spraying damages their mental 
health.”
11
 
Such concerns assumed a level of institutional 
credibility that became politically impossible 
to ignore only when the WHO’s International 
Agency for Research on Cancer upgraded its 
classification of glyphosate from “possibly” 
causing cancer, to “probably” causing cancer 
– an announcement that finally triggered the 
Colombian cessation of aerial spraying in 2015.
12 
“This spraying campaign [in Colombia] 
is equivalent to the Agent Orange 
devastation of Vietnam – a disturbance 
the wildlife and natural ecosystems 
have never recovered from.” 
Dr. David Olson 
Director of Conservation Science, 
World Wildlife Fund
2000
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poses a real risk of triggering extinctions, particularly 
given the wider pressure on natural habitats in the region.
Such effects are a clear indictment of the decision to 
fumigate vast areas of a country that has the world’s 
greatest diversity of both terrestrial mammal and bird 
species, the latter representing 19% of all birds on the 
planet. 
• Although the US Environmental Protection Agency 
explicitly prohibits the use of glyphosate solutions in 
or near bodies of water,
23
 Roundup was sprayed on 
tropical forests and cloud forest ecosystems 
• In 2002, the Colombian ombudsman received 6,500 
complaints alleging that counterdrug spray planes 
had fumigated food crops, damaged human health 
and harmed the environment
24
 
• Despite the fumigation of approximately 2.6 
million acres of land in Colombia between 2000 
and 2007,
25
 the number of locations used for coca 
cultivation actually increased during this period, 
from 12 of the country’s departments in 1999 to 
23 departments in 2004
26
 
• In 2004, 130,000 hectares of land were fumigated 
in Colombia, leading to a decrease of 6,000 hectares 
of coca crops against the previous year. In other 
words, to eradicate one hectare, it was necessary 
to fumigate 22,
27
 even before taking into account 
resulting rises in production in other countries 
The contamination of national parks 
The inadvertent environmental damage caused by 
chemical eradications was exacerbated by the proximity 
of a number of Colombia’s national parks to illicit coca 
plantations. In effect, this meant that some of the areas 
most frequently targeted by aerial fumigations were also 
among the country’s most biodiverse and ecologically 
irreplaceable.
16
 As more than 17 million people depend 
on the fresh water that flows from these protected 
areas,
17
 this undoubtedly represented a threat to human 
health. It also further threatened Colombia’s more than 
200 endangered species of amphibians that live in these 
aquatic environments and are particularly sensitive to 
herbicides such as Roundup.
18
The danger to animal health
While the US State Department denied that the chemical 
agents used in Colombia have any severe effects on fauna, 
evidence suggests that animal health can be seriously 
impacted by their use. Cattle have lost hair after eating 
fumigated pastures, and chickens and fish have been 
killed as a result of drinking water contaminated with the 
fumigation spray.
19
More significantly, by eradicating large areas of vegetation, 
aerial fumigations destroyed many animals’ habitats and 
deprive them of essential food sources. With numerous 
bird, animal and insect species unique to Colombia, this 
Biological warfare: the looming threat of mycoherbicides
The use of fungi known as mycoherbicides has previously been proposed as a more effective weapon in the fight 
against illicit crop production. One of the mycoherbicides considered for use is fusarium oxysporam, a fungus 
which produces a toxin harmful enough to be classified as a biological weapon by the draft Verification Protocol 
to the UN Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons.
20
 
Despite its ability to cause skin diseases and respiratory problems in humans, and despite the obvious risks 
of introducing novel (in this case genetically engineered) biological pathogens into fragile ecosystems, in 2000 
the US lobbied the Colombian government to introduce a strain of fusarium oxysporam as part of its drug crop 
eradication programme. Although this proposal was eventually rejected, a number of members of Congress made 
subsequent attempts in 2006 and 2007 to “fast-track” research into the fungus so that it could be used for opium 
eradication in Afghanistan and coca eradication in Colombia.
21
 There have been unconfirmed suspicions that a 
fungus infestation that struck the heart of the opium poppy cultivation region in Afghanistan in 2010, destroying 
almost one quarter of the year’s crop, may have been deliberately instigated as part of an eradication effort.
22
  
The eagerness with which this drastic measure has been pursued in the past indicates that the use of mycoherbicides 
in the war on drugs remains a potential environmental threat. 
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• The growing of opium poppy in countries such 
as Thailand and Myanmar depletes thin forest 
soils and their nutrients so quickly that slash-
and-burn growers, after harvesting as few as two 
or three crop cycles, clear new forest plots. The 
cumulative effect of this has compounded the 
environmental destruction taking place in the 
Golden Triangle region
31
 
• Significant areas of US national parks in California, 
Texas and Arkansas have been taken over by 
Mexican drug cartels growing cannabis
32
2. Deforestation
While eradications necessarily cause localised 
deforestation in the areas in which they are conducted, 
they also have a multiplier effect, because once an area 
has been chemically or manually eradicated, drug crop 
producers deforest new areas for cultivation. In their 
search for new growing sites, producers move into 
increasingly remote or secluded locations as a means 
of evading eradication efforts.
28
 Exacerbating the 
environmental cost of this balloon effect, they also often 
target national parks or other protected, ecologically 
significant areas where fumigation is banned. 
Mexico’s Sierra Madre Occidental mountain range, for 
instance, is one of the most ecologically diverse regions 
in North America, yet is also now one of the most prolific 
opium and cannabis producing regions in the world. The 
displacement of drug producers to this area has fuelled 
widespread deforestation, jeopardising the 200 species of 
oak tree and the habitats of numerous rare bird species – 
such as the thick-billed parrot – found in the region. Such 
deforestation is not limited to the area cultivated for illicit 
crops. Rather, in addition to this land, drug producers 
also clear forest for subsistence crops, cattle pastures, 
housing, transport routes and in some cases, for airstrips. 
As a result of this, several acres of forest are often clear-
cut to produce just one acre of drug crop. 
• Protected ecological zones in Central America have 
become a hub for the trafficking of South American 
cocaine. The annual deforestation rate in Honduras 
more than quadrupled between 2007 and 2011, a 
period in which the illegal drug trade prospered. 
Huge swathes of the Río Plátano Biosphere Reserve, 
an endangered UNESCO world heritage site, have 
been caught up in this deforestation
29
 
• In 2008, the UN reported that, for the fourth 
consecutive year, the Alto Huallaga region of Peru – 
which is located in tropical and subtropical forests – 
was the country’s largest coca cultivating area
30
 
The balloon effect in the Andean region
“This destruction of the rainforest for 
coca production and coca plantation 
has gone on under the radar of the 
environmentalists. We hope that 
this will be a wake-up call. We hope 
that the World Wildlife Fund and 
Greenpeace will start saying ‘what is 
this?’” 
 Francisco Santos Calderón 
Vice-President of Colombia 
2008
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The Andean region: bearing the 
brunt of drug war deforestation
The countries that make up the South American 
Andes region are among the most ecologically 
precious in the world, containing thousands of 
endemic species of plants, hundreds of endemic 
species of mammals, birds, fish, reptiles and 
amphibians, and countless endemic insect 
species. But it is these countries, vital though 
they are to global biodiversity, that are most 
impacted by the deforestation which stems 
from the war on drugs. 
Although reliable data on rates of deforestation 
as a result of illicit drug production are hard to 
produce, the following statistics have been put 
forward by drug law enforcement agencies or 
public officials:
• In Colombia, at least 60% of illicit crops 
are grown on newly deforested land
33
 
• In Colombia overall, 2,910 square 
kilometres of primary forest are 
estimated to have been lost to coca 
cultivation between 2001 and 2014
34
• In 2000, the Colombian Minister of 
Environment suggested a million hectares 
of native forests had been eliminated as a 
result of the cultivation of drug crops
35
• Between 2003 and 2004, coca cultivation 
within Bolivia’s national parks increased 
by 71%, from 2,400 to 4,100 hectares
36
 
• According to the US Drug Tsar, 10% of 
Peru’s total rainforest destruction over 
the past century is due to the illicit 
drug trade
37
• In both Bolivia and Colombia, researchers 
suggest that under “alternative 
development” initiatives, coca farmers 
cleared more primary forest to plant 
“land hungry substitute crops” that could 
not be cultivated as intensively as coca
38
“Drug cultivation, production and 
related trafficking and enforcement 
activities can also cause serious 
harm to the environment, including: 
deforestation; soil erosion and 
degradation; loss of endemic 
species; contamination of soil, 
groundwater and waterways; and 
the release of numerous gases 
that fuel climate change.
“Eradication campaigns have had 
devastating consequences for 
the environment. [They] have not 
eradicated illicit production but rather 
displaced it to new areas of greater 
environmental significance.”
United Nations Development Programme 
2015 
3. Pollution from unregulated, illicit drug                   
    production methods
Responsibility for the production of potentially dangerous 
substances has defaulted to unscrupulous criminal 
profiteers. One of the many negative consequences of this 
is the creation of an unregulated system of chemically 
processing drug crops (primarily coca into cocaine and 
opium into heroin). 
To minimise costs and limit the risk of being apprehended 
by law enforcement, drug producers must dispose of 
waste chemicals in a clandestine manner, which in many 
cases means pouring toxic waste into waterways or onto 
the ground. This leads to soil degradation, destruction of 
vegetation, contamination of water sources and loss of 
aquatic life in ecologically important areas. 
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Are there benefits?
The main claim for any environmental benefit of the 
current enforcement-led approach to drugs is that harsh 
eradication programmes and punitive law enforcement 
measures prevent drug producers from expanding 
their operations, so minimising the ecological damage 
they cause. Indeed, such environmental harms have 
frequently been highlighted as one of the justifications for 
enforcement efforts, and attempts to deter use.
44
But this claim, frequently made by the US State 
Department and others, reveals a wilful blindness to the 
evidence. Eradication programmes have not reduced the 
environmental harms that result from unregulated drug 
production. The reality is that such interventions have 
magnified these harms, transferring environmental costs 
to ever more remote, ecologically sensitive areas such as 
the Amazon forests. Current drug control measures are 
no such thing: without proper regulatory oversight, left 
in the hands of unscrupulous criminals, drug production 
will continue to be conducted covertly, leading to the 
dangerous disposal of chemical waste, and damage to 
sensitive and important ecosystems.
How to count the costs?
Environmental impact assessments should be conducted 
to establish the effects of past and future eradication 
programmes on non-target flora and fauna. The social, 
economic and health impacts of eradication efforts on 
humans should also be assessed. This must include a 
rigorous monitoring system to investigate complaints 
from farmers and indigenous communities. 
More generally, environmental concerns and indigenous 
rights must be taken into account in the planning, 
implementation and, crucially, the evaluation of 
programmes and policies at national level. Similarly, 
international funding of any measure must pass through 
environmental scrutiny, and the UNODC should adopt 
environmental guidelines for country teams. 
Finally, the environmental impacts of current drug 
policies should be assessed alongside a range of 
alternative systems – including decriminalisation of 
personal possession of drugs, and models of legal 
regulation – to provide guidance on the best ways forward. 
 
• In Colombia, cocaine producers discard more than 
370,000 tons of chemicals into the environment 
every year
40
 
• Thousands of tons of chemical waste are dumped 
into the rivers located in the Peruvian Amazon 
region annually
41
The production of methamphetamine is also notorious 
for the environmental harm it causes, due to the large 
number of dangerous chemicals used in its manufacture,
42 
which include sulphuric acid, ether, toluene, anhydrous 
ammonia and acetone. As a result, the production of 
one kilo of methamphetamine can yield five or six kilos 
of toxic waste, which is sometimes dumped directly into 
water wells, contaminating domestic water and farm 
irrigation systems in the US, and Mexico.
43
 
Energy up in smoke: the carbon 
footprint of indoor cannabis 
production
An additional environmental cost of the war 
on drugs is the vast amount of electricity 
consumed by indoor cannabis farms. The 
necessarily covert nature of their operations 
diverts producers away from outdoor growing 
with the aid of natural light, instead using 
exceptionally energy-intensive growing 
facilities hidden indoors. 
A report from a staff scientist at the Lawrence 
Berkeley National Laboratory estimated that 
these indoor facilities, with lighting 500 times 
more intense than that needed for reading, 
account for 1% of the US’s total electricity 
consumption.
39
 In California, the top producer 
state in the country, indoor cultivation 
is thought to be responsible for 3% of all 
electricity use. This corresponds to the amount 
of electricity consumed by one million average 
California homes, or greenhouse gas emissions 
equal to those from one million average cars. 
According to the report, such levels of energy 
consumption mean that a single cannabis 
joint represents two pounds of CO2 emissions, 
equivalent to running a 100- watt light bulb for 
17 hours. 
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Conclusions
The environment is under threat in a variety of ways, 
from a variety of sources – including the illicit drug 
trade. But what is clear, reflecting on the experience 
of the past 50 years, is that the war on drugs has been 
wholly counterproductive in its attempts to stem the 
environmental harms caused by this trade.
That it is the drug war itself, and the criminal market it 
creates, which exacerbates and spreads these harms – most 
frequently across ecologically rich and fragile regions – is 
all too apparent. Indeed, few if any of the harms outlined 
in this chapter occur in the legal production of coca, 
opium or cannabis for medicinal or other legitimate uses. 
It is also clear that, for the foreseeable future, poverty 
and inequality in producing regions mean there will be 
no shortage of farmers willing to grow drug crops.
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Introduction
The growing costs of the war on drugs – particularly for 
the worst affected producer and transit countries – have 
reached a crisis point that is driving an increasingly 
high-level and mainstream global debate on the future of 
drug policy, and is leading to real reform too. In fact, the 
2016 UN General Assembly Special Session on the World 
Drug Problem was convened at the request of three Latin 
American governments frustrated with the failings of the 
war on drugs and keen to explore alternative approaches. 
President Santos of Colombia stated clearly at the UN 
General Assembly in 2013 that “it is our duty to determine 
– on an objective scientific basis – if we are doing the 
best we can or if there are better options to combat 
this scourge.”
1
 
But while there is a growing consensus that current 
approaches to drug control have been ineffective and 
need to be reconsidered, there is less agreement on how 
these shortcomings should be addressed. 
The debate on the future of drug policy often appears 
highly polarised between punitive “drug warriors” and 
“legalisers”. But this is actually an unhelpful caricature 
driven by the media’s desire for more dramatic debate. In 
reality, there exists a spectrum of options between these 
poles, with the majority of views nearer to the centre 
ground, and to each other. In a debate that is often emotive 
and highly politicised, it is important to stress that, on 
many fundamental issues, there is in fact considerable 
common ground. 
However, it is crucial that as we explore and assess policy 
alternatives, we make a clear distinction between aims 
and related measures intended to reduce harms caused 
by the war on drugs (as described in the first section of 
this report), and aims and measures related to reducing 
the harms of drug use itself.
As we move beyond the UNGASS and towards the next 
major moment in global drug policy development – the 
2019 UN review and update of the 10-year global drug 
strategy – the real debate needs to focus on which policy 
and legal options can most effectively deliver the shared 
goals of a healthier and safer society. For UN member 
states endeavouring to deliver the three pillars of the UN’s 
work – peace and security, human rights and development 
– this debate plays out in an environment of multiple, 
often conflicting priorities: the requirement to operate 
within the parameters of the UN drug conventions; the 
The growing consensus that the costs of the current drug control 
system are unacceptably high inevitably leads to a discussion of 
alternative approaches. Policy choices will be shaped by local needs 
and available resources, but can ultimately only be guided by an 
objective, evidence-based review of all the options, freed from the 
distorting influences of drug-war politics. 
This section explores the main options for drug policy. It has a 
particular focus on decriminalisation and legal regulation, given that 
these approaches are at the forefront of the reform debate. It should 
be read in conjunction with the more detailed real-world case studies 
in the following section.
“I urge Member States to use [the 
opportunity of the 2016 UN General 
Assembly Special Session on Drugs] 
to conduct a wide-ranging and open 
debate that considers all options”
Ban Ki-moon 
UN Secretary-General
2013
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need to meet obligations under other UN conventions, 
including on human rights; the need to reduce the 
“unintended consequences” of the war on drugs; the need 
to deliver improved drug policy outcomes, as well as a 
range of domestic and international political pressures. 
Additionally, there have been many decades of political 
and financial investment in the current approach. 
Reinvesting in alternatives is anything but simple, and 
involves potentially significant institutional reforms. 
Realism is needed about the pace of change.  
However, as explored in chapter 2, while policy responses 
remain driven by a threat-based narrative – be it the threat 
of the drugs themselves, or the threat of the criminal 
market created by prohibition – evidence of effectiveness 
on key health, human rights, development and security 
indicators will always be marginalised. Moving towards 
more effective responses will inevitably require redefining 
the nature of the problem in more conventional health 
and social policy terms, with appropriate indicators – 
moving away from the threat-based security discourse, or 
“desecuritising” the problem. 
In this context, it is also important to acknowledge that 
there are no silver-bullet solutions or one-size-fits-all 
answers. The challenges faced by member states will 
vary considerably depending on whether their primary 
concerns are with security issues, human rights or public 
health, and with drug production, transit or consumption 
(or a combination of these). There may also be political 
and practical tensions between urgent short-term reforms 
aimed at reducing some of the most egregious harms of 
the drug war – such as the HIV epidemic or violence and 
insecurity – with more substantial, long-term reforms to 
domestic and international laws and related institutions.
The ability of different countries or regions to implement 
alternative models is also dependent on their development 
status – some of the regions where problems are most 
severe are also the least well equipped, in terms of 
resources and state infrastructure, to make substantial 
changes in the short term. 
They could, however, still benefit substantially from 
changes in wealthier consumer countries. That is why 
the primary producer and transit regions that bear the 
greatest burden of the war on drugs are increasingly 
calling on the richer consumer countries to not only 
demonstrate a “shared responsibility” for the problems 
related to drug demand, but also for the collateral damage 
resulting from global drug policies. 
Options for reform
The first three options described below – increasing the 
intensity of the war on drugs; refinements to a primarily 
criminal justice-led approach; and a re-orientation to 
a more health-based approach (including ending the 
criminalisation of people who use drugs) – involve legal 
and/or policy reforms permitted within the overarching 
international prohibitionist legal framework that can 
take place at a domestic level. The fourth option – state 
regulation and control of drug production and supply 
– requires either reforms to the international legal 
framework, or for reforming countries to breach their UN 
A graphical representation of the argument for legal drug regulation 
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prohibitionist approach, is nothing of the kind when the 
outcomes of its drug policy are examined in detail.
2. Refinements to a primarily criminal 
justice-led approach
This position maintains a primarily criminal justice, 
enforcement-based approach and at least a rhetorical 
commitment to eliminating drugs from society, but 
seeks to improve effectiveness through innovation and 
marginal reforms to enforcement practice and public 
health interventions. This can include:
• Adopting more realistic and pragmatic enforcement 
priorities, or as the Global Commission on Drug 
Policy has described it: “redefining the goals of 
drug law enforcement to what is achievable rather 
than arbitrary politically motivated benchmarks. In 
practical terms this can mean focusing on reducing 
the most pernicious effects of illicit markets rather 
than necessarily eradicating them”
3
• Improving monitoring and evaluation of 
enforcement outcomes, and sharing of information 
between domestic and international police agencies, 
to establish “what works”
• Improving accountability of law enforcement 
officers, to reduce or prevent human rights abuses 
and corruption, address cultures of police impunity, 
and help to rebuild trust between police and 
communities
• Targeting enforcement at the most violent organised 
crime groups (sometimes referred to as selective 
deterrence), with the primary aim of reducing 
drug-market-related violence. There is growing 
evidence that targeting the most disruptive elements 
of the drugs market in this way can increase the 
effectiveness of scarce police resources, as well as 
disincentivising disruptive or violent conduct
4 5 6 7 8
    
• De-prioritising enforcement aimed at low-level 
participants in drug markets, including consumers, 
small-scale farmers, low-level dealers and drug 
couriers whose involvement in the trade is driven 
primarily by economic necessity
treaty commitments (or break away from the drug treaty 
system altogether). 
This briefing is a simplification and “snapshot” summary 
of the continuum of current, real-world policy models, 
some of which involve more complex interactions 
between health and enforcement measures at different 
stages of their evolution. A selection of reform models are 
explored in more depth in the series of case studies in the 
section that follows this one. 
1. Increasing the intensity of 
the war on drugs
This option is premised on the idea that a highly punitive 
enforcement model can be effective at significantly 
reducing, or even eradicating, the non-medical use of 
certain drugs. Those advocating it believe that the failings 
of the war on drugs are not due to any fundamental flaw 
in the prohibitionist paradigm, but rather due to a lack 
of application and resources. They contend that the war 
on drugs could be won if it were fought with sufficient 
vigour, with more resources put into coordinated supply-
side enforcement, and more punitive responses directed 
at people who use drugs. 
Although many governments are distancing themselves 
from the hawkish war on drugs rhetoric of the past
2
 
and are moving away from more punitive approaches, 
throughout much of the world crackdowns and zero-
tolerance approaches (associated with harsh sentencing 
and the increased militarisation of enforcement) remain 
a core feature of responses to the drug problem. The 
analysis of the Count the Costs initiative, however, clearly 
indicates that the arguments for a “get tough” approach 
are not supported by evidence. Enforcement has proven to 
be a blunt and ineffective tool, not only delivering dismal 
outcomes on stated targets such as eliminating drug use 
(see box, opposite), but also creating or exacerbating a 
range of harms associated with the criminalisation of 
users and criminally controlled drug markets.
Increasing the ferocity of the war on drugs with yet more 
punitive and militarised enforcement will therefore not 
deliver its intended goals, and is only likely to increase 
harms, as detailed in many of the examples in this report: 
the epidemic of HIV among people who inject drugs in 
Russia, the spiralling levels of violence in Mexico since 
2007, or the state-sanctioned violence and human rights 
abuses in the name of drug control in Thailand, Iran, 
and China. Even countries like Sweden, which is often 
held up as a success story by those advocating a harsh 
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Criminal penalties: do they deter drug use?
One of the most potent claims made for prohibition based approaches is that the harsher enforcement is, the 
more it will deter use. But in fact, levels of use are a poor indicator of levels of harm. The UNODC states that 
approximately 90% of illicit drug use is not “problematic”.
9
 However, even putting that aside, the reality is that 
increasing the penalties for drug possession has only a marginal impact on levels of consumption.
Evidence for this comes from three main sources: longitudinal studies following the impacts of changing laws, 
comparative analyses of jurisdictions with different enforcement models, and qualitative survey data.
In an example of the first type of research, the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction looked 
at the effects of reforms to various jurisdictions’ cannabis laws over time. Researchers examined data from nine 
European countries, to test what they call the “legal 
impact hypothesis” – essentially the theory that increased 
penalties will lead to a fall in drug use, and reduced 
penalties will lead to a rise in drug use. They concluded: 
“… in this 10-year period, for the countries in question, no 
simple association can be observed between legal changes 
and cannabis use prevalence”.
10
 In other words, the fact 
that some countries’ cannabis laws became harsher and 
some became more lenient had no discernible effect on 
the number of people using the drug. 
It is not just legal changes within countries that appear to 
make little difference. Comparisons of different countries’ 
approaches to drugs and their respective levels of drug 
use also produce the same result. A large-scale study 
using World Health Organization data from 17 countries 
found: “Globally, drug use is not distributed evenly and 
is not simply related to drug policy, since countries with 
stringent user-level illegal drug policies did not have lower levels of use than countries with liberal ones”.
11
 A 2014 
evidence review by the UK Home Office came to the same conclusion, stating: “... we did not in our fact-finding 
observe any obvious relationship between the toughness of a country’s enforcement against drug possession, and 
levels of drug use in that country”.
12
 
Globally, one thing is clear: the number of people using illicit drugs has not diminished – notably not since world 
leaders came together under the slogan “A drug-free world – we can do it!” at the 1998 United Nations General 
Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem.
13
 In fact, since then, despite the dominance of an enforcement-
led approach, global drug production and consumption have increased.
14
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reallocation of 10% of enforcement expenditure to health 
by 2020.
16
 They note: 
“If the adoption of harm reduction in new countries 
continues at the current pace, it will be 2026 before 
every country in need has even one or two harm 
reduction programmes operating (like opioid 
substitution therapy or needle and syringe exchange 
programmes) or has endorsed harm reduction 
within national policy. In the meantime we will lose 
thousands if not millions of lives.”   
Clearly the impacts of different enforcement practices 
can vary significantly, and focusing enforcement on the 
elements of the illicit market that are the most harmful 
has the potential to reduce some negative impacts
15
 
(some have even applied a harm reduction analysis of 
enforcement practices in this context).
Seeking to use supply-side enforcement in a more strategic 
and targeted way to shape and manage drug markets (and 
thereby reduce the harms they cause) is a more pragmatic 
proposition than futile attempts at eradication. Indeed, 
there is real potential to rapidly address some of the most 
urgent concerns in affected areas.
However, in the longer term, easing the burden of 
enforcement costs for key affected populations and 
reducing some of the worst drug market-related harms 
– particularly violence – may be the most that “smarter 
enforcement” can achieve. This is because such reforms 
are at best a symptomatic response to harms that the 
wider enforcement paradigm itself is responsible for 
creating  in the first place.
3. Health reforms
There are a range of health interventions that have been 
shown to be effective at reducing the health burden 
of illicit drug use, specifically including investment in 
various forms of prevention, treatment/recovery, and 
harm reduction. Within each of these fields there are 
interventions that are more cost-effective than others, 
and there is good and bad practice. 
Encouraging innovation and development of an evidence 
base for which interventions are most effective for 
different populations according to different indicators, 
independently from ideological pressures and political 
interference, will naturally help inform best practice, 
policy development and improvement of outcomes. 
The Swiss experience with heroin-assisted therapy is a 
relevant example that is explored in the following chapter.
Filling gaps in coverage, and ensuring adequate resourcing 
for proven approaches is also an urgent imperative. Harm 
Reduction International (HRI) has highlighted how even 
a modest reallocation of resources from enforcement to 
health could address current shortfalls in provision and 
save many thousands of lives. UNAIDS estimates that 
$2.3 billion was required by 2015 to fund HIV prevention 
among people who inject drugs; but at the last estimate, 
just $160 million – 7% of what is actually required – was 
invested by international donors in low- and middle-
income countries. The HRI #10by20 campaign calls for a 
“Repressive responses to … drug 
use, rural crop production, and non-
violent low level drug offences pose 
unnecessary risks to public health and 
create significant barriers to the full 
and effective realisation of the right to 
health, with a particularly devastating 
impact on minorities, those living in 
situations of rural and urban poverty, 
and people who use drugs.
“Criminal laws relating to drug use 
and related policing also have the 
clear health-deterrent effect of driving 
people away from the health services 
they need, impeding responses to 
HIV, hepatitis C, overdose, and drug 
dependence. The ineffectiveness of 
such criminal laws in delivering health 
benefits or deterring drug use is also 
now well established by evidence-
based research.”
Dainius Pūras
UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health
2015
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Does enforcement reduce the availability of drugs?
Definitions of “drug availability” are potentially complex, but it is typically assumed that prices, potency and 
purity, and people’s perceptions of how easy it is to obtain drugs are all relevant facets.
17
 
The theory behind supply-side enforcement is that there must be a point at which availability becomes so 
low and prices so high that use would become effectively impossible. But while the simple illegality of drugs 
artificially inflates prices far beyond what they would be in a commercialised, legal “free” market, there 
is, as one recent review of the relevant literature concluded,: “little evidence that raising the risk of arrest, 
incarceration or seizure at different levels of the distribution system will raise prices at the targeted level, let 
alone retail prices.”
18
 
Farm-gate drug prices are so low relative to street-level prices that even if drug production levels are 
significantly reduced, or if seizure rates increase dramatically, any impact on the final prices paid by users 
will likely be negligible; increased production costs can easily be absorbed due to the huge mark-ups that are 
applied throughout the supply chain.
19
 
In fact, while drug prices regularly fluctuate, data from official surveillance systems show that, over the past two 
decades, while seizures of heroin, cocaine and cannabis in major production markets have generally increased, 
the average inflation-adjusted and purity/potency-adjusted prices of these drugs has decreased dramatically:
20
• In the US, average prices of heroin, cocaine and cannabis decreased by 81%, 80% and 86% respectively, 
between 1990 and 2007
• In Europe, during the same period, the average price of opiates and cocaine decreased by 74% and 51% 
respectively
• In Australia, the average price of cocaine decreased by 14%, while heroin and cannabis prices decreased 
49% between 2000 and 2010
And between 1990 and 2007, the average purity/potency of heroin, cocaine and cannabis in the US increased by 
60%, 11% and 161% respectively.
21
 If prohibition was successfully reducing the availability of these drugs, then 
dealers would be using increased amounts of cutting agents (except for cannabis), and the reverse trend would 
be observed, with purity falling not rising.
So when assessed by these proxy measures, it is clear that supply-side enforcement has, at best, only a limited 
impact on drug availability, and only rarely curtails the illicit trade to the extent needed to bring about non-
trivial reductions in the use of a given drug.
22 23
 
But whether or not basic provision of UN-mandated health 
services can be described as an “alternative” or “reform” 
is questionable; it should naturally be a key component of 
any pragmatic drug policy model as a baseline, regardless 
of the overarching legal framework in which that model 
is implemented. 
Framing improved health interventions in isolation, 
as the core response to the failings of current policy, 
is problematic. This report highlights how punitive 
enforcement undermines health on multiple fronts, 
and can create obstacles to effective responses. Calling 
for more resources for health initiatives in this context, 
while obviously a positive step in relative terms, does not 
address this underlying critique that the current punitive 
approach is responsible for creating many of the health 
costs in the first place.
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– one that has relatively marginal impacts on supply-
side issues. This approach has been adopted, in different 
forms, in a number of European countries, including 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, Portugal and the Czech 
Republic (see case studies in following section).
27
Key elements of such a shift generally involve: 
• A decrease in the intensity of enforcement – 
particularly user-level enforcement – in parallel with 
increased investment in public health measures 
• Legal reforms, such as decriminalisation (explored 
in more detail below), and other sentencing reforms, 
such as the abolition of mandatory minimum 
sentences for drug offences
• Institutional reforms, such as moving responsibility 
for drug policy decision-making and budgets from 
government departments responsible for criminal 
justice to those responsible for health
 
Decriminalisation
“Decriminalisation” is not a strictly defined legal term, 
but its common usage in drug policy refers to the removal 
of criminal sanctions for possession of small quantities of 
illegal drugs for personal use, with civil or administrative 
sanctions optional. Under this definition, possession of 
drugs remains unlawful and a punishable offence – albeit 
no longer one that attracts a criminal record. The term 
is often mistakenly understood to mean the complete 
removal or abolition of possession offences, or is confused 
with the more far-reaching step of legally regulating drug 
production and availability (see below). The UN drug 
agencies have made it clear that decriminalisation of this 
nature is permitted under international drug treaties.
28 29
 
It is difficult to generalise about these experiences as 
there are many variations between countries (and often 
between local government jurisdictions within countries), 
as well as different legal structures and definitions of civil 
and criminal offences and sanctions – some countries, 
for example, retain prison sentences for civil offences. 
Significant variations also exist in terms of implementation 
(whether they are administered by criminal justice or 
health professionals, and how well they are supported 
by health service provision), by the threshold quantities 
used to determine the user/supplier distinction,
30
 as well 
as the non-criminal sanctions adopted, with variations 
including fines, warnings, treatment referrals (sometimes 
mandatory), and confiscation of passports or driving 
licenses. A distinction is also made between de jure 
4. The decriminalisation of drug 
possession/use, and reorientation to a 
health-based approach
It is possible, within the existing international legal 
framework, for a more substantial state- or regional-level 
reorientation away from a criminal justice-focused model, 
and towards a more pragmatic health-based model. This 
involves  attempting to reduce overall levels of harm, 
rather than overall levels of drug use. 
The goal of a reduction in overall social and health harms 
does not preclude demand reduction, but focuses on 
reducing misuse or harmful use. As such, it can be seen as 
primarily a demand-side or consumption-related reform 
A “third way”?
The US has been vocal on the international stage in 
promoting what it calls a “third way”
24
 between the 
“extremes” of legalisation and a war on drugs. This 
approach, borrowing heavily from the language of 
the wider drug law reform movement, emphasises 
alternatives to incarceration, including diversion 
into treatment for drug offenders via a “drug court” 
model, alongside interventions such as screening 
and brief interventions. 
While some of these interventions are well 
supported by evidence (they are at least more 
effective than previous punitive incarceration-led 
approaches), there are questions over both the ethics 
and efficacy of drug courts in particular.
25
 Concerns 
have also been raised that the supposed  shift to a 
“public health approach” does not represent any 
significant shift in spending priorities.
26
 In the 
case of the US, the proportions of drug budgets 
allocated to enforcement and health have remained 
roughly constant, despite the rhetoric suggesting a 
reorientation or better balance between the two. 
The wider problem is that claiming the badge of 
“evidence-based” for health spending can often 
provide a smokescreen for the absence of an evidence 
base for enforcement. In the context of evidence-
based health approaches on the one hand, and 
actively counterproductive enforcement that creates 
many health harms on the other, the suggestion that 
the two need to be “balanced” seems nonsensical 
when they are often working in opposite directions.
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While there are certainly impacts on levels of health 
harms associated with use, and economic impacts for 
enforcement and wider criminal justice expenditure, 
research from Europe,
36
 Australia,
37
 the US,
38
 and 
globally,
39
 suggests changes in the intensity of punitive 
user-level enforcement have, at best, marginal impacts on 
overall prevalence of use.
Decriminalisation can only aspire to reduce the harms 
created, and costs incurred, by the criminalisation of 
people who use drugs. It is important to be clear that it 
does not reduce harms associated with the criminal trade 
or supply-side drug law enforcement. If inadequately 
devised or implemented, decriminalisation may have little 
impact, even potentially creating new problems such as 
“net widening” – expanding the number of people coming 
into contact with the criminal justice system, as police 
find it easier to hand out lesser penalties. A critical factor 
appears to be the degree to which the decriminalisation 
is part of a wider policy reorientation (and resource 
reallocation), away from harmful punitive enforcement, 
and towards evidence-based health interventions that 
target at-risk populations, particularly young people and 
people who are dependent on or inject drugs. 
As many UN agencies have now acknowledged, 
decriminalisation can be seen as part of a broader harm 
reduction approach, as well key to creating an “enabling 
environment” for other health interventions. 
5. State regulation of drug production 
and supply
As the critiques of the prohibitionist approach have 
gathered momentum, a corollary debate around regulatory 
market alternatives to prohibition has moved to the fore. 
The core argument is a simple one: that if prohibition 
is both ineffective and actively counterproductive, only 
retaking control of the market from criminal profiteers 
and bringing it within the ambit of the state, can, in the 
longer term, substantially reduce many of the key costs 
associated with the illegal trade. 
This suggestion is premised on the idea of market 
control rather than market eradication, with proposals 
generally involving the introduction of strictly enforced 
regulatory models. This is in contrast to some popular 
misconceptions that such reform implies “relaxing” 
control or “liberalising” markets. In fact, it involves 
rolling out state control into a market sphere where 
currently there is none, with a clearly defined role for 
decriminalisation – specific reforms enshrined in law 
– and de facto decriminalisation, which has a similar 
outcome but is achieved through the non-enforcement 
of criminal laws that technically remain in force.
34
 With 
the exception of some of the more tolerant policies for 
cannabis possession (for example those in Spain, the 
Netherlands and Belgium), people caught in possession 
under a decriminalisation model will usually have the 
drugs confiscated. 
Acknowledging the considerable variation in approaches, 
around 25 to 30 countries, mostly concentrated in Europe, 
Latin America and Eurasia, have adopted some form of 
non-criminal disposals for possession of small quantities 
of some or all drugs.
35
 Given the wide variation in these 
models, and their implementation around the world, 
there are relatively few general conclusions that can be 
made about the impacts of decriminalisation beyond the 
observation that it does not lead to the explosion in use 
that many fear. 
Harm reduction?
“Harm reduction” – the concept of reducing the 
harms associated with people unwilling or unable 
to stop using drugs
31
 – should be central to any 
drug policy model and has now become stated 
policy and established practice in more than 90 
UN member states.
32
 Specific interventions that 
form the core of current harm reduction policy – 
such as needle and syringe programs, and opioid 
substitution therapy – are all now supported by an 
overwhelming body of evidence and are endorsed 
by UN agencies.
33
 Access to harm reduction 
services, including in prison settings, has been 
clearly identified as a key element of the universal 
right to health. Harm reduction does, however, pose 
a fundamental challenge, in both principle and 
practice, to the punitive ethos that underpins the 
war on drugs.  Not only is harm reduction at odds 
with a prohibitionist philosophy; it is primarily a 
response to harms either created or exacerbated 
by the war on drugs  itself. 
Consequently, there now exists an unsustainable 
internal policy conflict – with health professionals 
caught in the middle. Evidence-based harm 
reduction approaches are evolving and gaining 
ground across the globe, but operating within a 
politically driven, harm-maximising, drug-war 
framework.
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The Netherlands and Spain (see following chapter) 
employ models  of de facto legal drug regulation by testing 
the limits on what constitutes “decriminalisation”, with 
their cannabis “coffee shops” and cannabis social clubs 
respectively. However, any moves towards de jure rather 
than de facto legal regulation will require negotiating the 
substantial institutional and political obstacles presented 
by the international drug control system. Specifically, 
the emerging trend towards exploring de jure regulation 
creates a clear tension with the three UN drug control 
conventions, as it unambiguously sits outside the limits of 
latitude that they permit.
44
Reforming countries have approached this problem in 
different ways. Uruguay has argued that its requirement 
to meet wider UN obligations to protect human rights, 
health, and security take precedence over technical UN 
drug treaty commitments; Bolivia has renounced the 
treaties and then re-joined them with a reservation on the 
specific articles that prohibit coca leaf; since early 2015 
Jamaica has regulated cannabis production and use for 
religious, medical and scientific purposes; New Zealand’s 
enforcement agencies in managing any newly established 
regulatory models. 
Advocates are clear that regulated markets cannot 
tackle the underlying drivers of drug dependence, such 
as poverty, inequality and psychological distress. State 
regulation is not proposed as a solution to the wider “drug 
problem”; only to the specific key problems created by 
prohibition and the war on drugs. It is argued, however, 
that by promoting evidence-based regulatory models 
founded upon a clear and comprehensive set of policy 
principles, and by freeing up resources for evidence-based 
public health and social policy, legal regulation would 
create a more conducive environment for improved drug 
policy outcomes in the longer term. 
The central argument for an effectively regulated market 
is summarised by the graphic on page 141, positioning it 
as the middle-ground option on the spectrum between 
unregulated, illicit markets controlled by criminals and 
unregulated, legal markets controlled by profit-seeking 
corporations. 
Decriminalisation and levels of drug use
In keeping with the finding that punitive laws do not significantly deter drug-taking (see box, p. 143), evidence from 
real-world decriminalisation-based reforms from around the globe shows that removing criminal penalties for 
personal drug possession does not result in significant increases in the prevalence of drug use. 
This is true whether the decriminalisation process was accompanied by greater investment in health and harm 
reduction measures (as was the case in Portugal, for example), or not (as was, to varying degrees, the case in the 
US, the Czech Republic and the Netherlands). In fact, a 2013 study of European Union member states that took into 
account not only countries’ stated drug policy regime, but also actual arrest rates for drug possession offences, 
found that lower arrest rates and decriminalisation were both associated with lower levels of last-month drug 
use.
40
 The extent of this association – which was, statistically, “among the strongest and most consistent findings” 
– was such that in countries where criminal penalties for personal possession have been eliminated, young people 
have a 79% lower odds of having used drugs in the last month. 
 
Despite having decriminalised personal drug possession, Portugal has levels of use well below the European 
average. However, the situation in another country that follows a similar approach is markedly different. The 
Czech Republic decriminalised the personal possession of drugs in 2010, and has some of the highest levels of drug 
consumption in Europe.
41
 On the face of it, this undermines the case for decriminalisation. But context is crucial. 
The country decriminalised the personal possession of drugs in 2010, after conducting a cost-benefit analysis of 
criminal laws that were introduced in 2000.
42
 The analysis found that the introduction of criminal penalties had 
not reduced the availability of drugs, that the social costs associated with drug use had increased significantly 
during the time the penalties were in force, and that the penalties had failed to prevent drug use rising. It was these 
negative outcomes that prompted the Czech government to (re-)decriminalise drug possession.
Importantly, although levels of drug use in the Czech Republic have historically been relatively high, they changed 
little following decriminalisation: lifetime, past-month and past-year prevalence of the use of a range of drugs 
remained more or less stable. In some cases, there were slight increases, and in other cases, slight declines.
43
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NPS regulation framework is only for drugs not controlled 
under the UN conventions; and heroin-assisted therapy 
and other forms of maintenance prescribing as a form 
of harm reduction for problematic or dependent users 
are not prohibited under the conventions as they are 
considered as medical interventions. The US has gone as 
far as arguing that its state-level legalisation of cannabis 
should be allowable under a “flexible interpretation” of 
the conventions that would allow countries to legalise 
“entire categories of drugs”.
45
 
 
The reality is that this area of drug policy reform is 
moving into unchartered waters in terms of the various 
potentially conflicting treaty obligations – and there are 
multiple outstanding questions of international law that 
are only now beginning to be explored in the various high-
level UN forums. While it is still unclear precisely how or 
when these can be addressed satisfactorily, the fact that 
multiple reforms are already underway clearly highlights 
the shortcomings of an outdated international framework 
that is unable to meet the needs of a growing number 
of member states. It therefore seems inevitable that 
some form of modernisation must take place to provide 
flexibility for the evidence-based experimentation and 
innovation that is being demanded.
Research into regulatory options has accelerated, with the 
emergence of the first formal models for the legal control 
of cannabis, coca and NPS. More detailed proposals for 
regulating these and other drugs have been developed, 
covering aspects of the market such as drug products 
(dose, preparation, price, and packaging), vendors 
(licensing, vetting and training requirements, marketing 
and promotions), outlets (location, outlet density, 
appearance), who has access (age controls, licensed 
buyers, club membership schemes), and where and when 
drugs can be consumed.
46 47 48
  
Transform Drug Policy Foundation’s report “After the War 
on Drugs: Blueprint for Regulation”
49
 explores options for 
regulating different drugs among different populations, 
and proposes five basic regulatory models for discussion 
(see box). Lessons are drawn from successes and failings 
with alcohol and tobacco regulation in various countries, 
as well as controls over medical drugs and other harmful 
products and activities that are regulated by governments. 
As the Global Commission on Drug Policy has observed, 
effective regulatory structures, both international and 
domestic, have already been demonstrated: 
“The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control
50
 provides a useful template for how 
international best practice in trade and regulation 
“We should not be locking up kids or 
individual users for long stretches of 
jail time when some of the folks who 
are writing those laws have probably 
done the same thing. It’s important 
for [the legalization of cannabis in 
Colorado and Washington] to go 
forward because it’s important for 
society not to have a situation in 
which a large portion of people have 
at one time or another broken the law 
and only a select few get punished.” 
Barack Obama
President of the United States 
2014
for non-medical use of a risky drug can be developed, 
implemented and evaluated. The Convention features a 
level of member state support comparable to the three 
existing prohibitionist drug treaties.”
As noted elsewhere in this report, regulation advocates 
also highlight how many of the same drugs prohibited 
for non-medical use are legally produced and supplied 
for medical uses (notably including heroin, cocaine, 
amphetamines, and cannabis). The UN drug conventions 
provide the legal framework for both of these parallel 
systems. The stark difference between the minimal harms 
associated with the legally regulated medical markets, 
and the multiple costs associated with the criminally 
controlled non-medical markets for the same products, 
can assist in informing the debate.
Using the example of heroin, widely regarded as one of the 
most risky and problematic of all drugs, and comparing 
the criminal and regulated models for production and use 
that currently exist in parallel, is illustrative of this line 
of argument. Half of global opium production is legally 
regulated for medical use and is not associated with any 
of the crime, conflict, or security and development costs 
of the parallel illegal market for non-medical opiate use 
(see following chapter).
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The costs of developing and implementing a new 
regulatory infrastructure would likely represent only 
a fraction of the ever-increasing resources currently 
directed into efforts to control supply and demand. There 
would also be potential for translating a proportion of 
existing criminal profits into legitimate tax revenue. 
The primary outcome of moves towards legal drug 
regulation is the progressive decrease in costs related to 
the criminal market as it contracts in size. These impacts 
have the potential to go beyond those that are possible from 
reforms such as the decriminalisation of people who use 
drugs within a blanket prohibitionist framework (outlined 
above). Rather than merely managing the harms of the 
illegal trade, or attempting to marginally reduce its scale 
through demand reduction, legal regulation – if developed 
and implemented responsibly – holds the prospect of a 
long-term and more dramatic reduction in harms.  
Cross-cutting UN support for ending  
the criminalisation of people who use drugs
• The Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon, has stated: “We must consider alternatives to 
criminalization and incarceration of people who use drugs.... We should increase the focus on public health, 
prevention, treatment and care, as well as on economic, social and cultural strategies.”
51
 
• UNAIDS has clearly stated that criminalisation of people who use drugs is fuelling the HIV epidemic, and 
have long called for it to be ended
52
• The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has highlighted the human 
rights abuses relating to criminalisation – especially regarding vulnerable populations including ethnic 
minorities, women, children, indigenous peoples, and people who inject drugs. OHCHR has stated that the 
criminalisation of people who use drugs is a violation of the fundamental right to health
53
• UN Women has called for decriminalisation, highlighting the particular negative impacts criminalisation has 
on women
54
• The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) released a briefing advocating the decriminalisation of 
people who use drugs, highlighting the health and human rights harms and linked to criminalisation and 
further stating it was “neither necessary nor proportionate”, and could put member states in violation of UN 
commitments to the right to health
55
• The World Health Organization has endorsed decriminalisation, calling it  a “critical enabler” for key health 
interventions and highlighting the health harms relating to criminalisation
56
• The UN Development Programme has clearly articulated the health, development and human rights 
implications of criminalisation and called for it to be ended
57
• UNICEF and nine other UN agencies – UNODC, the WHO, UNFPA, UNHCR, the World Bank, UNDP, 
UNESCO, UNAIDS and the ILO – made a collective call for decriminalisation in the context of guidance on 
the HIV response amongst children and young people
58
“How could I, a representative 
of the Government of the United 
States of America, be intolerant 
of a government that permits any 
experimentation with legalization of 
marijuana if two of the 50 states of the 
United States of America have chosen 
to walk down that road?” 
William Brownfield
US Assistant Secretary of State
2014
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As criminal drug markets in consumer countries 
contract, the associated costs for producer and transit 
regions – in terms of fuelling conflict and insecurity, 
underdevelopment, crime and corruption – would 
experience a concurrent contraction. The extent to which 
the criminal market would shrink would depend on the 
particular regulatory measures brought in, but, as an 
example, only around 11% of the global tobacco market 
is illegal.
59
While countries such as Afghanistan, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mexico and Colombia, have multiple development 
and security challenges independent of the criminal 
drugs trade, regulation offers the genuine prospect of a 
significant reduction in its scale and corrosive impacts. 
In the longer term, illegal poppy production could largely 
disappear from Afghanistan, the drug profits for the 
Mexican cartels and funding of Colombian insurgents 
could dry up, and the use of Guinea-Bissau as a drug 
transit point for illegal drug shipments could end. In 
Western consumer countries, the costs associated with 
the criminal trade at all levels would similarly diminish 
over time. In place of the opportunity costs of drug law 
enforcement would potentially just be opportunities 
– to reallocate billions into a range of health and social 
interventions, with positive impacts that could reach well 
beyond the confines of drug policy. 
Risks of unintended negative consequences exist for 
any policy change, and advocates of legal regulation 
additionally argue that change in this direction would 
need to be phased in cautiously over a period of years, 
with close evaluation and monitoring of the system’s 
effects. Key risks include the potential displacement of 
criminal activity into other areas, such as extortion or 
counterfeiting, and an increase in drug use associated with 
inadequately regulated commercialisation. Improved 
understanding of how social costs are influenced by 
the legal and policy environment (assisted by the use of 
impact assessments, modelling and scenario planning) 
can help develop policy models that mitigate such risks, 
for example by restricting commercial pressures and 
profit motives in the market through advertising and 
marketing controls, or state monopolies. 
Cannabis is by far the most widely used illegal drug, 
accounting for around 80% of all illegal drug use globally. 
So the implementation of different cannabis regulation 
models in multiple jurisdictions is hugely significant. It 
also means best practice in cannabis regulation policy 
is being informed by real-world evidence. With, among 
other things, more state-level ballot initiatives likely in 
the US; the Supreme Court in Mexico declaring cannabis 
prohibition to be unconstitutional; the implementation of 
Five proposed models for 
regulating drug availability
1. Prescription – The riskiest drugs, such 
as injectable heroin, are prescribed to 
people who are registered as dependent on 
drugs by a qualified and licensed medical 
practitioner. This model can also include 
extra tiers of regulation, such as requiring 
that drug consumption takes place in a 
supervised medical venue
2. Pharmacy – Licensed medical professionals 
serve as gatekeepers to a range of drugs 
– such as amphetamines or MDMA – 
dispensing rationed quantities to people who 
wish to use them. Additional controls, such 
as licensing of purchasers, could also be 
implemented
3. Licensed sales – Licensed outlets sell 
lower-risk drugs at prices determined by 
a regulatory authority, in accordance with 
strict licensing conditions, such as a ban 
on all forms of advertising and promotion, 
no sales of non-drug products, no sales to 
minors, and health and safety information 
on product packaging
4. Licensed premises – Similar to pubs, 
bars, or cannabis ‘coffee shops’, licensed 
premises can sell lower-risk drugs for on-
site consumption, subject to strict licensing 
conditions similar to those for licensed sales, 
described above. Additional regulation, such 
as partial vendor liability for customers’ 
behaviour, may also be enforced
5. Unlicensed sales – Drugs of sufficiently 
low risk, such as coffee or coca tea, require 
little or no licensing, with regulation needed 
only to ensure that appropriate production 
practices and trading standards are 
followed, and that product descriptions and 
labelling (which includes use-by dates and 
ingredient lists) are accurate 
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sales as demonstrations of the risks of free markets for 
what can be harmful products. 
While “full legalisation” remains a feature of the debate, 
demarcating one extreme end of the spectrum of options, 
it has few advocates and is more useful as a thought 
experiment to explore the perils of inadequate regulation.
Uruguay’s non-commercial cannabis market; and Canada’s 
government being elected in 2015 on a commitment to 
legally regulate the drug, cannabis regulation will remain 
at the forefront of the drug law reform debate.
Some free-market libertarian thinkers have gone further, 
arguing for what is sometimes called “full legalisation”. 
Under this model, all aspects of a drug’s production and 
supply would be made legal, with regulation essentially 
left to market forces, with only a minimal level of 
government intervention – in the form of, for example, 
trading standards and contract enforcement – combined 
with any self-regulation among vendors. Regulation 
models would be comparable with standard consumer 
products available in a supermarket. In contrast, 
advocates of a more strictly regulated legal market point 
to past experiences with unregulated alcohol and tobacco 
Legal regulation and levels of drug use
Evidence suggests decriminalising personal drug possession does not increase use. However, under decriminalisation, 
the supply of drugs remains prohibited. In contrast, when considering legal regulation, it is also necessary to factor 
in changes to how drugs are made available, and promoted (if at all), and how social and cultural norms around 
their use might evolve. Legal regulation can take many forms, from minimal controls over a commercially driven 
free market, to restrictive, public health-led regulations and a government monopoly. The devil is in the detail. 
Evidence of the impact of legalisation and regulation on levels of use comes from a range of sources including 
tobacco and alcohol regulation (including repealing Prohibition in the US); medicines; heroin prescribing; the 
Netherlands’ de facto legal cannabis market, cannabis social clubs in Spain; recent large-scale, de jure legally 
regulated cannabis markets in Uruguay, and several US states (see case studies in following section).
Evidence from tobacco regulation has shown that comprehensive bans on advertising reduce consumption.
60
 
Similarly, since a greater concentration of alcohol outlets is associated with increased alcohol use,
61 62
 controls on 
the location and density of drug outlets are likely to constrain increases in consumption. 
Regulation can also help shape the impact of legalisation on social deterrence factors that influence use levels. So 
while a change of legal status could provoke an increase in use among certain groups, stringent and responsible 
regulatory controls can moderate this effect. Adopting such controls for tobacco products, combined with better 
education and prevention efforts, has fostered a norm of social disapproval for smoking, contributing to a 50% 
decline in prevalence in some countries over the past 30 years.
63 64
 Crucially, it was not necessary to prohibit 
cigarettes, or criminalise smokers, to achieve this. 
Of the growing number of regulated cannabis markets, the Netherlands’ is most well-established, yet has prices 
comparable to the illicit US market.
65
 This shows legalisation does not have to mean dramatic price decreases, which 
could produce large increases in consumption. This, along with age restrictions, advertising bans, and control of 
numbers and location of outlets has been credited for the Netherlands having levels of cannabis use comparable 
with neighbouring countries, and substantially lower than the US, despite 40 years of effectively legal availability. 
So the extent of any increase in drug use following legalisation is likely to be dramatically lower if commercial 
promotion is resisted, stringent regulations are imposed, and prices are kept relatively high.
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New Zealand’s Psychoactive 
Substances Act66 67
In 2013, New Zealand passed the Psychoactive 
Substances Act, which allows certain “lower- risk” 
novel psychoactive substances (NPS) to be legally 
produced and sold within a strict regulatory 
framework. The new law puts the onus on producers 
to establish the risks of the products they wish to 
sell, as well as mandating a minimum purchase age 
of 18; a ban on advertising, except at point of sale; 
restrictions on which outlets can sell NPS products; 
and labelling and packaging requirements. Criminal 
penalties – including up to two years in prison – 
were established for violations of the new law. 
The New Zealand government stated: “We are doing 
this because the current situation is untenable. 
Current legislation is ineffective in dealing with the 
rapid growth in synthetic psychoactive substances 
which can be tweaked to be one step ahead of controls. 
Products are being sold without any controls over 
their ingredients, without testing requirements, 
or controls over where they can be sold.” The new 
law remains in place, but has run into a number 
of technical challenges – crucially, how to establish 
‘“low-risk” harm thresholds without using animal 
testing – as well as political opposition. Hence as yet 
no NPS are regulated under the system.
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who use drugs was contributing to this problem, and that 
under a new, more humane, legal framework it could be 
better managed. 
Portugal complemented its policy of decriminalisation 
by allocating greater resources across the drugs field, 
expanding and improving prevention, treatment, 
harm reduction and social reintegration programmes. 
The introduction of these measures coincided with an 
expansion of the Portuguese welfare state, which included 
a guaranteed minimum income. While decriminalisation 
played an important role, it is likely that the positive 
outcomes described below would not have been achieved 
without these wider health and social reforms.
3
Finally, although Portugal’s decriminalisation policy has 
attracted the most media attention, it is not the only country 
to have enacted such a reform. While there are variations 
in how “decriminalisation” is defined and implemented, 
around 25 countries have removed criminal penalties for 
the personal possession of some or all drugs,
4
 contributing 
to the growing global shift away from punitive drug policies. 
 
Background
Portugal decriminalised the personal possession of all 
drugs in 2001. This means that, while it is no longer a 
criminal offence to possess drugs for personal use, it is 
still an administrative violation, punishable by penalties 
such as fines or community service. The specific penalty to 
be applied is decided by “Commissions for the Dissuasion 
of Drug Addiction”, which are regional panels made up of 
legal, health and social work professionals. In reality, the 
vast majority of those referred to the commissions by the 
police have their cases “suspended”, effectively meaning 
they receive no penalty.
1
 People who are dependent on 
drugs are encouraged to seek treatment, but are rarely 
sanctioned if they choose not to – the commissions’ aim 
is for people to enter treatment voluntarily; they do not 
attempt to force them to do so.
2
The initial aim of the commissions, and of the 
decriminalisation policy more broadly, was to tackle 
the severely worsening health of Portugal’s drug using 
population, in particular its people who inject drugs. 
In the years leading up to the reform, the number of 
drug-related deaths had soared, and rates of HIV, AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Hepatitis B and C among people who 
inject drugs were rapidly increasing. There was a growing 
consensus among law enforcement and health officials 
that the criminalisation and marginalisation of people 
Drug decriminalisation in Portugal: 
setting the record straight
Portugal decriminalised the possession of all drugs for personal use in 2001, and there now 
exists a significant body of evidence on what happened following the move. Both opponents 
and advocates of drug policy reform are sometimes guilty of misrepresenting this evidence, 
with the former ignoring or incorrectly disputing the benefits of reform, and the latter 
tending to overstate them. 
The reality is that Portugal’s drug situation has improved significantly in several key areas. 
Most notably, HIV infections and drug-related deaths have decreased, while the dramatic 
rise in use feared by some has failed to materialise. However, such improvements are not 
solely the result of the decriminalisation policy; Portugal’s shift towards a more health-
centred approach to drugs, as well as wider health and social policy changes, are equally, 
if not more, responsible for the positive changes observed. Drawing on the most up-to-date 
evidence, this briefing clarifies the extent of Portugal’s achievement, and debunks some of 
the erroneous claims made about the country’s innovative approach to drugs.
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Drug use
One of the most keenly disputed outcomes of Portugal’s 
reforms is their impact on levels of drug use. Conflicting 
accounts of how rates of use changed after 2001 
are usually due to different data sets, age groups, 
or indicators of changing drug use patterns being 
used. But a more complete picture of the situation 
post-decriminalisation reveals:
• Levels of drug use are below the European average
5
• Drug use has declined among those aged 15-24,
6
 the 
population most at risk of initiating drug use
7
• Lifetime drug use among the general population has 
increased slightly,
8
 in line with trends in comparable 
nearby countries.
9
 However, lifetime use is widely 
considered to be the least accurate measure of a 
country’s current drug use situation
10 11
• Rates of past-year and past-month drug use among 
the general population – which are seen as the 
best indicators of evolving drug use trends
12
 – have 
decreased
13
• Between 2000 and 2005 (the most recent years for 
which data are available) rates of problematic drug 
use and injecting drug use decreased
14
• Drug use among adolescents decreased for several 
years following decriminalisation, but has since risen 
to around 2003 levels
15 
• Rates of continuation of drug use (i.e. the proportion 
of the population that have ever used an illicit drug 
and continue to do so) have decreased
16
Overall, this suggests that removing criminal penalties 
for personal drug possession did not cause an increase 
in levels of drug use. This tallies with a significant body 
of evidence from around the world that shows the 
enforcement of criminal drug laws has, at best, a marginal 
impact in deterring people from using drugs.
17 18 19
 There 
is essentially no relationship between the punitiveness of 
a country’s drug laws and its rates of drug use. Instead, 
drug use tends to rise and fall in line with broader 
cultural, social or economic trends.
Health
It has been claimed that the prevalence of drug-related 
infectious diseases rose after decriminalisation,
20
 yet 
this is strongly contradicted by the evidence. Although 
the number of newly diagnosed HIV cases among people 
who inject drugs in Portugal is well above the European 
average,
21
 it has declined dramatically over the past 
decade, falling from 1,016 to 56 between 2001 and 2012.
22
 
Over the same period, the number of new cases of AIDS 
among people who inject drugs also decreased, from 568 
to 38.
23
 A similar, downward trend has been observed for 
cases of Hepatitis C and B among clients of drug treatment 
centres,
24
 despite an increase in the number of people 
seeking treatment.
25
  
Deaths
Some have argued that, since 2001, drug-related deaths in 
Portugal either remained constant or actually increased.
26 
However, these claims are based on the number of people 
who died with traces of any illicit drug in their body, 
rather than the number of people who died as a result of 
the use of an illicit drug.
27
 
Given an individual can die with traces of drugs in their 
body without this being the cause of their death, it is the 
second number – derived from clinical assessments made 
by physicians, rather than post-mortem toxicological tests 
– that is the standard, internationally accepted measure 
of drug-related deaths. And according to this measure, 
deaths due to drug use have decreased significantly – 
from approximately 80 in 2001, to 16 in 2012.
28
Homicides
A widely repeated claim is that, as a result of Portugal’s 
decriminalisation policy, drug-related homicides 
increased 40% between 2001 and 2006.
29 30
 But this claim 
is based on a misrepresentation of the evidence. The 40% 
increase (from 105 to 148) was for all homicides, defined 
as any “intentional killing of a person, including murder, 
manslaughter, euthanasia and infanticide”
31
 – they were 
not “drug-related”. In fact, there are no data collected for 
drug-related homicides.
This claim stems from the 2009 World Drug Report, in 
which the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
speculated that the increase in homicides “might be related 
to [drug] trafficking.”
32
 However, neither the UNODC 
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nor anyone else has proposed a causal mechanism by 
which the decriminalisation policy could have produced 
this rise, and given that the policy did not include any 
changes to how drug trafficking offences were dealt with, 
the possibility of such a link seems highly implausible. 
Furthermore, Portugal’s homicide rate has since declined 
to roughly what it was in 2002.
33
Crime
Despite claims to the contrary,
34
 decriminalisation 
appears to have had a positive effect on crime. With 
its re-categorisation of low-level drug possession 
as an administrative rather than criminal offence, 
decriminalisation inevitably produced a reduction in the 
number of people arrested and sent to criminal court 
for drug offences – from over 14,000 in the year 2000, to 
around 5,500-6,000 per year once the policy had come into 
effect.
35
 The proportion of drug-related offenders (defined 
as those who committed offences under the influence of 
drugs and/or to fund drug consumption) in the Portuguese 
prison population also declined, from 44% in 1999, to just 
under 21% in 2012.
36
  
Additionally, decriminalisation does not appear to have 
caused an increase in crimes typically associated with 
drugs. While opportunistic thefts and robberies had gone 
up when measured in 2004, it has been suggested that this 
may have been because police were able to use the time 
saved by no longer arresting drug users to tackle (and 
record) other low-level crimes.
37
 Although difficult to test, 
this theory is perhaps supported by the fact that, during 
the same period, there was a reduction in recorded cases 
of other, more complex crimes typically committed by 
people who are dependent on drugs, such as thefts from 
homes and businesses.
The impact of economic recession
There is a real risk that Portugal’s severe economic 
recession will undermine many of the drug-related health 
and social improvements observed since 2001. 
Socioeconomic deprivation is associated with greater 
levels of drug-related harm and drug dependence,
38 39 40 
and public spending cuts taken in response to economic 
crises can exacerbate this situation.
Significant reductions in health and welfare budgets in 
Portugal have led to fears that the country may experience 
a dramatic increase in HIV infections, as Greece did when 
it closed drug treatment and harm reduction programmes 
as part of its attempts to reduce public spending.
41
  
The independent Institute for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 
which was responsible for implementing the national drug 
strategy, has effectively been abolished and absorbed by 
the country’s National Health Service, which in turn has 
had its budget cut by 10%.
42
 A number of harm reduction 
services are also facing partial closure, or experiencing 
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significant delays in receiving public funding, all of which 
has had a negative effect on the extent and quality of 
services provided.
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The threat posed by economic recession underscores 
how crucial adequate health and social investment was 
in achieving the gains made following decriminalisation. 
The challenge now for Portugal is ensuring these gains 
are not lost.  
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Case study: Cannabis social clubs in Spain
favouring cannabis regulation, although the proposals 
of the sympathetic parties (Ciudadanos, PSOE and 
Podemos) differ.
The first CSC was founded in 2001, and legal experts have 
identified several criteria that the clubs must meet in 
order to comply with precedents set in case law.
Cannabis social club rules
• CSCs must register in a regional registry of 
associations, with founding members subject to 
background checks. Associations are defined as ‘a 
group of people who enter into an agreement, in 
order to accomplish a common objective with a non-
profit motive, independent (at least formally) from 
government, public administration, political parties 
and companies’
4 5 6 7 
• CSCs must seek to reduce the harms associated with 
the supply and use of cannabis – by, for example, 
promoting responsible consumption 
• CSCs and their premises must be closed to the public, 
with membership granted only upon invitation 
by an existing member who can vouch that the 
person seeking to join is already a cannabis user 
Background
Spain has long pursued a relatively tolerant approach to 
drugs, particularly cannabis. Following a series of rulings 
by the country’s Supreme Court beginning in the 1970s, 
the personal possession of small amounts of any illicit 
drug is not considered a criminal offence. With regard 
to cannabis, this decriminalisation policy has extended 
to production too, with Spanish law typically being 
interpreted in a way that permits private cultivation of the 
drug for personal use. Activists used both this provision, 
and the fact that “shared consumption” of cannabis 
has generally been tolerated by law, to develop the CSC 
model, through which cannabis is grown collectively and 
distributed to members for their own use.
1 2 
In the absence of formal legal regulation, the cannabis 
clubs continue to exist in a legally ambiguous space 
shaped by case law and established state and police 
practice. In a 2015 prosecution against a cannabis club 
in Bilbao, the Spanish Supreme court (in its first such 
ruling on a CSC), determined that the club had committed 
a crime against public health because the group’s specific 
“structure and functioning exceeded the philosophy” of 
shared consumption. The wider applicability of the ruling 
to other clubs, however, remains unclear, although its 
is likely to at least act as a restriction on the size of the 
clubs.
3
 The December 2015 election is also significant, as 
there is now  hypothetically a parliamentary majority 
Cannabis social clubs in Spain:
Legalisation without commercialisation
Cannabis social clubs (CSCs) are private, non-profit organisations in which cannabis is 
collectively grown and distributed to registered members. With no profit motive to increase 
cannabis consumption or initiate new users, the clubs offer a more cautious, public health-
centred alternative to large-scale retail cannabis markets dominated by commercial 
enterprises. The growth of the CSC model in Spain demonstrates that cannabis legalisation 
does not have to mean commercialisation. As CSCs show, it is entirely possible to restrict 
the availability and promotion of cannabis while at the same time making the drug legally 
available to adult users. Additionally, the UN drug conventions have been interpreted as 
permitting CSCs, on the basis that they are an extension of decriminalisation policies. Because 
of this, the CSC model avoids many of the political and diplomatic obstacles associated with 
more far-reaching systems of legal regulation.
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Alternatively, prospective members can join if they 
have a doctor’s note confirming that they suffer from 
an illness which could be treated with cannabis 
• Limits on the quantity of cannabis consumed must be 
enforced. Daily personal allowances of, on average, 
three grams per person are set in order to reduce 
the likelihood of cannabis being diverted for sale 
on the illicit market. Additionally, the quantity of 
cannabis to be cultivated is calculated based on the 
number of expected members and predicted levels of 
consumption
• Cannabis distributed by the clubs must be for more 
or less immediate consumption. Small quantities are 
often allowed to be taken away for off-site use, but 
the general aim is to promote planned, non-impulsive 
usage and to minimise the risk of a member’s supply 
being re-sold on the illicit market or diverted to a 
non-member
• Clubs must be run on a non-profit basis. Members 
pay fees to cover production and management costs, 
but all revenue generated is reinvested back into 
their operations. In addition, clubs pay rent, tax, 
employees’ social security fees, corporate income tax, 
and in some cases VAT (at 21%)
Although they must operate in line with these criteria, the 
clubs are effectively self-regulating. They follow either 
their own voluntary codes of practice or, more often, 
those established by regional federations of clubs. A 
Europe-wide code of practice has also been created by the 
European Coalition for Just and Effective Drug Policies.
8
The spread of the CSC model
The total number of CSCs in Spain is difficult to estimate 
precisely, as many clubs do not remain in operation for 
very long.
9
 However, there are thought to be roughly 400 
CSCs or similar associations in Spain,
10 
most of which are 
located in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Beyond 
Spain, several other jurisdictions now also permit (or at 
least tolerate) such clubs. Uruguay has made CSCs a key 
component of its national, legally regulated cannabis 
market,
11
 and informal CSCs have been accommodated 
within domestic drug laws in Argentina, Colombia 
and Chile. Belgium also has five CSCs,
12
 while the local 
government of Utrecht, in the Netherlands, is attempting 
to establish a club as a means of solving the so-called 
“back-door problem” of illegal, unregulated supply to 
the city’s cannabis coffee shops.
13 14
 The Swiss canton of 
Geneva has also established a commission to explore the 
possibility of setting up cannabis user associations similar 
to Spain’s CSCs.
15
A non-commercial approach
In a commercial market, the primary goal of cannabis 
producers and suppliers will usually be to generate the 
highest possible profits. This is most readily achieved by 
maximising consumption, both in total population and 
per capita terms, and by encouraging the initiation of new 
users. Public health problems will only become a concern 
when they threaten to affect sales. It is therefore crucial 
to design a regulatory system that removes or at least 
minimises profit-motivated efforts to increase or initiate 
use. The CSC model – as well as other alternatives such as 
state-run outlets and home cultivation – meets this aim. In 
particular, the relatively closed membership system and 
culture of immediate use of CSCs helps to limit availability 
and reduce the potential for new (and typically young) 
users to be initiated into cannabis use.
 
CSCs have the further advantage of, thus far at least, 
not attracting criticism from either of the primary drug 
control bodies, the INCB or  the UNODC. As they are treated 
as an extension of cannabis decriminalisation policies, 
CSCs offer a simpler (and more cautious) alternative 
to comprehensive retail cannabis markets that would 
breach treaty commitments or require treaty reform. 
CSCs could be a transitional model that helps to establish 
healthy social norms around cannabis consumption, in 
advance of more far-reaching legalisation measures in 
the future. Equally, CSCs could be the sole legal form of 
cannabis supply, or operate in parallel with regulated All cannabis social clubs keep thorough records and operate in line 
with established codes of conduct
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retail cannabis markets once they have been established. 
This last approach is being employed in Uruguay.
The tension between regulation and 
commercialisation
Although profit-making by CSCs is a crime, the 
proliferation of clubs in Spain has led to concerns that 
some will turn away from the non-commercial ethos on 
which they were founded. Some clubs, particularly those 
in Barcelona, have grown to such an extent that they now 
have thousands of members, mostly as a result of the 
clubs adopting less stringent membership policies and 
admitting tourists.
16
Formal regulation of CSCs would safeguard against the 
possibility of over-commercialisation, and many clubs 
have long been calling for greater oversight of their 
operations. This aspiration is now becoming a reality 
in some parts of Spain: in 2014, both the parliament of 
the Navarre region
17
 and the city of San Sebastián in the 
Basque Country
18
 voted to formally license and regulate 
CSCs, building on the voluntary codes of conduct that 
the clubs have been following up until now. While 
many CSCs throughout Spain are still subject to raids 
and investigations by the police, regional initiatives 
such as these should provide a more solid legal basis for 
the clubs’ operations.
 
Getting the balance right
There is, however, a need to get the balance right: if a 
club system is too restrictive, then consumers will simply 
turn to the illegal trade, meaning one of the main aims of 
legalisation – to reduce the size of the criminal market – 
will not be met. It may therefore be necessary to relax the 
criteria for club membership; accepting adults who are 
not existing cannabis users would be an obvious starting 
point. But there is no perfect solution. It is a matter of 
balancing priorities, seeing what works, and making 
responsible, informed choices based on an ongoing 
evaluation of the costs and benefits. In other words, it 
requires a rational, pragmatic approach – something 
that has not been a feature of drug policy-making 
under prohibition.
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• Annually, the coffee shops generate an estimated 400 
million euros in corporate tax
5
 (as opposed to sales 
tax) – money that would otherwise be forgone
Pragmatism also underpins the Dutch policy around more 
problematic drugs, such as injectable heroin, where they 
have long followed a harm reduction approach consisting 
of needle exchanges, substitute opiate prescribing, and 
some heroin maintenance prescribing. Rates of lifetime 
heroin use in the Netherlands are a third of those 
in the US.
6
 
However, the system has not been without its problems. 
In some southern border towns, there have been issues 
caused by large numbers of visitors from neighbouring 
countries travelling to the coffee shops.
7
 More 
significantly, the quirks of the system’s evolution within 
an international legal framework that strictly forbids 
legal production, has led to the paradox that while sales 
are tolerated and de facto legalised,
8
 the coffee shops are 
still supplied via an illegal production system – often 
involving organised criminal groups. 
Opponents of cannabis law reform have tried to paint 
the Dutch experience in a negative light, but have largely 
failed as the overwhelmingly positive outcomes speak 
for themselves. However, when a new conservative 
government decided to impose a range of new restrictions 
on the coffee shops in 2011, this was seized upon by critics 
as evidence that the Dutch “cannabis experiment” was 
being ended due to its failure. This briefing challenges 
this narrative by setting out the facts on the key issues.
Background
The Dutch approach to cannabis policy has always been 
fundamentally pragmatic, rather than politically or 
ideologically driven. When the “new” approach was 
formally adopted in 1976, it was motivated primarily by 
a desire to separate the market for cannabis, deemed to 
be relatively low-risk, from the market for other, more 
risky illegal drugs. The policy effectively decriminalised 
the personal possession and use of cannabis for adults, 
but unlike other decriminalisation approaches that have 
been implemented elsewhere,
1
 it additionally tolerated 
the existence of outlets for low-volume cannabis sales, 
outlets that eventually became the well-known Dutch 
“coffee shops”. The coffee shops are allowed to operate 
under strict licensing conditions, which include age-
access restrictions, a ban on sales of other drugs (including 
alcohol), and controls on the shops’ external appearance, 
signage and marketing. The approach has been broadly 
successful:
• Just 14% of cannabis users in the Netherlands report 
that other drugs are available from their usual 
cannabis source, compared to 52% in Sweden
2
 
• Rates of cannabis use in the Netherlands are 
equivalent to or lower than those of many nearby 
countries (which do not have coffee shops),
3 
and are 
substantially lower than those of the US
4
 
• Although the use of cannabis in the Netherlands has 
risen since 1976, this has been in line with wider 
European trends
Cannabis policy in the Netherlands:
Moving forwards, not backwards
Misunderstandings and misreporting of actual and proposed changes to Dutch cannabis 
policy in 2011 have led some opponents of cannabis reform to suggest the country is retreating 
from its longstanding and pragmatic policy of tolerating the possession, use and sale of 
cannabis. This is not the case. In reality, most of the more regressive measures have either not 
been implemented, have been subsequently abandoned, or have had only marginal impacts. 
Additionally, there is growing public support for wider, progressive reform, including 
a system of legal cannabis regulation similar to that adopted in Uruguay, and efforts are 
underway by numerous municipalities to establish such models of production and supply.
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The ‘wietpas’
One of the most high-profile initiatives for restricting 
cannabis sales in the Netherlands has been the proposed 
“wietpas” (or “weed pass”) – a system that would 
effectively make the coffee shops private clubs with a 
maximum of 2,000 adult members who must be residents 
of the Netherlands. 
Concerns about the proposed move were widespread 
from the outset, with objections coming from the 
Netherlands’ largest police union, as well as the mayors of 
the four largest cities, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague, 
and Utrecht, where the majority of the coffee shops are 
situated. The Amsterdam authorities were particularly 
vocal; one third of the country’s coffee shops are located 
in the city, generating valuable economic activity – in 
particular, income from tourism – with few problems. 
Polling in 2012 revealed that 60% of the public thought the 
wietpas scheme should be stopped, and that 80% believed 
it would increase the illegal trade.
9
 In a more recent survey 
of Dutch judges and prosecutors,
10
 63.9% said they did not 
consider the residence requirement to be an effective way 
of suppressing public disorder around coffee shops. These 
concerns were well founded: increased street dealing 
was widely reported in the southern municipalities that 
adopted such restrictions. 
The wietpas was supposed to be rolled out nationwide in 
2013, but was essentially abandoned by the new coalition 
government in October 2012. Nevertheless, municipalities 
maintain control over local coffee shop policy (hence 
some do not allow any) and some have maintained a 
residents-only restriction despite the rejection of the 
wietpas proposals.
11
 However, a 2014 survey found that, 
of those municipalities that permit coffee shops, 85% do 
not enforce the resident criterion.
12
Potency limits on retail cannabis
Another widely reported move was the 2011 
announcement that the Dutch government intended to 
impose a potency limit of 15% THC on the cannabis sold 
from the coffee shops. Cannabis above this limit would be 
classed as a “hard” drug and subject to an enforcement 
response commensurate with its legal status. This 
proposed move has not yet been implemented and has 
been opposed by almost every government office that 
would be involved in enforcing the limit, including 
the police, and prosecution and forensic services.
13
 
The current government still intends to implement the 
measure, but its future is increasingly uncertain. Research 
from the Trimbos Institute has argued convincingly that 
the potency threshold is arbitrary and that there is no 
evidence it would reduce health harms.
14
 
A cannabis coffee shop in Amsterdam
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Coffee shop closures
The total number of coffee shops in the Netherlands has 
gradually reduced from around 850 in 1999 to 591 at the 
end of 2014.
15
 Some have interpreted this as a trend that 
will eventually lead to the closure of all the Dutch coffee 
shops, but in reality it is mostly the result of evolving 
municipal licensing rules. There is no suggestion that the 
coffee shop system is being abandoned (see public opinion 
below) and the number of municipalities in which coffee 
shops are located has remained the same. 
Another development that took place in 2011 was the 
introduction of a ban on coffee shops within 250 metres 
walking distance of a high school. Although announced 
as a child protection measure, it was more of an eye-
catching political gesture and was not supported by 
any meaningful evidence. In practice, however, the 
licensing powers granted to municipalities mean they can 
effectively override the ban if they so wish.
Opposition has focused on the fact that in some urban 
areas – where the majority of the coffee shops are situated 
– a strict 250-metre rule would require most of them to 
close. And while the question of how strictly the rule is 
or will be enforced remains a moot point, it means that 
in Amsterdam at least 28 were due for phased closure 
between 2014 and 2016. However, due to the increase 
of customers and the related nuisance in the remaining 
shops, the closures have been postponed.
Public opinion
Public support for the coffee shops has increased 
throughout their existence. Polling in 2013, showed a 
significant majority of the Dutch population would like to 
go further, with 65% supporting the kind of legal cannabis 
regulation implemented in Uruguay.
16
 The most recent 
data from 2015 showed support for regulated production 
reaching 70%,
17
 with strong majority support across 
voters for all main parties.   
The ‘backdoor problem’
Perhaps the most justifiable concern with the coffee shop 
system is the “back-door problem”, whereby sales of 
cannabis are tolerated (the drug can leave the coffee shops 
via the front door), but production and cultivation (i.e. the 
supply chain that leads up to the back door of the coffee 
shops) remain prohibited. This has led to concerns about 
the links between the coffee shops and organised crime. 
However, if there is any truth in the claims about such 
links, it is almost entirely because of the legal paradox in 
which supplying cannabis to the coffee shops is a criminal 
act, while selling cannabis via the shops is (effectively) 
not. Furthermore, claims that 80% of the cannabis 
cultivated in the Netherlands is destined for export and 
controlled by criminal organisations have been exposed 
as unevidenced propaganda.
18
 Efforts to resolve this issue 
through some form of regulated production and supply to 
the coffee shops have been ongoing for many years, but 
have recently been given fresh impetus by developments 
in other countries, such as the growth of Spain’s cannabis 
social clubs, and the legalisation of cannabis in Uruguay 
and multiple US states. 
60 municipalities have endorsed a manifesto calling for 
the production of cannabis to be regulated, and 25 of the 
38 biggest municipalities have applied to the Minister 
of Justice for permission to experiment with various 
forms of authorised cannabis production and wholesale 
supply.
19
 These include the licensing of private growers 
and municipally run cannabis farms. So far, no such 
applications have been approved, however the mayor 
of one municipality in the south, Heerlen, has publicly 
expressed his willingness to proceed without formal 
permission. 
Judges are also increasingly showing unease with current 
policies in their sentencing. A court sentenced  two 
cannabis growers – who cultivated overtly, reported their 
income to the tax authorities and paid their electricity 
bills – but no punishment was applied.
20
 The court 
criticised the policy that criminalises cannabis production 
while allowing its sale: “Given that the sale of soft drugs 
in coffee shops is tolerated, this means that these coffee 
shops must supply themselves and so cultivation must 
be done to satisfy the demand”. The ruling is potentially 
ground breaking, paving the way for legal supply to the 
coffee shops. The conviction has been  appealed and is 
now due to be heard in the Supreme Court for a final 
ruling in late 2016.
While the goverment continues in its attempts to restrict 
activities that would facilitate cultivation, by criminalizing 
preparatory acts (such as growshops),
21
 local authorities 
are increasingly supporting regulation of the backdoor 
through a new Cannabis Act.
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7. For more discussion, see: Blickman, T. (2014), ‘Cannabis 
policy reform in Europe: Bottom up rather than top down, 
TNI Series on Legislative Reform of Drug Policies No. 28’, 
http://www.druglawreform.info/en/publications/legislative-
reform-series-/item/6007-cannabis-policy-reform-in-europe  
and, chapter on cannabis tourism, page 197, in Rolles, S. 
Murkin, G. (2013) How to Regulate Cannabis: A Practical 
Guide, Transform Drug Policy Foundation. www.tdpf.org.
uk/resources/publications/how-regulate-cannabis-practical-
guide
8. For more on the distinction between de facto and de jure 
legalisation, see Rolles, S. and Murkin, G., op. cit., pp. 30-31.
9. Peil.nl (2013) ‘Cannabis opinion polls in the Netherlands’ 
(translated by the Transnational Institute). www.
druglawreform.info/images/stories/documents/Cannabis_
opinion_poll_in_the_Netherlands_2.pdf   
10. Lensink, H., Husken, M. (2013) ‘De rechter is het zat’, Vrij 
Nederland, 10.12.13 www.vn.nl/Archief/Justitie/Artikel-
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Transnational Institute, www.druglawreform.info/en/
weblog/item/4005-cannabis-pass-abolished-not-really  
12. Maalsté, N. et al. (2014) ‘Verplicht nummer Onderzoek naar 
de lokale handhaving van het coffeeshopbeleid, Access 
interdit’. http://accesinterdit.nl/images/2014-02/verplicht-
nummer-def_1.pdf
13. The possibilities for regulating potency in legal cannabis 
products, and the issue of potency-related harm, are 
discussed in Rolles, S. and Murkin, G., op. cit., pp. 107-116.
14. Trimbos Institute (2013) THC-concentraties in wiet, 
nederwiet en hasj in Nederlandse coffeeshops. www.
trimbos.nl/webwinkel/productoverzicht-webwinkel/
alcohol-en-drugs/af/af1221-thc-concentraties-2012-2013  
15. Bieleman, B., Nijkamp, R., Bak, T. (2015) ‘Coffeeshops in 
Nederland 2014’. Groningen: Intraval. www.intraval.nl/pdf/
b134_MCN15.pdf 
16. Peil.nl, op. cit.
17. See:http://www.detransparanteketen.nl/upload/files/
Onderzoek%20motivaction.pdf . For an overview of public 
opinion polls, see http://druglawreform.info/images/stories/
documents/Cannabis_opinion_polls_in_the_Netherlands_
June_2015.pdf
18. Blickman, T., Jelsma, M., (2013)‘The Netherlands is ready 
to regulate cannabis’, Transnational Institute, http://
druglawreform.info/weblog/item/5219-the-netherlands-is-
ready-to-regulate-cannabis  
19. de Graaf, P.(2013) ‘Burgemeesters werken aan manifest 
voor legalisering wietteelt’, Volkskrant.nl. http://
www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/
detail/3565577/2013/12/20/Burgemeestersmanifest-voor-
legalisering-wietteelt.dhtml
20. Skynews.com.au (17.10.2014)  ‘Dutch court lets off cannabis 
growers’ http://www.skynews.com.au/news/world/
europe/2014/10/17/dutch-court-lets-off-cannabis-growers.
html 
21. Dutch News, ‘Helping people grow marijuana is about to 
become a crime’, 23.02.2015 http://www.dutchnews.nl/
news/archives/2015/02/helping-people-grow-marijuana-is-
about-to-become-a-crime/
22. Summary and conclusions, in: Meesters, M. (2015). ‘Het 
failliet van het gedogen: Op weg naar de cannabiswet’, 
Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG); https://vng.nl/
files/vng/rapport_werkgroep_cannabisbeleid_engels.pdf
23. Blickman, T.,(2013) ‘Majority of the Dutch favour 
cannabis legalisation’, Transnational Institute blog, www.
druglawreform.info/en/weblog/item/4960-majority-of-the-
dutch-favour-cannabis-legalisation   
24. DutchNews.nl, ‘D66 Liberals to draft regulated marijuana 
production proposal’, 20/11/13. http://www.dutchnews.
nl/news/archives/2013/11/d66_liberals_to_draft_regulate.
php#sthash.rBMjAisw.dpuf; and DutchNews.nl (26.02.2015) 
‘D66 devises plan to regulate Dutch marijuana production, 
Dutch News, 26 February 2015, http://www.dutchnews.nl/
news/archives/2015/02/d66-devises-plan-to-regulate-dutch-
marijuana-production/
A report by the Dutch platform of municipalities (VNG), 
in November 2015 called on the government to allow 
regulated cannabis production by introducing licences for 
growers, to take cannabis out of the hands of organised 
crime. The report concluded: 
“The changing circumstances, in particular the fact 
that organised crime has a firm hold of the production 
and trade of cannabis, makes a toleration policy 
untenable.” 
Furthermore, it said: 
“[t]he discussion on cannabis policy has reached 
an impasse, between proponents and opponents of 
regulation. We cannot allow the various levels of 
administration to become bogged down in discussions, 
while organised crime profits and public health 
remains insufficiently protected. We call upon all 
parties to above all employ a pragmatic approach 
in searching for solutions. We have reached the 
conclusion that a system of rules for the entire 
cannabis supply chain offers the best possibilities.”
22
In addition, the majority of voters of both the political 
parties that currently make up the Netherlands’ coalition 
government are in favour of legally regulating the supply 
of cannabis.
23
 One of the major opposition parties, 
Democrats 66, has tabled a bill that would realise this 
goal.
24
 Consequently, all signs point to there being broad 
popular and political support for continuing the country’s 
historically progressive stance on cannabis. 
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Case study: Turkey’s opium trade
Turkey’s opium trade: successfully 
transitioning from illicit production to a legally 
regulated market
Turkey provides a useful example of the practical steps involved in transitioning from illicit 
to legally regulated opium production, and how such changes can impact on the global 
illicit trade, even while wider global prohibitions remain in place alongside steady or rising 
demand.
Turkey’s move from illicit to licit opium production for medicinal use demonstrates that an 
orderly transition, with a range of benefits for the producer country, is possible in places 
with the institutional capacity to deliver the right regulatory framework. In contrast, if 
there is a solution for countries like Afghanistan, which face far more acute governance and 
institutional challenges that make managing even small-scale regulated opium production 
difficult, it will be longer-term and phased in gradually. This will include progressively 
reducing illicit global demand through developing regulated systems for supplying non-
medical opiates to dependent users in consumer countries (such as opioid substitution 
therapy and heroin-assisted treatment – HAT), and by addressing the underlying social and 
economic drivers of opiate dependence. It will need to be done in tandem with managing 
the remaining illicit market to reduce the harm it causes,
1
 and wider development efforts 
in affected areas,
2
 taking into account the implications for traditional and illicit growing 
regions where the market can be an important source of  economic activity, and in some 
cases, even a form of stability. 
However, Turkey also demonstrates that moving  opium production from the illicit market 
to the licit medical use market alone will not reduce overall global illicit production. The 
economic dynamics of the illicit trade mean supply will expand in other countries to meet 
continuing illicit demand. This is true of all “silver bullet fantasy”
3
 poppy-for-medicine 
proposals in places such as Afghanistan, Guatemala and Mexico, that are aimed at eliminating 
global illicit opium production.
Background
Opium is often perceived as an illicit commodity, but in fact 
around half of global production is entirely legal, licensed 
for the manufacture of a range of pharmaceutical, opiate-
based painkillers. This production for the legal medical 
market is not associated with any of the crime, violence, 
and insecurity linked to the parallel illicit market for non-
medical use. 
Within the non-medical market, a relatively small 
population of dependent users consume a disproportionate 
amount of the total opium produced. In Switzerland, for 
example, it has been estimated that the 10% heaviest 
users consume about 50% of the imported heroin. Use 
by a proportion of  this group – and the production and 
supply to meet it – transitioned from the illicit to the licit 
market through the introduction of a heroin-assisted 
treatment (HAT) model in 1994, something a number of 
other countries have also explored. 
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If medicalised heroin prescription models were expanded 
to meet need in other major consuming countries, a 
substantial proportion of the global illicit market would 
shift from illicit to licit production, with a commensurate 
reduction in criminal activity. There are also many 
developing countries where opiate-based painkillers are 
not adequately available
4
 and there is therefore  scope to 
expand licit production.
This could take place through expanding opium poppy 
production in more industrialised countries like Australia. 
But a case can also be made for more traditional, illicit 
and quasi-licit opium production in developing countries 
being legalised and licensed instead. This may, however, 
require favourable trade arrangements to be put in place 
(and navigating World Trade Organization rules and 
regional trade agreements to do so) to allow small-scale 
producers to compete on the global market with the large-
scale industrialised producers.  
Traditional opium production
Poppies have been farmed in Turkey for centuries, the 
seeds used for both human and animal food, and the poppy 
resin as opium for medicinal use. As far back as the early 
nineteenth century, Turkish opium was being shipped to 
England and China. When Turkey ratified the 1961 UN 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1967, it opted not 
to apply for a transitional exemption to gradually phase 
out opium use and production. Instead, along with India, 
it was given the status of a “traditional opium producing 
country”, granting a right to continue production for 
use in essential medicines, on the condition that it was 
managed under a state-controlled license system. 
During the gradual implementation of the system, a 
substantial amount of licit opium was diverted into illicit 
heroin production for the US market. This became an 
increasing source of tension with the US – particularly 
in light of the emerging, politically awkward challenge 
of heroin use among the armed services in Vietnam 
and returning veterans. By the end of the decade, an 
estimated 80% of heroin used in the US originated in 
Turkey. President Nixon, elected in 1968 and launching 
his war on drugs in 1971, viewed heroin as a threat to 
national stability, leading the US to exert increasing 
pressure, including threats to cut off aid, resulting in 
Turkey banning opium cultivation in 1972. 
A licensed production model
In 1974, Turkey restarted opium cultivation for medical 
purposes on a significant scale under a new and strictly 
state-controlled license system, in compliance with the 
UN Single Convention, and supported both politically 
and technically by the US. The Turkish Grain Marketing 
Board (TMO) was the national agency responsible for 
the country’s poppy licensing for medicines system. The 
TMO sits within the Ministry of Agriculture, which owns 
the nationalised poppy-to-opium processing facility. 
Over 350 TMO officials (excluding local administrators) 
are involved in the control of poppy cultivation, costing 
Turkey approximately $6 million per year.
Unlike the large-scale, highly industrialised opium 
production in Tasmania for example, in Turkey, licit opium 
production remains in the hands of the 70,000 to 100,000 
mostly small-scale farmers who are licensed every year, 
each cultivating an average of just 0.4 hectares. In 2005, 
the TMO estimated that 600,000 people earn their living 
from poppy cultivation in Turkey. 95% of the morphine 
(and poppy seed) production is exported, generating an 
export income of over $60 million.
5
 
In many respects, the new licensing system can be viewed 
as a success – providing oversight of the previously 
illicit and quasi-licit unregulated industry, maintaining 
traditional producers’ incomes, creating valuable export 
revenue, and successfully preventing almost all leakage 
of opium to the illicit market. The US State Department 
claims that there is “no appreciable illicit drug cultivation 
in Turkey other than cannabis grown primarily for 
domestic consumption”, and that, “The Turkish Grain 
Board (TMO) strictly controls licit opium poppy cultivation 
quite successfully, with no apparent diversion into the 
illicit market.”
6
 Equally, the UNODC says that since “1974 
until now [2003], no seizures of opium derived from 
Turkish poppies have been reported either in the country 
or abroad.”
7
This is in contrast to India’s less robustly regulated licit 
opium production, which uniquely among licit producing 
nations allows farmers to produce raw opium gum/
resin – as opposed to harvested whole plants or “poppy 
straw”. There, diversion rates are estimated by the Indian 
government to be around 10%. 
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The ‘balloon effect’
Turkey is now one of the major licit opiate producers for 
the pharmaceutical market – primarily for morphine, 
diamorphine (heroin), and codeine – along with India, 
Australia, France, Spain, Hungary and some smaller 
producers, including the UK. However, global demand for 
illicit opium for non-medical use has continued to grow, so 
when Turkish opium production was first banned in 1972 
and then legalised and regulated for the production of 
medicines in 1974, illicit production was simply displaced 
elsewhere – a classic example of the “balloon effect”.  
Production to supply the illicit heroin markets in Europe 
and elsewhere shifted firstly to Pakistan, Burma and Iran, 
then later to Afghanistan, which now dominates global 
illicit production. With respect to the US market, the US 
Drug Enforcement Administration has acknowledged 
this problem, saying: “Mexico emerged as a prominent 
source of heroin to the United States in 1974, when 
growers stepped up production to fill the void left by the 
suppression of heroin supplies from Turkey in 1972.” As 
early as 1975, Mexico was supplying 89% of the heroin 
consumed in the United States.
8
 
This displacement of illicit opium production to other 
countries has also meant that Turkey remains a major 
transit country for illicit opiates from Afghanistan to 
Europe,
9
 with Turkish organised crime groups a key 
presence in the trade across the continent.  
References
1. Gutierrez, E. (2015) ‘Drugs and Illicit Practices: Assessing 
their impact on development and governance - Christian 
Aid Occasional Paper’, Christian Aid. http://www.
christianaid.org.uk/Images/Drugs-and-illicit-practices-Eric-
Gutierrez-Oct-2015.pdf 
2. United Nations Development Programme (2015) 
‘Addressing the development dimensions of drug policy’. 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/HIV-
AIDS/Discussion-Paper--Addressing-the-Development-
Dimensions-of-Drug-Policy.pdf 
3. Rolles, S. (2007) ‘Field of Dreams’, Druglink, http://
transform-drugs.blogspot.co.uk/2007/04/why-legalising-
afghan-opium-for.html
4. The Global Commssion on Drug Policy (2015) ‘The Negative 
Impact of Drug Control on Public Health: The Global Crisis 
of Avoidable Pain’ http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.
org/?wpdmdl=1194
5. Kamminga, J. (2006) ‘The Political History of Turkey’s 
Opium Licensing System for the Production of Medicines: 
Lessons for Afghanistan’, Senlis Council. http://www.
icosgroup.net/static/reports/Political_History_Poppy_
Licensing_Turkey_May_2006.pdf 
6. US Department of State (2008) ‘International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report 2008’, p. 528 http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/102583.pdf 
7. UNODC (date unknown) ‘Turkey Programme’. www.unodc.
org/pdf/turkey_programme.pdf
8. Jelsma, M. (2011) ‘The Development of International Drug 
Control: Lessons Learned and Strategic Challenges for the 
Future’. http://docplayer.net/296753-The-development-of-
international-drug-control-lessons-learned-and-strategic-
challenges-for-the-future.html 
9. UNODC (date unknown) ‘Turkey Programme’. www.unodc.
org/pdf/turkey_programme.pdf
174
The Alternative World Drug Report
2012, enabling adults aged 21 or older to possess cannabis, 
grow up to six cannabis plants themselves, and give up to 
one ounce to other adult users. So while not particularly 
revealing at this stage, the available data provides a 
limited indication of the effect that a year of such legal 
activity has had on cannabis consumption.   
• According to the biennial Healthy Kids Colorado 
Survey (HKCS), “The trend for current and 
lifetime marijuana use [for high school students 
in Colorado] has remained stable since 2005.”
2
 
Marginal falls were observed, but deemed not 
statistically significant.
• The HKCS found that, in 2013, 20% of high school 
students admitted using cannabis in the preceding 
month, and 37% said they had at some point in 
their lives.
3
 Both of these figures are lower than the 
national averages (23.4% and 40.7% respectively), 
Background
In 2012, Colorado and Washington State became the first 
jurisdictions in the world to formally legalise cannabis 
markets for non-medical use. The reforms were passed 
through ballot initiatives, with voters in both states 
choosing legalisation by a solid margin. Colorado’s 
Amendment 64 was approved in November 2012, with 
the state’s first retail stores opening on January 1, 2014, 
following the development of a comprehensive regulatory 
infrastructure devised by an expert task force.
1
Cannabis use
Unfortunately, it is too early to say what the immediate 
impact of a commercial cannabis market has been on 
consumption, as the latest data on use only goes up to 2013, 
and the first retail cannabis stores only opened in 2014. 
However, Amendment 64 became law on 10 December 
Cannabis regulation in Colorado: 
Early evidence defies the critics
The core argument made by opponents of legal regulation is that any regulated market for 
cannabis would inevitably fuel a significant rise in use and associated harms – particularly 
among young people. So inevitably, as the first jurisdiction in the world to implement a 
legally regulated market for the production and supply of cannabis for non-medical use, 
Colorado is under intense scrutiny, with advocates keen to demonstrate its successes, and 
prohibitionists keen to highlight its failings.  
Given that Colorado’s cannabis market only began trading in January 2014, it is not yet 
possible to draw firm conclusions about longer-term impacts. But a review of early evidence 
on key indicators suggests that, aside from some relatively minor teething problems, the 
state’s regulatory framework has defied the critics, and its impacts have been largely positive. 
There has been no obvious spike in young people’s cannabis use, road fatalities, or crime, 
and there have been a number of positives, including a dramatic drop in the number of 
people being criminalised for cannabis offences; a substantial contraction in the illicit trade, 
as the majority of supply is now regulated by the government; and a significant increase in 
tax revenue, which is now being spent on social programmes. Consistent public support 
for legalisation also suggests Coloradans perceive the reforms to have been a success. 
Where challenges have emerged, for example around cannabis edibles, the flexibility of the 
regulations has allowed for modification to address them. 
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which are recorded by the National Youth Risk 
Behaviour Survey
4
• Looking at a different youth demographic, the 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health found that, 
although cannabis use among adolescents (aged 
12-17) and young adults (aged 18-25) both rose in 
Colorado between 2012 and 2014, these increases 
were not statistically significant
5
• While arguably a lesser public health concern, 
there have, however, been statistically significant 
increases in cannabis use among adults in Colorado 
in recent years, but these are in line with broader 
national patterns, including states that have not 
legalised cannabis.
6
 Between 2011 and 2013, past-
month cannabis use among those aged 26 and above 
rose from 7.6% to 10.1%,
7
 while use among those 
aged 18 and over rose from 10.4% to 12.6% 
• A year after the retail cannabis stores opened, a 
Denver Post survey asked: “Since marijuana became 
legal, has your use changed?” 13% said it had 
decreased, 17% increased and 70% stayed the same
8
 
In summary, to date, the dramatic increases in cannabis 
use predicted by some have not materialised, with any 
rises broadly in line with changes seen elsewhere in the 
US. While recorded adult use has risen (and was rising 
even before the legalisation vote in 2012), this increase 
may, in part, reflect a greater willingness to admit to 
cannabis use now that it is legal, rather than an actual 
change in the number of users. The novelty and huge 
publicity around the newly legal drug market may also 
have contributed to the rise in use, as curious older users 
in particular exercise their new freedoms. It is too early to 
say what will happen as this novelty wears off.
Health harms
Assessing the health impacts of cannabis use is 
challenging, and isolating any impacts of a policy change 
related to cannabis use even more so. However, the 
following trends have been observed:
• The number of treatment admissions with cannabis 
as the primary substance of abuse has risen from 
around 5,500 in 2005, to around 6,900 in 2009, before 
falling to around 5,500 again in 2013
9
 
• Since 2000, “cannabis-related” A&E admissions have 
risen consistently. More recently, admissions rose 
from 8,198 in 2011, to 12,888 in 2013.
10
 A caveat 
is that “cannabis-related” means the drug was 
“mentioned”, rather than identified as the cause of 
the admission (again, the legal change may have 
made people more forthcoming about their use). 
There have also been changes in how, and how 
consistently, emergency room data is reported, 
which is likely to have contributed to the increase
• Accidental ingestions of cannabis by children have 
risen, although in real terms, the numbers remain 
low – for under-9s, the number rose from 19 in 2011, 
to 45 in 2014,
11
 all of whom made full recoveries 
(for perspective, the equivalent 2014 numbers 
for under-5 pediatric exposures to analgesics 
were 2,178, and 1,422 for cleaning products
12
). 
The reduced stigma associated with attending 
A&E post-legalisation may also go some way to 
explaining this trend
Crime
Unsurprisingly, arrests for cannabis possession have 
dropped dramatically – by nearly 80% – since 2012, an 
obvious direct and positive outcome of the change in 
the law.
13
 And while it is disappointing that black people 
are still disproportionately arrested for cannabis-related 
offences, there has nonetheless been a significant drop in 
criminalisation across the board.
There has, however, been a contrasting rise in citations 
for public consumption of cannabis. In the first nine 
months of 2014, police wrote 668 tickets, up from 117 
for the same period the year before.
14
 Despite the size 
of this increase, these are still small numbers, and 
their significance should not be overstated given that 
public cannabis consumption is classed as a minor 
administrative offence. This trend is likely explained 
by an absence of legal consumption venues (outside of 
private homes), a poor initial understanding of the new 
law (particularly among out-of-state visitors, who do not 
have any designated consumption spaces), and changes 
in policing priorities now that resources are no longer 
needed for other cannabis offences.
Other crime data – on, for example, theft, sexual assault, 
and violent crime – has been seized on by both advocates 
and critics to support their positions. Figures for some 
crimes have gone up, and some have gone down, with 
considerable variation between demographics and 
regions. With the link between most of these variables 
and cannabis legalisation generally unclear, it is probably 
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unhelpful to infer much from them in the absence of more 
focused, longer-term comparative studies.  
Estimates from the Colorado Department of Revenue 
suggest that 41% of the total demand for cannabis is not 
being met by licensed recreational vendors.
15
 Instead, it 
is being met by (as they describe them) “grey-market” 
medical suppliers, or ‘black-market’ illicit production. 
This means that 59% of the recreational market has 
now been legalised, regulated, and taxed, which, even if 
total demand has increased marginally, still represents a 
significant contraction in the untaxed criminal market. 
Tax revenue
Some critics have noted that tax revenues from the first 
year of legal cannabis sales have not matched initial 
predictions (which curiously implies they are critical of 
not enough legal cannabis being sold and used).
16
  
   
There are three types of state taxes on recreational 
cannabis: the standard 2.9% sales tax, a 10% “special 
marijuana sales tax”, and a 15% excise tax on wholesale 
cannabis transactions (to put this in perspective, cigarettes 
are taxed in Colorado at 3.74%). The cumulative revenue 
total (including both recreational and medical cannabis 
taxes and fees) was over $120 million in 2015.
17
 
The terms under which retail cannabis sales were legalised 
require the first $40 million of the excise tax revenue to 
be spent on Colorado school construction projects. The 
first ten months of 2015 brought in $28.3 million in excise 
tax towards this total, with a record $3.3 million in August 
alone.
18
 This compares with $13.3 million for all of 2014.
19
 
Sales of medical cannabis have been more resilient than 
expected, possibly because taxation, and hence prices, 
remain substantially lower than for non-medical supplies. 
Taken together, the legal medical cannabis industry and 
legal recreational industry in Colorado generated $700 
million in sales in 2014 ($386 million and $313 million 
respectively).
20
 In the first ten months of 2015, this figure 
rose to $814 million ($475 million from recreational sales 
and $340 million from medical sales).
21
Driving under the influence
Data for fatalities involving drivers testing positive for 
cannabis is available from the Colorado Department of 
Transport,
22
 which recorded 40 in 2003, and most recently, 
36 in 2013 (ranging from 20 in 2004, to 56 in 2011). No 
obvious trend is apparent from these figures, and there 
are ongoing challenges in determining the extent of the 
link between blood-THC levels and impairment.
23
 
A rise or fall in the number of positive roadside tests is 
an even less useful indicator, as it can indicate changes in 
policing activity (the number of tests carried out, or types 
of drivers targeted), rather than actual changes in drivers’ 
behaviour, whether as a result of legalisation or not.
Nevertheless, there has, reassuringly, been no jump in 
total road fatalities, which remain at near-historic lows.
24 25
 
This trend is likely to be driven primarily by the ongoing 
decline in people driving under the influence (DUI) of 
alcohol, which in itself indicates how DUI incidents do not 
simply rise when a drug is legal. Instead, cultural norms 
and public education are the key factors.
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if the Colorado model does turn out to be sub-optimal 
in some respects, it is a dramatic improvement on the 
prohibition it has replaced, and is providing invaluable 
evidence to guide other jurisdictions as they legally 
regulate cannabis. As a result, its very existence is already 
undermining decades of cannabis prohibition, not just in 
the US, but worldwide too.
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Inevitably, there have been some mistakes made and 
some challenges have been inadequately anticipated  – 
in particular the need for more stringent regulation of 
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Over-commercialisation?
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criticism from within the pro-legalisation movement 
for being too commercialised. Whether this is the case 
remains to be seen, and the data now emerging will 
provide an instructive contrast to that coming from other 
US states, and other types of cannabis markets, such as 
those in Uruguay,
30
 Spain,
31
 the Netherlands
32
 (see other 
case studies) and elsewhere. What is clear is that even 
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Cautious regulation
Uruguay is taking a cautious approach in its attempt to 
achieve these goals. Policymakers are clear that they 
do not want to create a “free-for-all”; they envisage a 
cannabis trade that is strictly and responsibly regulated.
6
 
The new market will therefore be relatively restrictive 
– at least compared to the nascent markets in the US.
7
 
In October 2015, the Uruguayan government selected 
two private companies to legally cultivate cannabis.
8
 
Retail sales of the drug will be managed by licensed and 
regulated pharmacies only.
The task of regulating will be carried out by the newly 
established Institute for the Regulation and Control of 
Cannabis (IRCCA), which will closely oversee all aspects 
of the market.
Products
Some of the details of Uruguay’s regulatory model are 
still being developed, but according to the most recent 
statements made by the head of the National Drug Board, 
three types of herbal cannabis will be made legally 
available for purchase,
9
 with potency ranging from 
around 5% THC (the main psychoactive ingredient in 
cannabis) to a maximum of 15% THC. The cannabis will 
be sold in plain, unbranded packaging, and retail prices 
will be set by the IRCCA at around $1 per gram, which 
is just below current illicit-market rates (although prices 
will be higher for higher-potency varieties).
10
 Cannabis 
Background
In December 2013, Uruguay passed a bill to establish 
a legally regulated market for cannabis.
1
 It is the first 
market of its kind anywhere in the world and has taken 
over two years to become operational. While similar, 
state-level cannabis markets have been established in 
several US states, no other country has legalised cannabis 
nationwide.
The market being established in Uruguay differs from 
those in the US in other important ways. The US reforms 
were the result of ballot measures approved by popular 
vote, but in Uruguay, the government itself was the 
catalyst for change. In fact, according to a 2013 poll, only a 
minority of Uruguayan citizens – 28% – support cannabis 
legalisation. This figure did increase by around 4% once 
the details of the government’s plans were publicised,
2
 
and polling data from 2014 showed support had increased 
to 33.6%.
3
The government’s plans were motivated primarily by 
concerns about crime, insecurity and public safety – its 
rationale being that a legal cannabis market will reclaim 
most of the trade from organised crime groups and 
subsequently reduce rates of violence.
4
 An additional 
stated aim is to separate the market for cannabis from the 
markets for riskier drugs such as heroin or pasta base, 
a form of smoked cocaine paste widely used in South 
America.
5
Cannabis legalisation in Uruguay:
Public health and safety over private profit
Uruguay is the first country to introduce a nationwide legally regulated market for the 
production and supply of cannabis for non-medical use, and it intends to set a good example. 
The government’s plans are motivated by concerns over insecurity and public safety, and so 
intend to reduce criminality and violence by depriving organised crime groups of most of the 
cannabis market. Policy makers do not want a free-for-all, so the market is strictly regulated, 
with very limited commercial involvement. Just two companies are producing the cannabis, 
to sell through licensed pharmacies, to registered over-18 Uruguayan residents – and all 
promotion is banned. There is also scope for cultivation at home, and as part of non-profit 
cannabis social clubs, which also avoid the pitfalls associated with a commercialised market.
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edibles or other cannabis-infused products will not be 
available for retail sale.
Restricting consumption levels 
The IRCCA will also maintain an anonymised national 
registry of cannabis users, in order to track purchasing 
patterns and limit sales to 40 grams per user per month 
(10 grams per week). This is intended to moderate use and 
minimise the risk that legal cannabis will be diverted for 
sale on the illegal market. Only Uruguayan citizens and 
residents aged 18 or older will be accepted in the registry. 
At the point of sale, they will have to provide a fingerprint 
scan to identify themselves as registered purchasers.
Throughout the market, Uruguay will enforce a ban 
on all forms of cannabis advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship, a measure that is both politically and 
practically difficult in the US, due to laws guaranteeing 
so-called “commercial free speech”.
11
 The possession of 
cannabis has never been criminalised in Uruguay, and 
illicit cannabis has long been cheap and readily available, 
so there is unlikely to be any significant impact on use 
from reduced user-level deterrence or regulated supply.
The main identified risk has been commercial promotion. 
As the history of alcohol and tobacco regulation has shown, 
when legal drugs are aggressively promoted by profit-
seeking businesses, public health concerns are invariably 
marginalised. Uruguay’s cannabis regulations have been 
specifically designed to mitigate any potential health 
risks of over-commercialisation following legalisation.
12
 
Specifically, the marketing ban, combined with the limited 
involvement of private companies and strict government 
oversight, should go some way toward preventing market-
led increases in cannabis consumption or the initiation of 
new users.
Medical, personal and social club 
cultivation and use
In addition to a regulated retail market, Uruguay’s new 
law includes provisions for three other forms of legal 
cannabis supply. There will be a system to provide medical 
users with access to the drug, as well as the option for 
any adult user to either cultivate cannabis in their own 
home or join a club that will cultivate it on their behalf. 
Licensed home-growers can cultivate up to six cannabis 
plants per household, with the cannabis clubs – which 
must have between 15 and 45 members – restricted to 99 
plants. With both these forms of supply, individual users 
can harvest no more than 480 grams of cannabis per year 
– the same as the annual limit on retail sales.
A pioneering system
While some may argue that Uruguay’s cannabis 
regulations are unduly restrictive, it is worth reiterating 
the context in which these reforms are taking place. 
This is the first ever nationwide regulatory system for 
the production and supply of cannabis. Given that the 
eyes of the world will be upon Uruguay as it rolls out its 
pioneering system, proceeding with caution is probably 
wise. The system will therefore be closely evaluated, and 
the government has pledged to keep it under review.
The fact that Uruguay will regulate cannabis more strictly 
than alcohol and tobacco may strike some as being unfair, 
especially in light of the relative health harms of the three 
drugs. But it is perhaps more useful to view cannabis 
regulation as an opportunity to demonstrate best practice 
in drug control. And by choosing to responsibly regulate 
what is, after all, still a risky substance, it is clear that 
Uruguay intends to set a good example. 
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The prescription of injectable heroin to treat long-term  injectors of illicit opiates (also known 
as heroin-assisted therapy or HAT) has been successfully used by a range of countries, 
including Switzerland, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Australia and Canada - in many 
cases, for decades. 
While significantly less widespread, and often seen as more politically controversial than 
opiate substitution therapy (OST) programmes (which involve prescribing methadone or 
buprenorphine), HAT now has a substantial body of evidence demonstrating its effectiveness, 
albeit within the relatively limited populations where it has been used. As such, it provides 
useful lessons for managing one of the most risky and problematic drug-using behaviours 
as a public health challenge, rather than a criminal justice one.
HAT is legally recognised as a medical intervention, and is therefore not subject to the 
prohibitions of the UN drug control regime. However, importantly, in terms of lessons for 
drug policy, HAT also demonstrates the wider potential benefits, locally, nationally and 
internationally, of moving a significant segment of the illicit supply and use of a drug into a 
completely legal, regulated market. 
As a result, if this form of treatment was rolled out widely – particularly in major consumer 
countries – it could have a significant impact on the scale of illicit drug markets nationally 
and globally.
Yet access to HAT remains difficult to obtain even in the relatively small number of countries 
where it exists; it is only available under strict criteria, including long-term use and failure to 
respond to other treatment programmes. Some argue that HAT’s benefits could be extended 
far more broadly if the barriers to access were lower – although so far there has only been 
one study into this possibility.
1
 
Other related models, such as prescribing smokable heroin, heroin “reefers”, or smokable 
opium have been tried but, so far, inadequately researched. HAT is also a model that could 
potentially be adapted for other currently illicit drugs. Indeed, there are already drug-of-
choice prescribing programmes for dependent users of amphetamines.
2
 
Heroin-assisted therapy in Switzerland: 
Successfully regulating the supply and use of a 
high-risk injectable drug
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Background
The prescribing of medical-grade heroin as a treatment 
for heroin dependence has a long history, having been 
firmly established in UK medical practice by the 1926 
Rolleston Committee,
3
 after which it operated in parallel 
with the criminalisation of non-prescribed heroin 
under both domestic and international law.
4
 Coming to 
be known as the “British system”, it remained in place 
until concerns around rising heroin use among young 
people, overprescribing, and the risk of the drug being 
diverted to the illicit market, led to heavy restrictions 
being introduced in 1967. Despite an exponential rise in 
use since then, today less than 200 of the UK’s more than 
200,000 users receive heroin on prescription.     
Switzerland, like much of Europe, experienced a rapid 
rise in injecting heroin use during the 1970s and 1980s, 
but ultimately adopted a very different policy model to 
the UK. By the 1980s, heroin use had graduated into a full-
blown public health crisis, as it became clear that illicit 
injecting – and particularly high-risk behaviours such as 
the sharing of needles – was associated with high rates of 
HIV transmission. In 1986, Switzerland had approximately 
500 HIV cases per million people, the highest in Western 
Europe at the time.
5
 By 1989, half of all new cases of HIV 
transmission were linked to illicit drug injection.
6
 By 1990, 
HIV prevalence was over 40% among those who reported 
having used drugs for more than 10 years, and in the era 
before effective treatments for HIV/AIDS, mortality rates 
among this population were correspondingly high. Added 
to this, there were growing fears about sexual contact 
with injecting drug users leading to a rise in HIV infection 
rates among the wider population.
As this challenge grew, initial responses consisted mostly 
of traditional law enforcement crackdowns. Switzerland’s 
federal drug law was revised in 1975, to include a greater 
focus on abstinence, which led to significantly increased 
arrests, and mandated registration of illicit drug users and 
sellers by the police – rejecting harm reduction measures 
such as needle and syringe programmes (NSP), and 
imposing onerous licensing requirements on methadone 
prescribing. The response failed, with illicit drug injection 
and related health problems continuing to increase 
sharply. Zurich became a particular focus, with the 
number of people who inject drugs growing from under 
4,000 at the time of the 1975 law revision, to an estimated 
10,000 in 1985; 20,000 in 1988; and 30,000 in 1992.
7
  
As Zurich’s street drug scenes became an increasingly 
visible, problematic and politically charged manifestation 
of the injecting phenomenon, new approaches were 
demanded. In 1987, the city authorities made a pragmatic 
decision, attempting to contain and manage the problem 
by establishing a tolerance zone – the Platzspitz park – 
where people were allowed to use drugs. The space soon 
became known as “Needle Park”, and it did enable the 
injecting scene to be contained and managed to some 
degree, as well as facilitating the targeted provision of 
health services. Between 1988 and 1992, the ZIPP-AIDS 
project based in the park responded to 6,700 overdose 
episodes, vaccinated thousands for hepatitis B, and 
distributed 10 million sterile syringes.
8
 
The ongoing health and crime problems linked with 
needle park, particularly those that spilled into 
neighbouring areas, ultimately led to its abrupt closure in 
1992. In another example of the so-called “balloon effect”, 
the drug scene simply shifted elsewhere, and problems 
continued. However, the way in which the  intervention 
pragmatically prioritised health helped shape the 
discussions around policy responses to drug injection that 
followed. Once again, it became clear that new thinking 
was needed.
In 1991, at the request of municipal authorities and state 
(canton) governments, a new national programme was 
established within the Federal Office of Public Health to 
reconsider the problems. Reflecting previous experiences, 
the recommendations that emerged were public health-
led, including a combination of established harm 
reduction interventions (OST and NSP), treatment and 
social support provision, and a new call to explore HAT. 
In 1992, a change in the law enabled such an exploration. 
The Swiss HAT model differed from the old British System 
in that rather than being given “takeaway” prescriptions, 
patients were required to attend a clinic once or twice a 
day and to use their prescriptions on site under medical 
supervision. The idea was to combine the benefits of a 
prescribed supply (heroin of known strength and purity, 
free from contaminants and adulterants, and used with 
clean injecting equipment), with the regular access to 
services and benefits of supervised use in a safe and 
hygienic venue (as found in the more common supervised 
injection facilities such as Canada’s Insite facility),
9
 while 
also preventing the diversion of prescribed supplies to the 
illicit market. 
The first HAT clinics opened in 1994 as part of a three-
year national trial. In late 1997, the federal government 
approved a large-scale expansion of the trial, aimed at 
accommodating 15% of the nation’s estimated 30,000 
heroin users, specifically those long-term users who had 
not succeeded with other treatments.
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The programmes were explicitly designed and 
implemented as an empirical investigation. They were 
rigorously documented and evaluated, and evolved in line 
with the results generated, following public consultation 
and debate. In this way, it was possible for the policy 
model to grow from a scientific experiment into a more 
formalised policy framework that enjoyed growing public 
support – a process helped by overwhelmingly positive 
outcomes.  
Cost-effectiveness
There have also been studies considering the cost-
effectiveness of HAT in three countries – Switzerland, 
Germany and the Netherlands. These report the costs 
Summary of impacts10 
Changing the law or regulatory infrastructure to allow heroin prescribing, while important, has not driven all 
the positive outcomes listed below by itself – these also reflect the wider realignment from a criminal justice to 
public health model, and the investment in services that has followed. However, the change in policy and law, 
much like the introduction of decriminalisation approaches in other countries, has enabled and facilitated this 
shift. 
• Health outcomes for HAT participants improved significantly 
• Heroin dosages stabilised, usually in two or three months, rather than increasing as some had feared
• Illicit heroin (and illicit cocaine) consumption was significantly reduced 
• A large reduction in fundraising-related criminal activity among HAT participants. This benefit alone 
exceeded the cost of the treatment
11
 
• Heroin from the trials was not diverted to illicit markets 
• Initiation of new heroin use fell – the medicalisation of heroin made it less attractive, and there were 
reductions in street dealing and recruitment by former “user-dealers”
12 13
 
• Uptake of treatments other than HAT, especially methadone, increased rather than declined (as some had 
feared it might)
These positive outcomes have been reproduced in other countries that employ the Swiss-style HAT model. A 
2012 EMCDDA review of these programmes concluded that HAT treatment can lead to:
14
 “the ‘substantially 
improved’ health and well-being of [participants]; ‘major reductions’ in their continued use of illicit heroin; 
‘major disengagement from criminal activities’, such as acquisitive crime to fund their drug use, and ‘marked 
improvements in social functioning’ (e.g. stable housing, higher employment rate).”
15
 A 2011 review from the 
renowned Cochrane Collaboration came to similar conclusions.
16
 
of such programmes to be between €12,700 and €20,400 
per patient per year – considerably higher than the cost 
of OST (with methadone estimated at between €1,600 and 
€3,500 per patient per year). This is due to both the greater 
costs of the drug and the additional costs of establishing 
and maintaining supervised facilities. But the studies 
also show that, despite the higher cost, the expenditure 
is more than compensated for by “significant savings to 
society”, including less spent on criminal procedures and 
imprisonment. The EMCDDA notes that “if an analysis 
of cost utility takes into account all relevant parameters, 
especially related to criminal behaviour, [HAT] saves 
money”.
17
 The EMCDDA concludes: “While [HAT] may 
be a useful addition to our treatment ‘toolbox’ for opioid 
users, it is not a solution for the heroin problem … But 
for those among whom the benefit is observed, there are 
major gains for themselves, their families and society.”
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10. For a broader overview of the impacts of the Swiss 
approach, see: Csete, J. (2010) ‘From the Mountaintops: 
What the World Can Learn from Drug Policy Change in 
Switzerland’, Open Society Foundations Global Drug Policy 
Program.
11. Killias, M. (2009) ‘Commentaires sur Peter Reuter/
Dominic Schnoz, “Assessing drug problems and policies in 
Switzerland, 1998–2007”’.
12. Killias, M. and Aebi, M. (2000) ‘The impact of heroin 
prescription on heroin markets in Switzerland’, Crime 
Prevention Studies, vol. 11, pp. 83-99. http://www.popcenter.
org/library/crimeprevention/volume_11/04-Killias.pdf
13. Reuter, P. and Schnoz, D. (2009) ‘Assessing drug problems 
and policies in Switzerland, 1998–2007’, Swiss Federal 
Office of Public Health.
14. EMCDDA (2012a) ‘New heroin-assisted treatment: Recent 
evidence and current practices of supervised injectable 
heroin treatment in Europe and beyond’, Lisbon: Portugal. 
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/insights/
heroin-assisted-treatment 
15. EMCDDA (2012b) ‘EMCDDA report presents latest evidence 
on heroin-assisted treatment for hard-to-treat opioid users’, 
19.04.12. http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/news/2012/1 
16. Ferri, M., Davoli, M. and Perucci, C.A. (2011) ‘Heroin 
maintenance for chronic heroin-dependent individuals’, 
Cochrane Drugs and Alcohol Group. http://onlinelibrary.
wiley.com/doi/10.1002/14651858.CD003410.pub4/abstract;js
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17. EMCDDA (2012b) ‘EMCDDA report presents latest evidence 
on heroin-assisted treatment for hard-to-treat opioid users’, 
19.04.12. http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/news/2012/1 
18. Reuter, P. and Schnoz, D. (2009) ‘Assessing drug problems 
and policies in Switzerland, 1998–2007’, Swiss Federal 
Office of Public Health.
19. Gutzwiller, F. and Uchtenhagen, A. (1997) ‘Heroin 
Substitution: Part of the Fight Against Drug Dependency’, 
in Lewis, D., Gear C., Laubli Loud, M., and Langenick-
Cartwright, D. (eds.) (1997) The Medical Prescription of 
Narcotics: Scientific Foundations and Practical Experiences, 
Seattle: Hogrefe and Huber Publishers
20. Associated Press (2008) ‘Swiss Vote to Keep Program 
Giving Addicts Heroin’, 30.11.08. http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/12/01/world/europe/01swiss.html 
21. Killias, M. and Aebi, M. (2000) ‘The impact of heroin 
prescription on heroin markets in Switzerland’, Crime 
Prevention Studies, vol. 11, pp. 83-99. http://www.popcenter.
org/library/crimeprevention/volume_11/04-Killias.pdf
In Switzerland, the generally successful outcomes are 
also reflected in shifting public opinion. Three-quarters 
of the population identified drugs as one of the five major 
problems facing the nation in the mid-1990s; that figure 
had fallen to one eighth by 2007.
18
 Reducing highly visible, 
public drug use was certainly identified as a key driver of 
support for HAT.
19
 In a national referendum in 2008, the 
Swiss public voted, by a resounding margin, to make the 
programme permanent.
20`
International benefits
It has been estimated that just the 10% heaviest users of 
heroin in Switzerland (most of whom fall into the HAT 
target group) consume around 50% of all the heroin 
imported.
21
 As a result, the reduction in their consumption 
of illicit drugs as they enter the HAT programme (and the 
absence of any increase in new heroin users) represents 
a substantial decline in the overall production and transit 
of illicit heroin for use in the country. So in addition to the 
potential benefits on an individual and domestic level for 
consumer nations, if these programmes were rolled-out 
widely, it could significantly reduce the global demand for 
illicit heroin. This in turn would lead to a corresponding 
reduction in illicit production, transit and supply - and the 
vast criminal costs they generate.
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Drug use
In 2007, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime produced 
a report entitled “Sweden’s successful drug policy: a 
review of the evidence”.
4 5
 In the introduction, UNODC 
director Antonio Maria Costa boldly stated: “societies 
have the drug problem that they deserve”, noting 
specifically that “in the case of Sweden, the clear 
association between a restrictive drug policy and low 
levels of drug use, is striking.”
6
 This narrative of Sweden 
as an example of effective prohibitionist drug policy has 
been widely repeated by opponents of reforms such as 
decriminalisation and legalisation.  
  
However, studies have consistently failed to establish the 
existence of a link between the harshness of a country’s 
drug laws and its levels of drug use. A 2008 study using 
World Health Organization data from 17 countries (not 
including Sweden) found: “Globally, drug use is not 
distributed evenly and is not simply related to drug policy, 
since countries with stringent user-level illegal drug 
policies did not have lower levels of use than countries 
with liberal ones.”
7
 Many other large-scale studies – 
including most recently a study by the UK Home Office 
– have come to the same conclusion.
8
Background
In its attempts to achieve a drug-free society, Sweden has 
pursued a “zero-tolerance” approach to drug use, investing 
heavily in law enforcement, prevention, and abstinence-
based treatment. This policy model emerged in the 1960s, 
following the rise in drug use that was observed across 
much of the developed world at that time. Since then, the 
maximum penalties for drug offences have been gradually 
ratcheted up, and in 1988 Sweden took the unusual step of 
criminalising not only drug possession, but drug use too. 
Initially, use was only punishable by a fine, but this 
changed in 1993, when imprisonment was included as 
a potential sanction. The introduction of this harsher 
penalty was a prerequisite for police to be able to conduct 
blood or urine tests without individuals’ consent.
1
 30,000 
such tests now take place annually, on top of the 10,000 to 
which drivers are subjected.
2
The number of people convicted of drug offences has more 
than doubled over the last 10 years. And while fines are by 
far the most common penalty issued, the vast majority of 
convictions (83%) are for simple drug possession or use.
3
 
It is therefore minor offenders who are overwhelmingly 
criminalised.
The central aim of Swedish drug policy is to create a drug-free society. To achieve this aim, 
the country has adopted a punitive, enforcement-led approach to drugs. It is this approach, 
some have argued, that is responsible for Sweden’s historically low levels of drug use. This 
apparent success of the Swedish model is therefore often presented as an argument against 
drug policy reforms such as decriminalisation and legal regulation. However, the degree to 
which Sweden’s low prevalence of drug use can be attributed to its repressive approach is 
highly questionable, as research consistently shows that wider social, economic and cultural 
factors are the key drivers of drug prevalence – not the harshness of enforcement. Also of 
note is that levels of drug use in Sweden, while in relative terms still very low, are increasing. 
Furthermore, the Swedish model – in particular its antipathy to proven harm reduction 
measures – has had serious negative consequences that are almost never mentioned by 
its advocates. These include alarmingly high rates of hepatitis C among people who inject 
drugs, and a 600% increase in drug-induced deaths over the last 20 years.
Drug policy in Sweden: 
A repressive approach that increases harm
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Other facts further undermine the notion of a causal link 
between Sweden’s harsh drug law enforcement and its 
low levels of drug use:
• Although one of the main intentions behind 
criminalising drug use in 1993 was to deter young 
people from taking drugs,
9
 the lifetime use of any 
drug by 15-16-year-olds increased from 6% to 9% 
between 1995 and 2011
10
• While alcohol and tobacco use among young people 
is declining, illicit drug use is rising.Again, between 
1995 and 2011, last-month cannabis use among 
15-16-year-olds rose from 1% to 3%.
11
 The lifetime 
use of illicit drugs other than cannabis among this 
group has also increased, from 2% to 4%
12
• Among the general population (15-64-year-olds), 
drug use is rising. By two out of three measures 
(last-year and lifetime) cannabis use is now higher in 
Sweden than in Portugal, which decriminalised the 
personal possession of all drugs in 2001
13
• The proportion of the adult population that have 
used amphetamines in their lifetime has risen from 
1.4% in 1994 to 5% in 2008 (the latest year for which 
data are available)
14 
• The lifetime use of inhalants and non-prescription 
use of tranquillisers and sedatives among young 
people has risen from below the European average 
to above it
15
• Countries that follow a similarly punitive approach 
to Sweden’s (such as the UK and France) have 
significantly higher levels of drug use
Research suggests that the prevalence of drug use is driven 
primarily by a complex interaction of social, economic 
and cultural factors. Drug policy – and specifically drug 
law enforcement – has, at best, a marginal impact. 
Furthermore, the prevalence of problematic drug use 
correlates closely with high levels of social deprivation 
and social inequality – two measures that Sweden has 
historically fared very well on, since it is a rich country 
with a highly developed and generous welfare state 
(although in recent years wealth and income equality has 
worsened in the country). Sweden also has a somewhat 
socially conservative and abstemious culture, with 
relatively low levels of alcohol and tobacco use, and low 
levels of prescription drug use too.
But it is important to recognise that the effectiveness of 
drug policy should not be judged on the prevalence of use 
alone; there are a number of other indicators of success, 
and on these, Sweden fares substantially worse.
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Insufficient harm reduction
Sweden’s focus on achieving a drug-free society has 
created a hostile environment for interventions that 
seek to reduce the potential harms of drug use, rather 
than preventing or eliminating drug use itself.
16
 A major 
review published in 2011 recognised the need to scale 
up harm reduction,
17
 but the government failed to act 
on it because of its commitment to an abstinence-based 
approach. Campaigners hope that the government will 
revisit the recommendations, but currently the provision 
of harm reduction services remains poor by European 
standards, and by those recommended by the World 
Health Organization and the UNODC:
• There are only five needle exchanges in the whole 
country – and none in Gothenburg, the second-
largest city 
• Opiate substitution treatment (OST) is available, 
but is subject to heavy restrictions (particularly for 
methadone) 
• Some OST centres have a zero-tolerance stance on 
the use of other drugs, leading to fewer people being 
retained in treatment 
• OST in prison started as a pilot project in 2007 and 
was continued as a national programme in 2010, but 
coverage remains poor
18
• Sweden has no provision of safe injecting kits; no 
universal hepatitis B immunisation programme; 
limited availability of overdose information and 
overdose response training; and naloxone – which 
can counter the effects of opiate overdose – can only 
be obtained through medical personnel and is not 
available for take-home use
19
• Sweden has no supervised drug consumption 
facilities (such as those seen in Denmark, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Spain and Norway), and collects no 
data on harm reduction provision in recreational 
settings such as night clubs and festivals
Hepatitis C 
This lack of harm reduction services has led to some 
extremely negative outcomes. Rates of hepatitis C among 
injecting drug users in Sweden are some of the highest 
in Europe. Hepatitis C is a blood-borne virus that, left 
untreated, can lead to cirrhosis of the liver and death. The 
Stockholm needle exchange has recorded prevalence of 
the virus at 74% in 2013,
20
 yet no official, national-level 
estimate is available, meaning it is unclear how many 
people need treatment for it, or how many people need 
access to needle and syringe programmes (NSPs).
Drug-induced deaths
Further demonstrating that low levels of drug use do 
not necessarily equal low levels of drug-related harm, 
Sweden’s drug-induced mortality rate was 62.6 deaths 
per million in 2012, more than three times the European 
average of 17.1 deaths per million.
21
 In 2012, the drug-
induced mortality rate in Portugal – which complemented 
its decriminalisation policy with an expansion of harm 
reduction services – was just 2.3 deaths per million.
22 
Sweden’s is therefore 30 times higher.
Some progress has been made, however, as Sweden’s rate 
of overdose deaths has led some to recognise that a new 
approach is required. OST and NSP provision is certainly 
better than it was ten years ago, but is still not nearly 
enough. Political bureaucracy and the continued use of 
drug-free rhetoric remain a barrier to the comprehensive 
programmes needed, and have meant Sweden has 
been unwilling to support such programmes on the 
international stage. 
Sweden’s pursuit of a punitive, abstinence-based 
approach to drugs, coming at the expense of proven harm 
reduction services, has had negative consequences for the 
health and wellbeing of its drug-using population. These 
consequences would most likely be even more severe 
were it not for the country’s comprehensive health and 
social welfare system, as well as its culture of temperance. 
Ultimately, the case of Sweden emphasises that prevalence 
of drug use is only one measure of success – overall health 
harms cannot be ignored.   
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The current enforcement-based, UN-led drug 
control system is coming under unparalleled 
scrutiny over its failure to deliver a promised 
“drug-free world”, and for what the UN Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) describes as 
its negative “unintended consequences”. It 
is unacceptable that despite acknowledging 
these negative impacts, the UNODC does 
not include them in its flagship World Drug 
Report, and neither the UN nor its member 
states have meaningfully assessed whether 
these unintended consequences outweigh 
the intended consequences.
This report fills this gap by detailing the 
full range of these negative impacts of the 
drug war. It demonstrates that the current 
approach is creating crime, harming health 
and fatally undermining all “three pillars” 
of the UN’s work – peace and security, 
development, and human rights. Globally, 
alternative drug policy approaches are a 
growing reality, and this report also details 
the options for reform that could deliver 
better outcomes, including exploring 
decriminalisation and legal regulation.
The global prohibitionist consensus has 
broken, and cannot be fixed. Ultimately, this 
Alternative World Drug Report is intended to 
help policymakers shape what succeeds it.
The Count the Costs initiative, backed by over 100 NGOs worldwide, 
is calling on governments and the UN to count the costs of the war on 
drugs, and explore the alternatives based on the best possible evidence. 
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